On the Shores of Anarchy: Jacques Rancière in International Relations by Kyriacou, Michael
Page 0 of 278 
 
Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of a Doctorate in Politics 
 
 
On the Shores of Anarchy: Jacques Rancière 
in International Relations 
 
 
Michael Peter Kyriacou  
 
 
School of Politics, Philosophy and Language Communication 
Studies 
 
University of East Anglia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to 
recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived therefrom 
must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or extract must 
include full attribution. 
Page 1 of 278 
 
Abstract 
In this thesis I argue for the articulation of the work of Jacques Rancière to International Relations (IR) 
theory. In response to the fourth “debate” I show, using Rancière that ‘anarchy’ is the ordering 
principle (arkhè) of IR theory and that Rancière helps us to understanding how this ordering takes 
place and what ramifications it has for our understanding of politics in International Relations. The 
thesis thus seeks to make two contributions to the field of IR: firstly, a general demonstration of the 
applicability of Rancièrian thinking to IR via the concept of ‘anarchy’; secondly, a Rancièrian argument 
about what is to count as ‘politics’ for International Relations.  
My thesis is a work of theory. I start from looking at the broader literature, then work through 
Rancièrian theory, and finally move to highlight the role of anarchy in ordering IR. From this basis I 
articulate Rancière to IR through the mobilisation of his concept of ‘the distribution of the sensible’. I 
then work through the application of these ideas to an exemplary case study, that of migration in IR.  
I argue that a Rancièrian theory of international Relations enables a re-evaluation of the divisions 
caused by the fourth “debate”. It shows how anarchy acts as the field’s ordering principle (arkhè) 
and excavate how politics functions in IR theory. Overall, then, the thesis aims to develop a critical 
and post-positivist understanding of politics with the potential for overcoming the ordering of the 
field occasioned by the ‘fourth debate’ 
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Introduction 
This thesis is a work of theory seeking to articulate the political theory of Jacques Rancière to 
International Relations (IR). Articulating Rancière with post-positivist IR theory can, I argue, help us to 
understand the fourth debate and to reconsider the way in which anarchy operates as the organising 
principle of IR. I begin, in this introduction, by charting the position of my argumentation within the 
field of IR, explaining where my research will develop and contribute to current theorising, and where 
I will challenge IR conventions. I then discuss my contribution and explain further why reading 
Rancière into IR is important. In Chapter One I set out the key findings of the relevant literature both 
in IR and with regard to Rancière. After assessing the movement of anarchy throughout the great 
debates in Chapter Two I undertake a close reading of Waltz.  Then, in Chapters 3 and 4 I break down 
and explicate Rancièrian theory and, in applying it to IR, show that the concept of ‘anarchy’ is the 
ordering principle (arkhè) of IR theory. I argue here for my Rancièrian formulation of IR theory. In 
Chapters 5 and 6, I apply my theorisation to IR using migration as an exemplary case-study. 
Why Rancière?  
My contribution to IR is aimed at post-positivist IR Theory. Post-positivism broadly refers to a shift in 
the field to call to question the use of positivism, or “empiricist epistemology which grounds our 
knowledge of the world in justification by (ultimately brute) experience and thereby licensing 
methodology and ontology in so far as they are empirically warranted”.1 The second debate, or so-
called behavioural revolution in IR, had pitted the traditional or classical methods of IR against 
scientific methods, which ultimately won out. Post-positivism in IR then emerged from critical 
attention to the consequent dominance of behaviourism, and a preoccupation with metatheory, 
which opened, as Fierke and Jorgenson describe, space for a “celebration of difference” in IR theory.2 
                                                          
1 S. Smith, Positivism and Beyond In International Theory, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1996) pp. 17 
2 K. Fierke & E. Jorgensen, Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, (Routledge, New York, 
2001) pp. 6 
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While post-positivist scholarship in IR can be traced back to the 1980s, this space for difference has 
inspired IR scholars to challenge some of the core assumptions of IR theory and of how knowledge is 
produced in IR.3 During the 1990s post-positivist methods gained ground, although there was some 
preoccupation with defending such methods and ways of thinking about the world in IR, to the extent 
that metatheory still perhaps overshadowed the scholarship itself.4 As a result of this groundwork, in 
more recent years post-positivist methods, interpretivist epistemologies and critical theory have 
become more broadly accepted in the mainstream of IR theory. As my argument springs primarily out 
of the articulation between Rancière’s body of thought and my deployment of these ideas in an IR 
context I being with a justification of my selection of Rancière.  
I use Rancière for a variety of reasons. The first is the way in which Rancière conceptualises politics 
which gives us a definition of a paradoxical mode of action.5 Having an understanding of politics as an 
active process, that necessarily transcends the available subjectivities in the world is useful for IR 
Theory. It is useful as it gives us a location for politics which exceeds the already existent order(ing). 
The focus on politics as an activity is useful given the state of the field during/after the fourth “debate”. 
As I show in Chapter One, in the context of the fragmentation of the field it is in post-positivist IR 
theory that the most effective and interesting theorisation of IR is taking place. Rancière’s distinct 
approach to politics can, I show, speak to this movement and provide a valuable way of understanding 
politics within.  Of particular value and importance here, and this is a second reason for turning to 
Rancière, is his notion of the ‘distribution of the sensible’. I provide a comprehensive definition of this 
in Chapter Three but it is worth highlighting it’s important for my argumentation here. The distribution 
                                                          
3 M. Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming causal analysis (Cambridge Uni. Press, New York, 
2008) 
4 See S. Smith, K. Booth & M. Zalewski, International Theory: Positivist and Beyond, (Cambridge Uni. Press, 
Cambridge, 1996), K. Holsti, The Study of International Politics During the Cold War, in The Eighty Years’ Crisis: 
International Relations 1919-1999, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1998) pp. 17-46, C. Wright, Philosophy of 
Social Science and International Relations, in Handbook of International Relations, (Sage, London, 2002) pp. 23-
51 & K. Fierke & E. Jorgensen, Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, (Routledge, New York, 
2001) 
5 J. Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, Theory and Event, Vol. 5, no. 3, (2001) pp. 1-7 
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of the sensible grounds Rancière’s argumentation in the world of the sensory.6 While focusing on the 
realm of the apprehensible is not unique to Rancière, it is of particular relevance for IR helping us to 
see the apprehensible as the terrain of the arguments we make in IR. In this respect my argument runs 
alongside post-positivist IR while also offering to it potentially useful understandings of its own 
project. This is so because the distribution of the sensible is not just a way of understanding the 
aesthetic terrain of politics in IR post fourth debate. It is also about charting a way outside of thinking 
about ontology as the grounding assumptions of IR. Critique of ontology is not unique to my argument, 
but I hope to show that Rancière helps us to think about the way in which we understand ontology as 
grounding positionality in the fourth “debate” in IR, and to problematize that focus. In articulating 
Rancière to IR I show how might separate out ontology from its location as the grounding and 
organising force for politics in IR.  
Rancière, and the key Rancièreian concepts are discussed in full in Chapters Three and Four. But it is 
worthwhile considering here how his work complements but also departs from that of his 
contemporaries and others who address related or similar issues, and so also what is distinct about 
his work when compared to other modes of theorisation more common in IR. In looking at the 
differences between these post-positivist theorists I want in particular to chart points of commonality 
around the notion of lack/surplus but also differences in how they organise their theoretical 
understanding.  
I begin by looking at Rancière in contrast to the theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Laclau 
and Mouffe in their book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy give a powerful account of the way in which 
the conditions of our realities condition the emergence of our shared social and politics identities.7 In 
particular they give us an understanding of a radical democracy,8 which they developed in later works.9 
                                                          
6 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 2 
7 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, (Verso, London, 2001) 
8 Ibid. pp. 152-159 
9 Laclau fleshes out his understanding of democracy and populism in On Populist Reason (Verso, London, 2005), 
The Rhetorical Foundations of Society (Verso, London, 2014). Mouffe has expounded her theorisation across he 
work The Return of the Political (Verso, London, 2005), The Democractic Paradox (Verso, London, 2005), 
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The way in which Laclau and Mouffe organise their conception of democracy is at once both agonistic 
and communicative. They are looking in their analysis of democracy to chart not only how it relates to 
a function of politics but how it acts as the foundation of that understanding of politics. In reading this 
understanding of politics and democracy as ‘post-foundational’10 we can see distinctions between 
both Laclau and Mouffe. Mouffe’s focus on the delineation of the political itself, drawing heavily on 
the work of Schmitt11, is particularly striking.12 Laclau’s work extends semiology into an understanding 
of discourse and political arrangement that has implications for thinking politics.13 Marchart elucidates 
this in the context of his own analysis of the Heideggarian categories of ontological and ontic 
understood as the political and politics,14 which he then directly contrasts to the Rancierian 
approach.15 Here the post-foundational notion of democracy is made possible through a combination 
of a linguistic turn and a distinction between the ontic and the ontological. As Marchart argues the 
distinction between the ontic and ontological and politics and the political connects theoretical 
organisation to political theorisation/theorisation of politics. This has been useful in producing a post-
positivist IR that is critical of the state and state discourses16 but it also produces an understanding of 
IR that is grounded within an ontological/ontic frame. This is problematic and a location through which 
                                                          
Agonsitics (Verso, London, 2013) and For A Left Populism (Verso, London, 2018). This list is not exhaustive but is 
designed to give an insight into the works presented by these authors.  
10 O. Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau, (Uni. 
Of Edinburgh Press,  Edinburgh, 2004) pp. 134-154 
11See C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, (Uni. Of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007) and Political Theology (Uni. 
Of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006) 
12 C. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, (Verso, London, 2005) pp. 117-128 
13 E. Laclau, Emancipation(s), (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 36-66  
14 See, O. Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau, 
(Uni. Of Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh, 2004) pp. 18-25, O. Marchart, The Other Side of Order: Towards a Political 
Theory of Terror and Dislocation, Parallax, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2003) pp. 102-111 and O. Marchart Institution and 
Dislocation: Philosophical Roots of Laclau’s Theory of Space and Antagonism, Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal 
of Social Theory, Vol. 14, No. 3, (2014) pp. 271-282 
15 See O. Marchart Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau, 
(Uni. Of Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh, 2004) pp. 7 and S. Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière, (Uni. Of Oxford Press, 
Oxford, 2013) pp.50-53 for a discussion of this relation.  
16 O. Marchart, The Other Side of Order: Towards a Political Theory of Terror and Dislocation, Parallax, Vol. 9, 
No. 1, (2003) pp. 102-111 
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I begin to see value in adopting Rancière’s approach as it challenges and gets us out of this 
Heideggarian understanding and relationship between the ontological and the ontic.  
While this reading is convincing and productive I argue for an approach that severs Marchart’s thread 
joining the ontic/ontological and the politics/political. The Rancierian (ac)count shifts the weight of 
politics away from this singular reliance on ontology and enables us open up a space for challenging 
the relationship between politics and ontology and for instead conceiving of politics grounded in 
aesthesis as opposed to ontology.17 This then enables a conception of politics that is separate from 
the idea of foundation but is instead related to the particularity of subjectivation as grounded by an 
aesthetic arrangement.18 I argue that this is substantially different from the account of democracy or 
politics presented by either Laclau, Mouffe or Marchart. As we will see, the former understands 
politics as (mis)counting and as the subjectivation of the part which has no part. In reading Rancière 
into IR, as opposed to Mouffe, Laclau or Marchart, I argue that we get a novel framework, freed from 
strictures of ontology, able to break with the vocabulary and structure of semiology and which is 
aligned with post-positivist IR but also potentially transformative of these relations.  
With this in mind we can also compare Rancière’s approach to that of another theorist who has been 
widely read across a multitude of theoretical approaches into IR: Agamben.19 In works such as Homo 
                                                          
17 See J. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, (Verso, London, 2014)  and J. Rancière J. Rancière, On the Shores of 
Politics, (Verso, London, 2007)   
18 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 39 
19 For an indicative as opposed to exhaustive examples of Agamben’s translation into IR see: J. Edkins and V. Pin-
Fat, Through the Wire: Relations of Power and Relations of Violence, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, (2005) pp. 1-24, E. Dauphinee, War Crimes and the Ruin of Law, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1, (2008) pp. 49-67, A. Wedderburn, Cartooning the Camp: Aesthetic 
Interruption and the Limits of Possibility, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 47, No. 2, (2018) pp. 
169-189, C. Sylvester, Whither the International at the End of IR, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 
Vol. 35, No. 3, (2007) pp. 551-573, C. Sylvester, Bare Life as a Development/Postcolonial Problematic, The 
Geographic Journal, Vol. 172, No. 1, (March 2006) pp. 66-77, S. Prozorov, The Other as Past and Present: Beyond 
the Logic of ‘Temporal Othering’ in IR Theory, Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, (2011) pp. 1273-1293, J. 
Atteberry, Turning in the Widening Gyre: History, Corporate Accountability, and Transitional Justice in the 
Postcolony, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, (Winter 2019) pp. 333-374, T. Moore, 
International Relations as Juridical Life: Rethinking ‘the International’ in International Theory, Global Society, No. 
27, Vol. 4, (2013) pp. 421-437, M. Lacy, Intellectuals, International Relations and the Constant Emergency, Third 
World Quaterly, Vol. 32, No. 9, (2011) pp. 1673-1690, P. Owens, Reclaiming ‘Bare Life’?: Against Agamben on 
Refugees, International Relations, Vol. 23, Vol. 4, (2009) pp. 567-582, H. Mustafa Tagma, Homo Sacre vs. Homo 
Soccer Mom: Reading Agamben and Foucault in the War on Terror, Alternatives, No. 34, (2009), pp. 407-435, E. 
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Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life20 Agamben has been a key source for some excellent post-
positivist scholarship in IR. His springs partly from his spatial-temporal rendering of sovereignty and 
exclusion and partly from his focus on power, and the wide-ranging application of his work , especially 
the deployment of his understanding of bio-politics and of his central notion of bare life, has provided 
insightful scholarship. The findings of scholarship that draws on/from Agamben and my own 
argumentation are not dissimilar. Both look to break down and interrogate the core principles of IR 
and both open a new way of reading through these assumptions. The difference in my Rancièrian 
approach, and the reason for selecting it, comes from the distinctiveness of the concept of 
‘distribution of the sensible’ as opposed to that of sovereign exceptionality. While Agamben’s 
theorisation rests upon and problematizes the spatial and temporal relationship between the state, 
sovereign and population the Rancièrian framework is organised in light of a fundamental equality 
linked with the distribution of the sensible. Thus the excessive element of the system is understood 
not as bio-political bare life, but as ‘the part which has no part’. Both approaches look that the way in 
which fundamental aspects of the international/political order are rendered superlative to it, but the 
Rancièreian characterisation grounds the always already mis-counted part which has no part as the 
location for political action and does not subsume it into the framework of bio-politics. This enables a 
certain flexibility in the reading I can present of political subjectivation in IR – one that isn’t always 
necessarily tied into a relationship to a particular temporal articulation of sovereignty.  
This discussion of Agamben brings me around to my final theoretical comparison: that of Rancière to 
Foucault.  Foucault has of course been read into and across a multitude of theoretical approaches in 
                                                          
Fraser and K. Hutchings, Remnants and Revenants: Politics and Violence in the Work of Agamben and Derrida, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 13, (2011) pp. 127-144, K. Hutchings, Time and World 
Politics: Thinking the Present, (Manchester Uni. Press, Manchester, 2008), S. Prozorov, Generic Universalism in 
World Politics: Beyond International Anarchy and the World State, International Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2009) pp. 
215-247, A. McNevin, Ambivalence and Citizenship: Theorising the Political Claims of Irregular Migrants, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, (2013) pp. 182-200, N. Vaughan-Williams, The 
Generalised Bio-Political Border? Re-Conceptualising the Limits of Sovereign Power, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 35, (2009) pp. 729-749   
20 G. Agamben, Homo Sacre, (Stanford Uni. Press, California, 1998) 
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IR21 although his primary contributions to the field of IR have been through his analyses of power and 
population as well as archaeology and genealogy. Of particular note is work which draws both 
Agamben’s conception of bare life and Foucault’s bio-politics through and around Achille Mbembe’s 
notion of Necro-Politics.22 Foucault, then, has been central to the way in which IR has thought critically 
about the circulation of power within the international system but also about its own discourses of 
knowledge and the ways in which the activities of knowledge production are conditioned. Foucault 
has been essential in reading through the reflexive move in critical IR theory.  
To explain how and why I elect to use Rancière as opposed to Foucault a few distinctions that need to 
be drawn. While Foucault is heavily influential on not only Rancière’s conceptualisation of the Police23, 
                                                          
21For and indicative but far from exhaustive list of examples see: J. Der Derian, The (s)Pace of International 
Relations: Simulation, Surveillance and Speed, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, (1990) pp. 295-310, B. J. 
Steele, Of ‘Witches Brews’ and Scholarly Communities: The Dangers and Promise of Academic Parrhesia, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1, (March 2010) pp. 49-68, D. Chandler, Forget Foucault, 
Forget Foucault, Forget Foucault…, International Political Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2010) pp. 205-7, G. Shani, De-
Colonising Foucault, International Political Sociology, Vol.  4, No. 2, (2010) pp. 210-212, F. Debrix, We Other IR 
Foucaultians, International Political Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2010) pp. 197-199, P. Beaulieu, Bypassing the 
Reflexivity Trap: IR’s Disciplinary Status and the Politics of Knowledge, International Relations, Vol. 29, No. 2, 
(2015) pp. 263-266, J. Záhora, Between Sovereignty and Biopolitics : The Case of Enhanced Interrogation 
Techniques, Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2, (2014) pp. 87-110, L. 
Ansems de Vries, Politics of (in)Visibility: Governance-Resistance and the Constitution of Refugee Subjectivities 
in Malaysia, Review of International Studies, Vol. 42, No. 5, (2016) pp. 876-894, L. Zanotti, Reorienting IR: 
Ontological Entanglement, Agency and Ethics, International Studies Review, Vol. 19, (2017) pp. 362-380, O. 
Ditrych, Forget Hobbes, International Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3, (May 2016) pp. 285-302, J. Selby, Engaging Foucault: 
Discourse, Liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR, International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 3, (2007) 
pp. 324-345, M. Dillon, Afterlife: Living Death to Political Spirituality, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 
Vol. 42, No. 1, (2013) pp. 114-134, K. J. Koddenbrock, Strategies of Critique in International Relations: From 
Foucault and Latour Towards Marx, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 2, (2014) pp. 243-
266, A. Wedderburn, Tragedy, Genealogy and Theories of International Relations, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 24, No. 1, (2018) pp. 177-197, S. Borg, Genealogy as Critique in International 
Relations: Beyond the Hermeneutics of Baseless Suspicion, Journal of International Political Theory, Vol. 14, No. 
1, (2018) pp. 41-59, S. Hamilton, Foucault’s End of History: The Temporality of Governmentality and its End in 
the Anthropocene, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, (2019) pp. 371-395, A. 
Gkoutzioulis, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: On Foucault’s Notions of Power, Subjectivity, 
Freedom and Their (mis)Understanding in IR, Global Society, Vol. 32, No. 1, (2018) pp. 88-110, M. Richter-
Montpetit, Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Sex (in IR) but were Afraid to Ask: The ‘Queer Turn’ in 
International Relations, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No.2, (2018) pp. 220-240. 
22 See, A. Mbembe, On the Postcolony, (Uni. Of California Press, London, 200),  A. Mbembe, Necropolitics, Public 
Culture, Vol. 15, No. 1, (2003) pp. 11-40, M. Syrotinski, ‘Genealogical Misfortunes’: Achille Mbembe’s (Re-
)Writing of Postcolonial Africa, Paragraph, Vo. 35, No. 3, (2012) pp. 407-420, M. W. Wright, Necropolitics, 
Narcopolitics, and Femicide: Gendered Violence on the Mexico-U.S. Border, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 
and Society, Vol. 36, No. 3, (2011) pp. 707-731 
23 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 28 
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aesthetic order24 and subjectivation25 Rancière establishes a separation between power and politics.26 
While accepting that, as Foucault showed, police order is not confined to specialised institutions, 
Rancière nevertheless insists that nothing is political in itself merely because power relationships are 
at work in it. For a thing to be political, it must give rise to a meeting of police logic and egalitarian 
logic that is never set up in advance. He goes on to explain that, for example, a strike may or may not 
give rise to politics. It doesn’t do so if it is only about reforms to wages or management style. It does 
so only when it reconfigures the relationships that determine the workplace in its relation to the 
community. My argument with regard to the potential of Rancière’s work for theorising the politics of 
IR is that it makes possible an approach not necessarily grounded in the analysis of the flow of power 
throughout IR but which, rather, looks to understand the aesthetic scene which constitutes the 
formation of IR. While this is a slight difference it is an important one. My selection of Rancière as a 
theoretical frame enables a reading of politics and subjectivation that, while aligned with the 
Foucauldian conception, enables an understanding of the political that isn’t orientated towards 
power, opening up a potential site for reading politics in IR as constituted through subjectivation that 
is not oriented towards that of power relations.  
Across these brief engagements with different thinkers who have been utilised as frameworks for 
thinking IR within post-positivist IR we can see not only the modes of thought I am aiming to write 
with but also how my argument and approach offers a useful addition to post-positivist IR. In my 
movement away from ontology as the core organising factor in a politics of IR as well as my focus on 
subjectivation and (ac)counting as the source of politics I present an argument that highlights the use 
value of my articulation of Rancière to IR.  
 
                                                          
24 J. Rancière, Mute Speech, (Columbia Uni. Press, New York, 1998) 
25 S. Chambers, The Lessons Of Rancière, (Oxford Uni. Press, Oxford, 2013) pp. 98-101 
26 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 32 
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Limitations of Rancière  
It goes without saying that Rancière cannot provide everything a theory of IR requires and that use of 
his work in the field requires developing a novel articulation rather than simply applying his ideas 
without modification. This is particularly clear in relation to three main issues: firstly, and primarily, 
Rancière’s relationship to ontology; secondly, his understanding of what it means to be a speaking and 
thinking being and the specificity of the human; thirdly, his focus on the polis, the ‘nation-state’ rather 
than the international.  In reflecting on these limitations I am in agreement with Chambers’ 
understanding of the utility of the application of Rancière. Chambers says of his own interpretation, 
that he has ‘started to push Rancière’s conception of politics past itself, to gesture in directions that 
frequently exceed Rancière’s concerns and sometimes work against his intentions.’27 
As I look show in more detail in Chapter Three, Rancière has actively tried to distance his theorisation 
from the deployment of ontology as the grounding principle28 or location for his critical work.29 Indeed, 
we can see ontology as one of the targets of Rancière’s critical work at multiple points and he is 
particularly critical of the way in which ontology is related to political theory. This is important as one 
of the contributions I hope to make is a consideration of how, in IR, this move away from ontology can 
help us to conceptualise politics. But there are tensions in Rancière’s own thought around ontology, 
and, as I will work through later, philosophy is a mode of constraint for the writing of this thesis but 
also my own voice, argument and understanding.  
The crucial distinction Rancière introduces is that between aisthesis and ontology, a fracture we can 
trace back to his split from Althusser,30 and which shows Rancière pushing on the social-political 
                                                          
27 S. Chambers, The Lessons Of Rancière, (Oxford Uni. Press, Oxford, 2013) pp. 157 
28 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 217 
29 See J. Rancière, A Few Remarks of the Method of Jacques Rancière,  Parallax, Vol.15, No. 3, (2009) pp.114-
123, Bram Leven, Heteroreductives- Rancière’s Disagreement with Ontology, Parallax, Vol.15, No. 3, (2009) pp. 
50-62, J. Deranty, Rancière and Contemporary Political Ontology, Theory and Event, Vol. 6, No. 4, (2003), S. Zizek, 
The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, (Verso, London, 1999) pp. 172 
30 J. Rancière, Althusser’s Lesson, (Continuum, London, 2011) 
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tension between the theorisation of politics/aesthetics and the actuality of politics.  As we shall see, 
equality is a fundamental assumption of his theory but understood not as ontological but rather as a 
non-ontological aesthetic assumption.31 His alternative way of thinking about grounding is aesthesis 
and part of what I want to show in the thesis is the benefit of this way of thinking, for IR. But there is 
a problem here in so far as this distances Rancièrian terminology from the language of IR in the fourth 
“debate”. That is a problem of translatability which I am trying to address by writing my own 
Rancièrian framework of IR into post-positivist IR. The latter is of course interested in looking at the 
ways in which ontology conditions and structures IR. In stepping away from this philosophical-
theoretical schema Rancière presents an approach that I argue is interesting and useful, but requires 
reworking in order to be apprehensible to IR. This is a limitation for Rancière’s theory and one which 
is at tension with my articulation as it means there is often a break between the language and 
theoretical stakes of IR’s argument and that of Rancière. While I do touch on movements in post-
positivist IR to think aisthesis as both a location for politics, these approaches don’t necessitate 
aisthesis in a similar position structurally to ontology but rather as a wellspring of political and social 
meaning. In making the articulation to IR I necessarily reform and reorganise Rancière’s work with my 
own thought.   
As Chambers explains, Rancière argues that politics cannot be deduced from any ontological 
principle32 and the majority of his work is written polemically against a notion of ontology as grounded 
politics (although Disagreement is the least congruent with this tone).33 Rancière’s break from 
ontology, as Chambers also argues, is characterised through the distinction between reality and the 
potential of politics to be inferred from this reality.34 Rancière objects to the movement between a 
                                                          
31 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 32-39 
32 S. Chambers, Jacques Rancière and the Problem of Pure Politics, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 10, 
No. 3, (2011) pp. 324  
33 S. Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière, (Oxford Uni. Press, Oxford, 2013) pp. 193 
34 S. Chambers, Jacques Rancière and the Problem of Pure Politics, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 10, 
No. 3, (2011) pp. 324 
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general theory of the subject and the conditions of being as a being, and politics35 and which he 
polemically characterises as a “superpower”.36 The way in which a general theory of the subject or a 
general theory of being becomes the ordaining force behind a politics is itself, for Rancière, a political 
action. It is a way in which the ontological becomes suffused with the weight, not only of particular 
assumptions but also of a conclusion. This is not to levy the accusation that ontologies already smuggle 
in the politics they suppose to predicate but, rather, that the position of drawing on ontology or any 
kind of general theory of the subject itself for a politics is inherently anti-political. This can be seen 
when we think the meta-political, and the relationship between Rancierian thought and philosophy, 
which I turn to later. However in terms of the specific limitation I am looking at here my concern is the 
success of divorcing Rancière’s own thought from a general theory of the subject or ontology.   
There are times in his work when Rancière does seem to be relying on schema which provides general 
theories of the subject. His notion of aesthetic regimes provides a structure, albeit one that isn’t 
historically specific or monocausal, from which generalisations can be made.37 This notion gives us a 
structure, one pregnant with void and surplus, but a structure with which art can be historically 
cognised and categorised nonetheless. This is a good example of where the limitations of Rancière can 
be recognised. His structures while liminal in their structuring are still ordering. Their reflexivity with 
regard to their own contingency and separation from the generalisation or “super-powers” does not 
occlude their geometric relation to Rancière’s thought. That is to say, there is here a tension between 
the ways in which he critiques ordering as a historical process and his provision of his own categories 
of order. Rancière’s whole understanding of politics is predicated on subjectivation in relation to social 
wrong.38  This modality of wrong and subjectivation are themselves tied up into a historical 
theorisation of the subject that is both ongoing and articulated in the majority of theoretical literature 
                                                          
35 J. Rancière, A Few Remarks of the Method of Jacques Rancière,  Parallax, Vol.15, No. 3, (2009) pp.117 
36 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 217 
37 See J. Rancière, Mute Speech, (Columbia Uni. Press, New York, 1998) pp. 15-16, J. Rancière, The Aesthetic 
Unconscious, (Polity Press, London, 2009) and J. Rancière, Aisthesis, (Verso, London, 2013) pp. xii & 225-262 
38 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. x 
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to ontology. While Rancière gives us an approach with a different flavour it is still congruent with that 
literature. This gives Rancière’s argumentation and theorisation an, as it were, atavistic character; the 
vestigial ontology he has sought to move beyond reappears and colours not only the concepts 
Rancière deploys but also his formal style and theoretical organisation. This inherent tension in, 
between his arguments or claims and the hangovers of their past with regard to ontology become a 
limiting factor. This is of particular interest to my argument in this thesis. As I seek to articulate 
Rancière’s theory to IR, and to speak to post-positivist IR, I necessarily have to smooth the transition 
between the different and competing tensions both within Rancière’s thought and that of IR. This 
tension is also the location for my own voice to be heard within the thesis. I have to perform the 
chiropractics of aligning Rancière’s understanding of, and objection to, ontology, with IR’s 
understanding without carrying over the fatal herniation of Rancière’s own internal tensions. This is 
where my own voice and understanding shape the way in which Rancière relates to my thesis. For me, 
these  tensions, central to Rancière’s understanding of ontology, are not terminal for his arguments 
but, on the contrary, a location of what makes them interesting while also something to more on from 
in order to successfully articulation of my theoretical framework to IR.  
In this respect, it is important to understand how Rancière’s critique of ontology is conceptualised 
within a break from the idea of philosophy. While Rancière is read in our universities as part of theory 
or philosophy courses he argues specifically against a notion of political-philosophy.39 This is put most 
clearly in Rancière’s indictment of Plato’s politics project as an ‘anti-maritime’ polemic.40 This 
approach characterises philosophy as a means to order and constrain the excessive world of the 
subject and of politics.41 There is a categorical distinction between the way in which philosophy relates 
to the political/politics and the theoretical orientation that Rancière gives through his theory. This 
                                                          
39 See J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010), J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, 
London, 1995), J. Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, (Duke Uni. Press, London, 2003) and J. Rancière, On 
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40 J. Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 1 
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critique is borne out in the distinction of metapolitics from archipolitics or parapolitics. Metapolitics is 
for Rancière the end point of political-philosophy and a particular means of eliminating politics.42 This 
is clear throughout Disagreement and The Philosopher and his Poor where Rancière gives us a spicy 
polemical take that cuts against any relation between philosophy and politics. It sets these modes of 
activity as diametrically opposed to each other. Part of the previous limitation and tension around 
ontology I spoke about can be derived from this separation out of philosophy from politics. This is 
more than just a position Rancière takes but a tension as he himself often identifies and is identified 
as a philosopher.43 This is important for thinking the limitations of Rancière as it gives us a sense of 
the internal tension between the approach Rancière puts forwards and the role he ascribes to 
philosophy. This tension runs deeper than consanguinity as it is a relation that is drawn out explicitly 
by Rancière himself and the critique he is making. Rancière is then at once a critic of philosophy and a 
philosopher. The tension between these positions is worked through across many of his different 
works.  
My thinking in relation to this tension is conditioned through my own reading and argumentation.  For 
my articulation and my thesis the broader conceptions and critique between philosophy and 
Rancière’s own position are a board against which my own understanding and voice are sounded. 
While there is this tension between Rancière’s own status, both personal and disciplinary, and his 
work my thinking is an attempt to move beyond this through my own application of the theory to IR. 
There is a way in which the philosophical orientation of Rancière’s work shifts when I apply it to IR. 
My own argumentation and voice here then condition the mechanism for the theories application in 
IR. This helps to neutralise the tension in philosophy through bringing Rancière into IR. In drawing out 
the breaks between the disciplinary and philosophical my articulation explores this limitation and 
tension. Through the application of Rancière to IR I am also forwarding that same critique of 
philosophy as ordering however the resonance of the tension is diminished through my own subject-
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position as author, as well as the argument I forward in my thesis. I don’t adopt the position of the 
philosopher. Instead I speak as a theorist of and to IR. In particular in speaking to post-positivist IR, I 
aim to dis-articulate myself from the heady draughts of philosophy and express thoughts that are 
reflexive in their relationship to their organisation and argumentation. In working through this 
limitation I am partly dealing with an issue of the feeling of my thesis. How it can and should be read 
and with what intonation. In charting this limitation here I hope to highlight my own dissatisfaction 
with the aisthesis of philosophy and ordering and open up the possibility of theory. My voice in this 
thesis is trying to sound with the timbre of, if not of the political edge of my thought, then at least in 
the direction of that edge. While, undoubtedly, I am chained in part to the vocabulary, convention and 
understanding of philosophical argumentation in post-positivist IR, I aim to speak with a critical, 
catachrestic tongue.  
This matter of voice connects with another series of potential limitations, linked with Rancière’s 
conception of thinking/speaking beings. Despite this linkage with being, the limitation I am working 
through here is not one of ontology but, rather, of the way in which thinking/speaking are understood 
in Rancière’s work and how this sets a limit for a thinking of where politics can occur. I work through 
this limitation to set my own understanding in contrast to Rancière’s as a location not only for further 
work outside this thesis but a staging ground for it.  
Rancière draws his understanding of thinking and speaking primarily out of the work of Aristotle44 and 
from the latter’s distinction between voice and speech; the discrepancy between indication and 
expression. This sense experience correlates with a dual mode of sensing. The sense of voice, 
pleasure/suffering, and the sense of speech - justice/injustice. While Rancière breaks down this 
assertion in detail45 it is the general underlying distinction which becomes the basis for (ac)counting 
people out of the sensible. The way in which the Police order renders people outside of social and 
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political relations is through the reduction of the fact that they always and already possess speech to 
the lowing of voice. This, for Rancière, is the key mechanism by which people are counted into and 
out of the distribution of the sensible. It is in fact what is constituted as within the sensory community 
as we see in his examples of the Scythians and Plebeians.46 This distinction is not the clear 
linguistic/biological one that Aristotle make but, instead, already a sensory one. There is already a 
distinction between feeling a blow and the “injury” caused by that blow as Rancière argues.47 As the 
stakes of the sublimation of our existence as subjects who always already possess the capacity for 
speech and act on that capacity for speech48 then it is essential that politics is actioned at the level of 
speech. 
A problem here is that Rancière considers speech as particularly human and this anthropocentrism 
has been contested in the literature on him. Chambers opens up a space by which we can think 
Rancière as arguing for language as never being possessed by the subject,49 so that we can think of his 
work as a useful tool in breaking from an anthropocentric conception of language.50 Chambers, 
through his reading of ‘literarity’, gives us an (ac)count of Rancière that potentially can escape the 
linkage between political subjects and human subjects.51 While I agree with Chambers that there is 
fertile ground in this mode of thinking about Rancièreian thought it is never purely within Rancière’s 
work itself. As Bennett highlights, Rancière is not interested in expanding the political beyond the 
human.52 There is a wealth of literature which reads Rancière not as providing us with a means of 
                                                          
46 Ibid. pp. 12-13 & 23-25 
47 Ibid. pp. 2 
48 This has been the running theme throughout Rancière’s more “historical” work. We can see him chart this 
process historically in the works: J. Rancière, Proletarian Nights: Workers’ Dream in Nineteenth-Century France, 
(Verso, London, 2015), J. Rancière, Staging the People: The Proletarian and his Double, (Verso, London, 2011), J. 
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51 Ibid. pp. 98-122 
52 J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, (Duke Uni. Press, London,2010) pp. 105-7 
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escaping from the anthropocentric but as still bound up within it.53 This debate around the 
anthropocentric reading of thought/speech in Rancière is a limit for my thesis in two ways. The first is 
that it draws out a tension between the subject and its referent. This is of particular importance as IR 
considers what can be (ac)counted as a subject within the international but also where within post-
positivist IR Rancière can be articulated. The second issue is that it establishes a horizon for the limits 
of my project and for what and to whom my thesis and argument can be made. My reading and 
position on the anthropocentrism of Rancière’s work, in which I side with Chambers, is a tension 
against which I write. This tension puts me directly in contrast to Rancière’s own reading of his 
theoretical and political project. While he may not intend for the reading of his work to escape the 
confines of humanity or the polis, my project inherently transgresses these intentions and boundaries.  
Thirdly, and more briefly, it is important to note an initial tension between the terrain and orientation 
of Rancière’s own thought and the discipline of IR. Rancière’s framework has always been the site of 
the polis. The rhetorical scenes painted for us in Disagreement are always insular to the state: the 
Aventine succession from Rome54, the Scythian rebellion55 and the demonstrations of 1968.56 These 
scenes are always tied at the level of the subjectivation to a singular state or Police order. For Rancière 
politics is generally considered at the level by of, in the language of IR, the Nation-State.  This is 
important. For an orthodox reading of Rancière the distribution of the sensible is related to a shared 
social world. This shared social world is apprehensible and produces/presumes the level of the Nation-
State/Polis. Part of the work of this thesis is that of establishing how Rancière’s concepts, formed at 
the level of the Nation-State/Polis, can be taken to the level of the international.  
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While it may seem odd to start this thesis by looking at the problems of my theoretical approach I 
have done so to highlight where and how I aim to move beyond them: to establish my own voice 
amongst the clamour of the theory I articulate. These limitations are the locations through and against 
which I am able to speak. They are not problems for my argument but rather places where I can move 
beyond and unfold my own reading and understanding of the key concepts. In thinking through these 
tensions and limitations I have not shown why an approach to using Rancière is hopeless but rather 
that is it hopeful. I have justified not only the use value of Rancière to my thesis but also highlighted 
the areas in which I am in disagreement with him and aim to go beyond him.  
Positionality in the Field 
Having articulated both the reasons for seeking to apply a Rancièreian theorisation to IR, and the 
limitations and challenges in doing so, I want now to look at how and where my work sits within the 
field of IR more generally – where I build on existing theory, and where I call to question some of the 
key ways of thinking in IR. As will become clear, I am writing in relation to the fourth debate and in 
particular addressing those post-structuralists most focused on radical contingency. This is not to be 
read as a criticism or bracketing out of the concerns of normative critical IR but rather to make clear 
the reach of my claims and argumentation in the thesis.  
Thematically, research in post-positivist IR is conditioned by and considers the radical contingency of 
IR theory while working through and thinking different logics of inclusion/exclusion. Rancière, I argue, 
supplements such themes but also highlights absences in our thinking of them. For example, Ashley’s 
work57 has provided a site of much discussion and debate within post-positivist and in particular post-
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structuralist IR theory58 and has been read as essential to the development of post-positivist IR 
theory.59 I am writing along a similar line to that of Ashley. As I discuss later in the thesis his breakdown 
of anarchy in the field is influential on both my characterisation and understanding of anarchy in IR.60 
I want to dissent from and disrupt the hegemonic constellation outside of post-positivist IR. In this 
respect both the approach I forward and the argument I make across this thesis can be seen as writing 
towards to the work of Ashley. However, as Weber highlights, Ashley is often constructed as focused 
partially on the disruption of mainstream IR, although of course his work is always already constitutive 
as much as it is disruptive.61 My argument, although it directly references and seeks to break down 
mainstream IR, especially in both the literature review and chapter two, is more concerned with 
opening up a space for post-positivist IR than it is to further critique mainstream IR.  
We can see a similar relationship that my argument has to Ashley in my relationship Walker. He too is 
a key source for post-structural IR and I work through his thinking in more detail later in the thesis and 
at multiple locations.62 I have been especially influenced by his theorisation of sovereignty and 
especially by his insight that IR is a location of political theory. Indeed, underlying my writing is the 
same thought that IR is both subject to and object of politics. I have also been influenced by the work 
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of thinkers such as Sylvester63, Dingli64 and Shepard.65 While different from each other they have each 
been critical in orienting my approach towards thinking and understanding the role of subjectivation 
in IR as well as the constitution of the field itself. Sylvester’s division of the field has been tremendously 
helpful in my thinking and writing66 however she is also positioned in part against the theoretical 
movement and blind spots of the kind of theory I am doing.67 Dingli likewise gives a clear and potent 
account of some the benefits of thinking and reading Rancière into IR.68 However the deployment of 
her reading of Rancière is something I come back to later in the thesis in order to show how my 
interpretation, argument and voice have a different frame and goals. This difference is about how out 
work is orientated and organised with regards to IR theory. Shepard’s reading of both the aesthetic 
and political character of IR has also grounded and organised my orientation towards the field 
although the Rancièrian approach is in some tension with this.  
At this point I look at how my argument fits into the larger domain of post-positivist IR theory. While 
writing to post-positivist IR theory my orientation and contribution is most clearly articulated to three 
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sub-fields of post-positivist IR: Narrative, Critical Feminist, and Post-Structural IR theory (distinctions 
which are not absolute within the scholarship and which often move between these “boundaries” but 
which have value in orientating our thinking). My thesis’s literature review explores this in more detail, 
but it is helpful to outline some of the relevant work here.69 
With regard to Narrative IR Theory, the Journal of Narrative Politics in particular is emblematic of a 
space of political potential in IR, whereby the unique take on how to do academic scholarship in IR can 
be considered political in the Rancièrian sense,70 in ways which might be illuminated by my arguments 
about the redistribution of the sensible. However, there are tensions here as evidenced by the journal 
and my own methodological orientation. These tensions are clear to see between how my own 
methodology in this thesis is theoretical whereas the journal has a much wider and critical basis in 
method. The second literature in IR towards which I am writing is Critical Feminist IR Theory. This body 
of work highlights the inability of the field to see the impact of IR in and on/across the “international” 
and IR’s own construction, along aspects of particular gendered social power and political experience. 
My argument offers a distinct conception of the kind of ordering of the sensory which enables us to 
explicate how the order(ing) of the field along the lines of anarchy has divided its approach into Police 
and political (ac)counts. I offer a contribution which highlights, without recourse to ontological 
assumption, the articulation between a Rancièrian understanding of politics and the critique offered 
by critical Feminist IR Theory.71 There is, of course a tension here, particularly with more liberal 
                                                          
69 It is important to note that these are not given as an exhaustive or complete list of potential politics in IR. As I 
will argue later in the thesis, such an understanding would be nonsensical. Rather I have selected these authors 
as examples given their centrality to the respective literatures.  
70 O. Löwenheim, ‘Back to Hebron’s Tegart Fort: An Autoethnography of Shame, Love, Loss and the De-
Securitisation of the Self’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2015) pp. 133-149; Oded Löwenheim, ‘The 
‘I’ in IR: An Autoethnographic Account’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, (2010) pp. 1023-1045; Marijn 
Nieuwenhauis, ‘On One Breath All Depend’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 1, No.2, (2015) pp. 167-179; Laura 
J. Shepherd, ‘Editors Interview with Laura Shepherd’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, (2016) pp. 105-
116; Christine Sylvester, ‘Editors Interview with Christine Sylvester’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, 
(2016) pp. 81-85; Cynthia Enloe, ‘Editors Interview With Cynthia Enloe’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 
2, (2016) pp.81-85 
71 C. Enloe, ‘The Mundane Matters’, International Political Sociology, Vol. 5, No. 4, (2011) pp. 447-450; Laura J. 
Shepherd, ‘Aesthetics, Ethics and Visual Research in the Digital Age: ‘Undone in the Face of the Otter’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, (2017) pp. 214-222; Christine Sylvester, ‘Experiencing 
the End and Afterlives of International Relations/theory’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, 
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oriented Feminist IR. The role of thinking modes of Feminist IR as Policing presents a tension in relation 
to which I have to not only carefully steer my argumentation but also am writing both away from and 
towards.  If we read feminist approaches to IR as divided into Police and political accounts we can see 
a tension that a Rancierian approach can grapple with but not necessarily resolve. Liberal feminism 
seeks to reorder the policing of the field along particular female-oriented approaches but, without 
engaging in epistemological or methodological critique, cannot truly be considered political in the 
Rancierian sense (that is not to detract from the achievements of liberal feminism in IR, for further 
discussion of IR feminisms.)72 Critical feminists are interested in how IR produces and is influenced by 
gendered social power and in working to shift IR internally, produce a potential space for politics, such 
is the focus of Maria Stern73, Peterson74, and Sjoberg.75 
Finally, Post-Structural IR theory can be read as the central location in IR where my contribution fits 
most smoothly epistemologically and methodologically. These literatures, because they are all 
concerned to question critically the way the field is ordered and how this links to questions of ‘the 
political’, can all be enriched by Rancière’s work and by the ways in which it can help to remedy the 
distinctions drawn by the fourth “debate”. We can see this in more detail, the alliances I hope to form 
and also their tensions and limitations, by looking, briefly, at work of Shapiro and Bleiker.  
                                                          
No.3, (2013) pp. 609-626; William Clapton & Laura J. Shepherd, ‘Lessons From Westeros: Gender and Power in 
Game of Thrones’, Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1, (2017) pp. 5-18; Christine Sylvester, ‘Experiencing War: A Challenge 
for International Relations’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No.4, (2013) pp. 669-674; Cynthia 
Enloe, ‘The Recruiter and the Sceptic: A Critical Feminist Approach to Military Studies’, Critical Military Studies, 
Vol. 1, No. 1, (2015) pp. 3-10; Christine Sylvester, ‘War Experience/War Practices/War Theory’, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 40, No.3, (2012) pp. 483-503; Cynthia Enloe, ‘Gender is Not Enough: The 
need for Feminist Consciousness’, International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1, (2004) pp. 95-97; Nicole George & Laura 
J. Shepherd, ‘Women, Peace and Security: Exploring the Implementation and Integration of UNSCR 1325’, 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 37, No. 3, (2016) pp. 297-306; Cerwyn Moore & Laura J. Shepherd, 
‘Aesthetics and International Relations: Towards a Global Politics’, Global Society, Vol. 24, No. 3, (2010) pp. 299-
309 
72 See A. Tickner, Gender is International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, (Columbia 
Uni. Press, New York, 1992) & C. Sylvester, Feminist International Relations: An Unfinished Journey, (Cambridge 
Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2002) 
73 M. Stern, Reading Mayan Women’s In/Security, International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1998) 
74 S. Peterson, Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory, (Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder, 1992) 
75 Sjoberg, Laura. (2006). “The Gendered Realities of the Immunity Principles: Why Gender Analysis Needs 
Feminism.” International Studies Quarterly 50 (4): 889–910. 
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While there are several different threads that can be drawn across Bleiker’s76 work I am focusing here 
on his engagement with aesthetics and the aesthetic turn. I do so for two reasons. Firstly so that I can 
draw out the specifics of Bleiker’s engagement with Rancière and highlight the similarities and 
differences between our approaches; secondly to highlight the way in which I am writing with Bleiker 
in regards to IR theory and the points at which our work diverges. Beginning with Bleiker’s reading of 
aesthetics we can see he is concerned not just with fleshing out the realm of art in IR but also with the 
sensory (dis)position of international relations. For Bleiker, like Rancière, there is this articulation 
between our sensory and political world.77 As Bleiker himself argues, ‘Rancière’s theory of political 
aesthetics and the political implications of recognition… Because these aesthetic practices frame what 
is thinkable and doable they are political at their very core.’78 Bleiker’s theorisation of the aesthetic 
and the political has a clear Rancierian character and as such is both an anchor and target for my work. 
While aligned with his project there are also clear breaks with my argument and reading of Rancière. 
Bleiker’s reading is wholly consistent with the texts but while Bleiker conceptualises Rancière as 
presenting a theory of political aesthetics I present him as a theorist of an aesthetic politics. This is a 
                                                          
76 For an unexhausted list see: R. Bleiker, Forget IR Theory, Alternatives, Vol.22, No.1, (1997) pp. 57-85,R. Bleiker, 
Pablo Neruda and the Struggle for Political Memory, Third World Quaterly, Vol. 20, No. 6, (1999) pp. 1129-1142, 
R. Bleiker, North Korea’s Hidden Revolution: How the Information Underground is Transforming a Closed 
Society, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2, (2018) pp. 239-241, R. Bleiker, A Rouge is a 
Rouge is a Rouge: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis, International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, (2003) 
pp. 719-737, R. Bleiker, Writing Visual Global Politics: in Defence of a Pluralist Approach- A Response to Gabi 
Schlag, “Thinking and Writing Visual Global Politics, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 32, 
(2019) pp. 115-123,  R. Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, (2001) pp. 509-533, R. Bleiker, ‘In Search of Thinking Space: Reflections on 
the Aesthetic Turn In International Political Theory’, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 
(2017) pp. 258-264 R. Bleiker, Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 2005), R. Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, (Cambridge Uni. Press, 
Cambridge, 2000), R. Bleiker, Aesthetics and World Politics, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2009), M. Brigg & R. 
Bleiker, ‘Autoethnographic International Relations: Exploring the Self as a Source of Knowledge’, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 26, (2010) pp. 779-798, E. Dauphinee & R. Bleiker, ‘Animal Politics? A Visual 
Provocation’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, (2015) pp. 1-10, M. Brigg & R. Bleiker, Mediating Across 
Difference: Oceanic and Asian Approaches to Conflict Resolution, (Uni. Of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 2011), M. 
Brigg & R. Bleiker, Introduction: Forum on Autoethnography and International Relations II, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 36, (2010) pp. 1021, and M. Brigg & R. Bleiker, Autoethnographic International 
Relations: Exploring the Self as a Source of Knowledge, Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, (2010) pp. 779-
798 
77 See, R. Bleiker & E. Hutchinson, Fear no More: Emotions and World Politics, Review of International Studies, 
Vol. 34, (2008) pp. 117, R. Bleiker, Art After 9/11, Alternatives, Vol. 31, (2006) pp. 77-99 
78 R. Bleiker, ‘In Search of Thinking Space: Reflections on the Aesthetic Turn In International Political Theory’, 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2017) pp.262 
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central point of divergence between Bleiker’s and my own reading of Rancière: we are, as it were, 
singing from the same hymn sheet but placing different inflection on the notes. For me Rancière is 
focused on the political implications of the distribution of the sensible and the aesthetic construction 
of our social (dis)positions. Bleiker reads a Rancière concerned with how our social (dis)positions are 
constructed/related to the production of certain aisthesis. These different readings, while they are 
always inexorably intertwined, do represent the crux of the distinction I draw out and perform in my 
argumentation.  
Shapiro, like Bleiker, has worked extensively on thinking aesthetics and its relationship to politics in 
IR.79 He deploys a similar political, ethical and aesthetic understanding of the field and places 
importance on the aesthetic relations that foregrounds our engagement with both the international 
and politics. Shapiro gives us a theorisation of IR that is able to glean insight into the political 
arrangement, powers and structures via thinking the sensory and artistic productions that mediate 
our engagement with the world. Like Bleiker and myself Shapiro is a post-positivist and post-structural 
theorist of IR. His reading of aesthetics as not simply delimited to art-objects but rather rounded out 
to the sensory is congruent with the argument I forward within the thesis and his reading of Rancière 
is more congruent with my own than that of Bleiker when it comes to configuring the relationship 
between Rancière, politics and aesthetics. In particular Shapiro’s position on the sublime in relation 
to Rancière’s political reading of aesthetics, aligns his reading of Rancière with that which I take later 
in the thesis.80 Shapiro’s integration and reading of Rancière is a clear beacon in the field in which I 
wright, write and right my thesis. However, my writing is focused specifically on what an explicitly 
                                                          
79 For a selection of books by Shapiro see M. Shapiro, Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual 
Practice, (Minnesota Uni. Press, Minnesota, 1992), M. Shapiro, Violent cartographies: mapping cultures of war 
(Minnesota Uni. Press, Minnesota, 1997), M. Shapiro, Methods and nations: cultural governance and the 
indigenous subject, (Routledge, New York, 2004 M. Shapiro, Deforming American political thought: ethnicity, 
facticity, and genre, (Uni. Of Kentucky Press, Kentucky, 2006), M. Shapiro, Cinematic geopolitics, (Routledge, 
London, 2009), M. Shapiro, The time of the city: politics, philosophy and genre, (Routledge, London, 2010), M. 
Shapiro, Studies in trans-disciplinary method: after the aesthetic turn, (Routledge, London, 2013), M. Shapiro 
& R. Hayward, Challenging boundaries: global flows, territorial identities, (Minnesota Uni. Press, Minnesota, 
1996), M. Shapiro & J. Bennett, The politics of moralizing. (Routledge, New York, 2002) & ), M. Shapiro, J. Edkins 
& V. Pin-Fat, Sovereign lives: power in global politics, (Routledge, New York, 2004), 
80 M. Shapiro, The Political Sublime, (Duke Uni. Press, London 2018) pp. 4 
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Rancièrian framework looks like in its application to IR. That is, while Shapiro applies some Rancièrian 
ideas to the analysis of aesthetic international politics my concern is with how those ideas, thought 
through fully, affect the way we think about what IR is. My contribution, as I have argued earlier, lies 
in my own interpretation and execution of a Rancierian articulation to and theorisation of IR and that 
entails a close and prolonged attention to Rancière’s work. This is something which is expanded on 
and brought through in my research questions. 
Research Questions 
As we have seen, my argument can be read as being centred around two key research questions both 
of which are articulated to post-positivist IR. They are the mechanism by which I articulate Rancièrian 
theory to the context of IR in order to make my contribution. These two research questions act as a 
guide rail by which I can navigate and examine the literatures I engage with and as a way of bringing 
together the political and aesthetic work of Jacques Rancière. While methodologically my thesis is 
theoretical and therefore takes Rancière as its method, these questions form a codex that enables the 
translation of political theory into IR theory. As such these questions are both spacing and bridging in 
their nature.  
Research Question One: 
My first research question can be stated thus: How does anarchy construct IR’s distribution of the 
sensible? 
This question draws our attention to a junction between anarchy and the Rancièrian concept of the 
distribution of the sensible. The distribution of the sensible is a central concept within Rancière’s work 
and forms the basis of his argumentation and I argue in later chapters that to apply Rancière to IR this 
must be the starting point. This question is useful because in working it through I am able to open up 
the points of articulation between IR theory as it currently stands and Rancièrian theory. Furthermore, 
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the framing of the question is such as to link it to the centrality of anarchy in the organisation of IR as 
a discipline. As we will see, anarchy is one of the theoretical locations where Rancierian theory can be 
articulated with IR.  
Research Question Two: 
My second research question can be stated thus: What effect does a Rancierian theory of IR have on 
our understanding of International politics? 
This question builds on the first. While the first enables the articulation of Rancière to IR, this question 
works through the implications of that articulation. I argue that the previous question’s articulation of 
Rancière to IR has implications for how politics can be understood in IR. This question explicitly raises 
this fact and opens up the opportunity for the evaluation of a Rancierian notion of politics for IR. As I 
have outlined in a previous section of this introduction, the Rancierian notion of politics is a useful 
tool with which to highlight those literatures that might find the articulation of Rancière to IR useful 
and therefore what the contribution of this thesis is in terms of the field at large. 
Conclusion 
This introduction has charted throughout the thesis the questions, limitations and contribution I am 
offering throughout. The first research questions is dealt with primarily in chapters one, two and then 
returned to in five and six. A detailed breakdown is given in the conclusion. The second research 
questions is dealt with primarily in chapters three and four and returned to in five and six a detailed 
breakdown is given in the conclusion.   The limitations of the thesis are engaged with throughout and 
are returned to in the conclusion.  Chapter  one  assess the literature , chapter two assess the  role of 
anarchy, chapter three looks at Rancière, chapter four articulates my understanding of Rancière to IR 
theory chapters five and six apply work through my theorisation with regards to my case study. 
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Chapter One: 
Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
This chapter of my thesis charts the development of the field across its constitutive “debates”. While 
this narrative of the field has been contested, for example by Dunne et. al1 and Schmidt2 this narrative 
still holds a lot of power over the discipline.3 In my (re)reading of that narrative I focus on the 
continued centrality of a concept of anarchy. I structure my engagement with IR across the four major 
“debates” in the field. I have opted for the four-debate structure as it enables the maximal 
engagement with the literature while also taking us to the present state of the field after the fourth 
“debate” which, I argue, has resulted in a field that is fractured.  
The chapter is divided into six sections. Across these six sections I lay the foregrounding for the 
argument of the thesis. Building on the introductions statement of the position in the field I organise 
the topology of IR via that “debates” to show who I am writing against in more detail. In charting the 
concept of anarchy I also foreground the notion of the ordering principle and its relation to IR. This 
links into my argument as a whole as it establishes the state of the field of IR and enables me to build 
on and develop the positon I have established in the introduction. This is significant for my argument 
as it gives a clear elocution of my positon to IR and understanding of the development and shape of 
the field.  
                                                          
1 T. Dunne et. al, The Eighty Years’ Crisis: International Relations 1919-1999, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 
1998) 
2 B. Schmidt, ‘On The History and Historiography of International Relations’, Handbook of International Relations, 
(Sage Publications, London, 2013) pp. 3-28  
3 See, O. Wæver, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate’, International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, 
(Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1996) pp. 149-185 and D. Lake, ‘Theory is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End 
of Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations’, European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol.19, No. 3, (2013) pp. 570-571 
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Before I move to the first section I must be clear that in looking at the history of IR through the 
“debates” narrative I don’t intend to imply that these manoeuvres direct or relate to the field in real 
time. Mine is a methodological move which enables us to understand the current shape of the field. I 
use the structure of the debates to gain an understanding of the story that IR tells itself in order to 
make itself intelligible to itself. I do not make claims as to the ultimate truth of this story. Rather, I am 
interested in the way in which this enables the field to congeal around the hegemonic Realist position 
in the first two debates and dissipate itself based on the field’s assumptions as set by the latter 
debates.  
The First “Debate”: Realism - Idealism  
This was the first and founding “debate” of IR, in part a response to the interwar period and the 
ascendance of Nazi Germany.4 The “debate” is usually constructed between the theoretical positions 
of Realism and Idealism but this is controversial not least because of challenges over the extent to 
which idealism can be seen as a coherent body of thought.5 Idealism’s core argument, that states 
objectives, understanding and philosophy can be translated from the domestic to the international, 
can be seen in the work of Angell6, Woolf7 and Zimmerman.8 The idealist position is also made possible 
given Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points and the League of Nations. It is worth noting that this not 
only made the Idealist position possible but also acted as the backdrop for Realist argumentation. 
Within the debate Idealism was presented as occupying the liberal position of teleological historical 
progress. The occlusion of this position by Realism shouldn’t be read as a failure of the idealist 
                                                          
4 C. Lynch, Beyond Appeasement: Interpreting Interwar Peace Movements in World Politics, (Cornell Uni. Pres, 
Ithaca New York, 1999) 
5 D. Lake, ‘Theory is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International 
Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol.19, No. 3, (2013) pp. 569 
6 N. Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage, (William 
Heinemann, London, 1913) 
7 L. Woolf, ‘Utopia and Reality’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 11, No.2, (April 1940) pp.167-182 
8 A. Zimmerman, ‘Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands’, Controversies in 
International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, (Macmillan, London, 1995) pp. 107-150 
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position9 as it is this understanding of history that resurfaces in the work of Fukuyama and the neo-
conservative moment in the 90s.10  
The role of history as framework and methodology is, alongside anarchy, one of the core tenets of the 
first “debate”. Dismissal of the historical approach separates IR from the discipline of History. Through 
looking to uncover a-temporal rules of international politics, a move that is undertaken both by 
Idealism through its progressivism and Realism through its tragic understanding of IR, the field 
establishes the pre-conditions of the second “debates” move towards scientism. The Realist 
understanding of human nature as the grounding principle of the basis of IR has a clear effect on the 
ordering of the field. As Classical Realism relies on a human nature that is exempt from material or 
historical development, it enables the later transition to science as the dominant mode for 
understanding the field. This is a twofold move. Classical Realism relies on a Hobbesian11 notion of 
human nature and the resultant anarchy that underpins IR is treated as a natural/physical law. Then 
Realism undergoes its methodological shift towards understanding itself as a science seeking then to 
uncover and falsify potential natural laws about IR. This is achieved through appropriating the 
conditions laid down by the Classical Realists as laws to be tested and evaluated. In doing so the Neo-
Realists methodologically carve away the Classical Realist argumentation that sustained the initial 
understanding of human nature as a-temporal. This understanding of human nature is essential in 
understanding how anarchy moves from being seen as a product of the human-condition to a set 
natural law of IR. Differences in the reading of history aren’t limited to just the first “debate”. The 
distinction between the Idealist understanding of history: as progressive, and the Realist 
understanding of history: as being constructed with regard to an unchanging human nature, form the 
preconditions of anarchy as the ordering principle of the field both in this “debate” and the second.  
                                                          
9 P. Wilson, ‘The Myth of The First Great Debate’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5, (December 
1998) pp. 8-9 
10 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and The Last Man, (Penguin, London, 2012) 
11 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2012) pp. 86-100 
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One thing that is worth noting is that the Idealist position was not solely an academic. It was 
propagated within the public sphere at large. I am not arguing that this is a strength for the Realist 
position, we can see this given Crossman12 and Hayek’s13 rebuttals of Carr that this “debate” was not 
a solely academic one. This is important as Wilson highlights the extent to which Idealism was 
manufactured as a coherent school of thought by Realism.14 Idealism, which in practice was a loosely 
formed coalition of publicists, writers and academics, becomes a cogent bloc in order to propagate 
the myth of a Realism tempered in debate and formed through the contestation of ideals, as opposed 
to ideals that crystallised autonomously and were subject to eclectic and disparate critique. The 
appearance of a cogent Realism enables Realists to craft the nature of the field and reify their 
assumptions via the myth of the ‘defeat’ of Idealism. This founding myth enables Realism to craft the 
idea that IR should be grounded in the material “real” as opposed to the ideational/theoretical. And 
within this constellation of concepts and arguments anarchy could become the core ordering principle, 
grasped as a material “reality” as opposed to the merely theoretical possibility of liberal progressivism.  
This is important for the first “debate” as the Realist move to understand IR, as resting on a core 
immutable human nature, capable of explaining the actual “real” rhythms and patterns of world 
politics is crucial for understanding the development of anarchy as IR’s ordering principle. The two key 
theorists for the Realist position in the first “debate” are Morgenthau15 and Carr16. While the 
coherence of Realism might be questionable (both Morgenthau and Carr’s Realism has been called 
into question by Cox17 and Williams18, Howe blurs the lines between Idealist and Realist thought in 
                                                          
12 R. Crossman, The Charm of Politics and Other Essays in Political Criticism, (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1958) 
13 F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (Routledge, London, 2001)  
14 P. Wilson, ‘The Myth of The First Great Debate’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5, (December 
1998) pp. 10 
15 H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (McGraw Hill, New York, 1985) 
16 E. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, (Macmillan, London, 1946)  
17 M. Cox, E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, (Palgrave, New York, 2000) 
18 M. Williams, Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau In International Relations, (Oxford Uni. 
Press, Oxford, 2000) 
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Carr19 and Osiander looks at the broader similarities between the positions)20 it is its mythology (of 
both coherence and importance) which is key. Part of the move in highlighting the inconsistencies 
within the Realist position of the first “debate” is to highlight the broader historical narrative of 
“power-politics”.21 Understanding the contribution of Carr and Morgenthau not only as Realism but 
as establishing a broader “power-politics” is convincing. Williams highlights that we can see in the first 
“debate” a complete blurring between the Idealist and Realist position and the emergence of a Realist 
Liberalism.22 This is something which, according to Williams,23 emerges not only out of the first 
“debate” but also fed through into the second. The broader historical narrative of “power-politics” is 
something that becomes crystallised into Realist IR throughout the latter debates. 
While there is some contestation over “power-politics” within Realism24 it still forms one of its central 
tenets. The interpretation of Realism winning out over Idealism has shaped the fields understanding 
of itself.25 The way in which this has rhetorically shaped the discipline is explored by Quirk and 
Vigneswaran, who show how the “debate” can influence current methodology in the field.26 One key 
thing that becomes clear here is the way in which Realism not only relies on its assumption of 
anarchy,27 but through its mythologised victory sets this up as the dominant understanding of the 
field. If we factor William’s Realist Liberalism into this understanding we can see that in the blurring 
of the two positions anarchy remains a central point of assumption and agreement.  
                                                          
19 P. Howe, ‘The Utopian Realism of E. H. Carr’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, (July 1994) pp.277-
297 
20 A. Osiander, ‘Rereading Early Twentieth Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited’, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol.42, (1998) pp. 409-432 
21 M. Williams, ‘In the Beginning: The International Relations Enlightenment and the end of International 
Relations Theory’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, (2013) pp. 654 
22 Ibid. pp. 659 
23 Ibid. pp. 655 
24 M. Williams, ‘Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral 
Construction of Power Politics’, International Organisations, Vol. 58, (Fall 2004) pp. 633-665 
25 B. Schmidt, ‘Lessons from the Past: Reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations’, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol.  42, (1998) pp. 433-459 
26 J. Quirk & D. Vigneswaran, ‘The Construction of an Edifice: The Story of a First Great Debate’, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, (January 2005) pp. 89-107 
27 G. Lowes, The European Anarchy, (George Allan & Unwin Ltd, London, 1916) 
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The narrative of the first “debate” establishes anarchy as one of the founding conditions for the 
existence of IR as a field. This is an important moment in the story of IR as it is where the discipline 
coheres around anarchy through the mythologised victory of Realism, which can then appear as a 
singular unbroken tradition with “ownership” of certain historical texts. Slomp, for example, has 
shown the confused way in which classical texts such as those by Thucydides28, Machiavelli29 and 
Clausewitz30 are appropriated within this understanding of the field.31 Realism self-selects and 
imposes its own assumptions and understandings, such as the causal power of anarchy, back through 
history onto these classical authors (while ignoring, for instance, the Kantian underpinning of 
Clausewitz’s theorisation of war).32 
Here my reading of the first debate highlights how it should be read not as a “true” contestation or 
dialectic between Realism and Idealism. Instead I have shown how it acts as a narrativised (ac)count 
of the mechanism by which Realism coheres itself into a distinction theoretical reading of IR. This is 
significant for my argumentation as it foregrounds the role of the organising principle of anarchy. This 
also highlights my understanding of the aesthetic nature of politics and IR given that Realism, by telling 
its own story about the foundation of the field enables not only its own internal (in)coherence but, 
more importantly, the establishment of the terms of the field. This establishment includes the 
enshrinement of anarchy as the disciplines organising principle. Thus, the first debate provides the 
initial moment in which the field, under Realism, begins to highlight anarchy as its central organising 
principle. I now go on to chart the movements in this narrative that occur within the second “debate”.  
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The Second “Debate”: Traditionalism - Scientism 
The second “debate” continues in line with the first’s establishment of anarchy and Realism as the 
dominant assumptions and forces within IR. The core difference in the narrative of this “debate” is 
not between two (in)coherent schools of thought but rather over the appropriate methodology of the 
discipline. The “debate” can be characterised as Realism moving away from its appropriated classical 
heritage in favour of the epistemological mantle of science. As I hinted in the previous section we can 
see in the second “debate” the historical product of Classical Realism’s ahistorical rendering of human 
nature and thus also of anarchy. The irony of the “debate” is highlighted by Ashley’s quotation of 
Morgenthau’s statement ‘it is a dangerous thing to be a Machiavelli. It is a disastrous thing to be a 
Machiavelli without Virtū.’33  Through the movement towards a scientific ontology and epistemology 
Realism organises IR against its own unfalsifiable Classical Realist tenets. Through Ashley’s use of 
Morgenthau, we can see that the “victory” of a scientific mode of IR leaves Neo-Realism grasping in 
the dark, with new scientific instruments, attempting to enthrone a Machiavelli without Virtū: which 
is a Machiavelli without Machiavelli. Interestingly we can see here progression from Realism 
attempting to re-appropriate its own historicity while serving its - and its assumptions - own 
temporality.34  
The second “debate” doesn’t have the same character as the first. It isn’t structured as a disagreement 
between competing schools within a new field but is instead reported as a disagreement between an 
understanding of IR as an excessive irreducibly complex international system (traditionalism) and IR 
as a materially and objectively reducible and understandable international system (scientism). The 
approach from science has its roots in the sub-field of strategic studies35 as well as the broader 
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behaviourist turn in the social sciences.36 One of the precursors to the debate that took a similar 
approach is the Chicago school.37 The position that best encapsulates the move towards this approach 
is that of the Neo-Realist position as given by Waltz’s Theory of International Politics38 and its 
precedent Man, The State & War.39 Waltz takes the Classical Realist assumptions of human nature40 
and submits them to an external a-temporal law: anarchy.41 This Neo-Realist approach is what the 
narrative of the second “debate” focuses on in and is seen as winning out. This movement towards IR 
understanding itself as a scientific approach not only shifts its methodology. It also changes the 
underlying way in which IR makes its assertions and assumptions intelligible to itself. The second 
“debate” changes the mainstream epistemology and ontology of IR. It is important to note that this 
phenomenon isn’t unique to IR but is indicative of some developments more broadly at the time.42  
The traditionalist understanding of IR was championed in part by the English School.43 They sought to 
resist the momentum towards the reduction of IR to simplistic formulae.  But while the English School 
favoured a social understanding of IR they also maintained that anarchy was the central ordering 
principle of the field.44 The distrust of the reduction of the complexities of IR to scientific laws can be 
seen in the first “debate”. Carr45 and Morgenthau46 both highlight their distrust of understanding IR 
through scientism. Morgenthau, paraphrasing Pascal, states: ‘the history of the world would have been 
different had Cleopatra’s nose been a little bit shorter… how do you systemize that?’47 It is important 
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to bear in mind that here Morgenthau is directly intervening into the debate calling for a movement 
away from the Neo-Realist obsession with scientism and a return to the Classical paradigm. This 
argument from Morgenthau highlights the extent to which Classical (or for Spegele Neo-Aristotelian48) 
Realism is reliant on a particularly conservative impulse: not only established historical, and 
historicised sources, but also a commitment to the irreducibility of the human condition. This has 
repercussions for how anarchy can be understood in IR. It moves anarchy from an assumption that is 
held to be true based on an a priori understanding of humans to an external law at work within the 
international system and in that sense quite separate from humans.  
This movement is important because it is implicit in the relation between Classical Realism’s 
understanding of complexity and Waltz’s internalisation of this within his first49 and second image.50 
Through this internalisation the complexities of the individual and state have their causal power 
removed. Instead the structure of the system, anarchy, becomes the ‘permissive cause’.51 Historical 
complexity and contingency are therefore subject to set external and a-historical maxims, the most 
prominent and effectual being anarchy.52 The second “debate” moves away from complexity and 
contingency as expressed through historicity and rationalism and towards elegant structural solutions. 
The story that IR tells itself through the second “debate” is grounded in an understanding of the 
sciences and mathematics as extracting universally applicable laws. This is instantiated within a certain 
methodological and epistemological frame. By narrativizing the second “debate” as an expression and 
acceptance of broader trends in American political science this has an odd effect on Realist 
understanding. As the second “debate” narrativizes the movement from a Classical to Neo-Realist 
hegemony it preserves the assumptions which underpinned Classic Realist IR.  
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By telling the story of the second “debate” as a methodological and epistemological conflict rather 
than a substantive one IR paves the way for the continuance of its core ordering principles, namely 
anarchy. This can be seen in the Neo-Realist movement from a theorisation of IR grounded in 
complexity, “human-nature” and an understanding of state-craft to one rooted in micro-economic 
analogy.53 What changes here isn’t the way in which IR is ordered in terms of conclusions. The 
assumptions which grounded Classical Realism are recast into the frame of scientific IR through the 
emergence of game theory. By focusing on anarchy as the structural constraint which makes possible 
IR, while desiring “scientific” credibility, the second “debate” sublates Classical Realist assumptions 
into laws to be tested and excavated by experimental practice. By turning to the deployment of 
modelling IR along the lines of Nash’s equilibrium,54 and games such as So Long Sucker,55 the political 
assumptions and lessons of Hobbes, Machiavelli and Thucydides are reconstituted as proven by zero-
sum games. The narrative of the second “debate” tells a story that simultaneously rejects traditionalist 
understandings of IR and accepts the ordering principle that made possible this position: anarchy. By 
turning to the behaviourist game-theory logic of strategic studies the second “debate” propagates not 
only scientism directly within IR but also enables the “dispute” between Offensive Realists such as 
Mearsheimer56 and defensive Realists such as Waltz57 as well as the third “debate’s” understanding of 
absolute and relative gains.58 
The political dimension of story of the second “debate” is captured through Morgenthau’s title of and 
argumentation within Scientific Man Versus Power Politics.59 In the text Morgenthau is concerned 
about the way in which the narrative of scientific progress can lead to the detriment of state-craft. 
                                                          
53 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, London, 1979) 
54 J. Nash, Essays on Game Theory, (Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1996) 
55 J. Nash Et. Al, So Long Sucker: A Four Person Game, (1964), Available online at: 
ftp://ftp.kanga.nu/users/claw/odd/games/Contrib/SoLongSucker.pdf, last accessed on 22/07/15 
56 J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Organisations’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 
(Winter 1994/95) pp. 5-49 
57 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, London, 1979) 
58 R. Keohane, After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Economy, (Princeton Uni. Press, London, 
2005) 
59 H. Morgethau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, (Chicago Uni. Press, London, 1946) 
Page 42 of 278 
 
This is substantiated in part by the relegation of diplomatic and state organisation to second image 
concerns within the work of Neo-Realism. Through the reduction of IR’s ability to understand itself 
only via simplified systemic maxims this cements the role of those maxims in organising the 
understanding of IR produced. As Torsten highlights, behaviourism and scientism in IR set the tone for 
later “debates” around ontology and epistemology.60 Rathburn situates the movements within the 
second and later “debates” as the resultant of the (ir)resolution of the first.61 These two authors 
highlight the way in which the “debate” narrative tells a story of IR that is not necessarily fixed 
historically but rather as a narrative that continually steps over and talks to itself.  
I argue that we should understand the “debates” then, not as providing a faithful historical account of 
the scholarship of IR but as a political expression of the dominant discourse within IR: Realism. This is 
significant as it highlights the way in which IR relates to itself and my engagement with it. The 
“debates” narrative is in part an ideological mechanism by which Realism maintains its hegemony. 
However, this also opens up sites of resistance (as we will see when we turn to the fourth “debate” 
and the advent of post-positivist IR). We can see the seeds of this in Mercer’s problematisation of the 
notion of IR as a social science62 as well as work in Post-Structural IR theory.63 The second “debate’s” 
(ir)resolution means that IR doesn’t develop a singular methodology but remains subject to a 
hegemonic constellation drawn together along the narratives of a scientism that never reached the 
point of falsification.64 This constellation also represents the retrenchment of anarchy as the ordering 
principle of IR. The second “debate” renders sensible the approbation of a “scientific” understanding 
of IR but also demarcates the distinction between appropriate methodology and epistemology. This 
“debate” then establishes the conditions which colour the later “debates” in their epistemological and 
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methodological frame. While this appears as a move which offers a development in the field it is also 
deeply conservative in its preservation of anarchy. The narrative not only established and 
strengthened the position of Neo-Realism, but also set the terms of debate within IR. This facilitates 
the transition of anarchy from an assumption tied to classical understanding of human nature to an 
external trans-historical maxim. Again here I am arguing for anarchy as being read via Realist thought 
as the organising principle of IR. The narrative of the second “debate” tells the story of an anarchy 
that must exist a-temporally and a priori to IR otherwise it would be part of the social baggage 
produced by IR and therefore not an appropriate assumption on which to produce a scientific analysis 
of the field. This is something that recurs in the third and fourth “debates”.  
The second debate is significant for the broader argument of my thesis in its configuration of the 
relationship between the scientific and traditionalist positions. This movement, which as I have 
argued, facilitates and is facilitated by the behavioural turn in political science grounds anarchy as the 
field’s central tenant. Through Realism’s re-interpretation of its own assumptions again we can see a 
story being told that enable the crystallisation of its own assumption. I argue that this story which 
maintains the methodological and epistemological promise of scientism shapes the way in which IR 
understands itself. This is a story within which anarchy maintains its central position as the guiding 
assumption. I have argued that the second “debate”, through its deployment of “scientific” 
understanding strengthens the organisation of IR around anarchy. This links through my thesis in it 
highlights not only who I am writing against both their organisation of the coherence of the field 
around anarchy. 
The Third “Debate”: Inter-Paradigm (But Really Neo-Neo Synthesis) 
The third “debate” is often understood as a response to the proliferation of the Kuhnian 
understanding of scientific research within IR.65 The “debate” is mainly focused on the parsing of the 
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field into three separate research paradigms: Neo-Realism, Neo-Liberalism and Marxist IR, and 
narrated by mainstream IR as a way in which, through division different modalities of research each 
could continue to proffer their understanding of IR along the lines of different assumptions. But the 
“debate” also served to delimit the possibilities of what could be seen as effective research in IR. The 
“debates” division of the field into these separate but equal paradigms enables the fourth “debate” 
but also effectively includes and excludes different modalities of research in IR, restructuring the field, 
as Guzzini highlights, along the lines of ontological assumption which prohibit different paradigms 
from being “tested” against each other.66 Nevertheless, as Guzzini also argues, anarchy persists 
throughout the historical development of the field and into the third “debate”.67  
There are clear conceptual problems with the story being told by the third “debate” however. The 
proposed division into three paradigms of Neo-Realist, Neo-Liberal and Radical deliberately organises 
the field along the lines of its hegemonic, predominantly Realist organisation. Both of the “Neo”-
paradigms share core assumptions: most prominently anarchy. The third “debate” in reality becomes 
about technical distinctions between relative vs. absolute gains68 and potential for the mitigation of 
anarchy.69  This runs counter to the understanding of a “grand debate” over the ontological positioning 
of differing paradigms.  The “debate” also turns on its head the manner by which the “debates” have 
divided IR between Neo-Realist, Neo-Liberal and Radical. While the first two categories are empirically 
substantiated by the quantity of research aligned with these approaches the Radical paradigm starts 
the “debate” as a catch-all for Marxism which then later mutates into Post-Structuralism.70 For these 
reasons the “debate” can be dismissed as not really impactful on the broader narrative of IR. This 
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position recounts the story of the third “debate” as an in-house squabble between the “Neo”-
paradigms. I contend that this “debate” has a larger function in the narrative of IR; through its 
constitution of the Radical paradigms the third “debate” works to conserve the position of anarchy as 
an ordering principle in IR and rather than offset the challenges or questioning of anarchy defers the 
impact of such questioning to the fourth “debate”.  
Weaver characterises the narrative of the debate as the move towards a neo-neo synthesis.71 This 
understanding of the “debate” moves the Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberal understandings of IR much 
closer to each other72 and in doing so refines their conceptual toolkits.73 Weaver makes clear that the 
“debate” acted as a centripetal force, sharpening the paradigms into ‘leaner and meaner’74 registers. 
Weaver thus highlights how the “debate” hardened of the paradigms’ commitment to their shared 
assumptions, such as anarchy, as well as to their differences. Jervis75, Buzan et. al76 & Ruggie77 also 
substantiate this reading of the “debate”. Within this narrative anarchy becomes an even more central 
assumption within IR, enabling the construction of and communication between both Neo paradigms 
research schemes. In the Neo-Neo synthesis anarchy’s position as essential to meaningful and 
intelligible IR research becomes further ingrained as the ordering principle of the hegemonic 
constellation. This movement is a continuance of the second debate’s focus on the uncovering of 
external a priori maxims. The third “debate” is not only a continuation but an intensification of this 
movement in that now these maxims, such as anarchy, become ontological necessities for IR research 
to be sensible to the field (and, as we will see when we look at the radical paradigm) modes of 
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scholarship that do not take anarchy as their ordering principle or as a necessary ontological 
assumption become written out of the narrative. This highlights where my contribution to developing 
the field is foregrounded. Smith foreshadows the fourth “debate” in saying that synthesis is impossible 
for differentiated theoretical approaches.78 In reading Smith it becomes clear that by synthesis is 
becoming impossible for approaches with differing assumptions. I argue that this is the case with 
regard to the positions taken by the Neo paradigms in the third “debate”.   
The “debate” cannot be characterised as a debate between multiple distinct paradigms. It should be 
constituted as the synthetic pursuit of technical clarification amongst the Neo paradigms. If we follow 
this narrative then the Radical paradigm becomes the point of actual paradigmatic dispute. Weaver 
complicates this by highlighting how there was little in the way of engagement across these lines.79 
The end result of the third “debate” for the Neo paradigms becomes the synthetic arrangement 
following the trajectory of the first and second debates and ensuring anarchy’s position as the ordering 
principle of IR. Wendt’s Anarchy is what states make of it80 is a good example of the proliferation of 
anarchy as the ordering principle of the field. This is a proliferation that serves in part to write the 
Radical paradigm out of the story IR tells itself in the third “debate”. In order to show how this 
proliferation writes out the Radical paradigm from IRs narrative and thus understanding of itself I turn 
now to how the third “debate” understood the Radical paradigm as “Marxist” and later “Post-
Structural”. In so doing the third “debate” constructs a narrative which serves to neuter the potential 
for critique of anarchy as an organising principle in IR and constructs the conditions for the fourth 
debate’s impact on the field.  
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Marxist argumentation within IR can be traced back at least as far as Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest 
Stage of Capitalism81 and within Marx’s Capital.82 As Rosenberg shows83 the distinction between 
looking at the organisation of empire and colonial practices became subsumed into IR during its 
formation as a discipline.84 While the third “debate” sublated Marxist IR’s accounts of the field into 
scholarship specifically on empire, the Neo’s paradoxically embrace Gramsci’s notion of hegemony.85 
The emergence of Marxism as (in)visible within the Radical paradigm is made possible through the 
second “debates” movement of the narrative towards scientism and behaviourism as I previously 
argued.  
As Lamola86 and Burawoy87 demonstrate Marxist theory has within it an understanding of and a 
relation to science. In IR’s positioning of itself as a “scientific” pursuit it necessarily has to confront the 
challenge of the Marxist claim to science. In naming the paradigm as radical the narrative of the third 
“debate” draws together and sublimates Marxist theory and its understanding of science as a singular 
component among a group of fringe approaches to IR. This move weakens any claim Marxist theory 
might offer to science as it is already bracketed out of the “scientific” hegemonic constellation: the 
Neo paradigms. This sublimation has the effect of continually focusing the narrative on the Neo 
paradigms as the question of scientific credibility had be settled by the second “debate”. The third 
“debate” is made possible precisely because of the strength of the assumptions established within the 
second “debate”. The story of the third “debate” is also one which is constructed along political lines. 
The exclusion of Marxist theorisations of IR is a symptom of the adoption of fundamental Realist 
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assumptions88 such as anarchy.89 The third” debate” highlights the inability of the field to process 
Marxism as either scientific or tangible given the political considerations of its hegemonic 
constellation.  
Marxism presented a systemic challenge to IR in the form of world systems theory. By offering a 
substantive and different way of configuring the structural limitations on state behaviour Marxism 
gave a competing ontology of IR. This way of reading IR doesn’t necessitate the organising power of 
international anarchy.90 Theorists such as Wallerstein91 & Chase-Dunn92 give an account of IR in which 
it is ordered not by a lack of world governance but through its division of labour and the predominance 
of capital flows. In this reading of IR, the economic system of Capitalism structures and enforces the 
actions of states.  The separation of the international system into a core and periphery undermines 
the notion of anarchy. Instead it places a necessary hierarchy between the central exploiting states 
and the periphery exploited states. This is an arrangement that is conditioned not by the lack of world 
governance but rather by the economic system which produces nation states.   
As the third “debate” bleeds over into the fourth “debate” the Radical paradigm becomes associated 
not only with Marxists but also post-structuralisms. The narrative here seeks to bind together an 
increasingly structural and scientific Marxism with the more post-positivist Critical-Theorists. This is a 
move undertaken to reduce and unpick the potential rigour of this alignment. The story told by the 
third “debate” becomes a political move by the hegemonic, predominately Realist, constellation to 
defend the field’s organising principles. The political ramifications of this movement can be charted in 
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the work of Renegger & Thirkell-White93, Haacke94 and Kratochwil.95 Given the failure of the third 
“debate” to effectively enable contestation between the differing theoretical approaches this 
becomes the ground on which the field enters into the fourth “debate”. The preference for internal 
refinement practiced by the Neo paradigm then provides a narrative inclination in the field to 
preference internal critique over external engagement. This doesn’t doom IR to synthesis between 
theoretically aligned positions. Rather it lends kudos to the extant Realist hegemonic constellation and 
encourages debate along similar ontological lines as opposed to across them.  
In terms of anarchy this means that it becomes enshrined as the principle that enables communication 
between differing paradigms within IR. This enables anarchy to organise IR not only around theoretical 
content but structurally across paradigms. My analysis of the third “debate” is useful as it draws out 
the distinction between the location in the field where I am making my contribution and what I am 
writing against.  The third “debates” linkage to normative IR opens up a gap to which I am sympathetic 
but do not argue towards. As I have written in my introduction my major alliance in writing my thesis 
is towards post-structural IR theory and away from normative and mainstream IR. This is something I 
build on in looking at the fourth “debate”. 
The Fourth “Debate”: Positivist IR Theory 
The fourth “debate” is the most recent and ongoing “debate” in IR. The “debate” constructs a 
narrative around the differentiation between Positivist and Post-Positivist IR. I argue that this “debate” 
is both the result and continuation of the previous “debates” narrative. I forward that the fourth 
“debate” divides the field along the lines of ontology. By making this distinction the “debate” 
conditions and establishes the possibility of what can be understood within IR. Through this distinction 
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then I contend that we see a divergence of approaches to IR in addition to a lack of communication 
between these approaches. Within the fourth “debate”, as in the other debates, anarchy structures 
the field as an ordering principle, although with the divergence between Positivist and Post-positivist 
IR critiques of anarchy become operationalised. As I have articulated in my introduction I offer a 
contribution to post-positivist and in particular post-structural IR. In breaking down the distinction 
between positivist and post-positivist IR I highlight that I am writing away from the “main-stream” and 
positivist conceptions of IR and contributing to post-positivist IR.  
The 2013 special issue of the European Journal of IR is focused on the theme: The End of International 
Relations Theory.96 Characterised by Dunne, Hansen and Wight as ‘the paradigm wars’97 the fourth 
“debate” sees the retrenchment of the positions drawn up within the third “debate”. The difference 
between the two “debates”, as Lake98 argues is that the fourth “debate” fractures the field definitively. 
In being structured around distinctions between positivist and post-positivist approaches the field 
becomes about the grounding assumptions and structure of the field. Keohane constructs the 
“debate” along the lines of rational versus reflectivist.99 In taking this line the ontological nature of the 
“debate” becomes explicit. There are two initially apparent contradictions in how the “debates” 
narrative is structured. The first contradiction is foregrounded in the second and third “debates” 
narrative with regards to scientism and the rejection of the Radical paradigm. The characterisation of 
the positivist position becomes in the fourth “debate” the position adopted by the IRs hegemonic 
constellation of approaches. This is the resultant of the previous “debates” marshalling and 
arrangement of these theoretical schools.  Although the positivist position is not monolithic but 
ontologically and epistemologically fractious. The second contradiction mirrors the third “debates” 
                                                          
96 T. Dunne, Lene Hansen et. al, ‘The End of international Relations Theory?’, European Journal of International 
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attempt to construct a Radical paradigm. The myriad, shifting post-positivistic approaches to IR are 
too disparate to be effectively characterised as a singular orientation to the field in the way Keohane 
and the fourth “debate” attempt. In the narrative of the fourth “debate” the construction of the post-
positivist position plays the political role of disempowering the critiques offered of mainstream IR by 
reducing them to the product of their requisite ontologies.  
The positivist understanding of the field can be understood as emerging from the Neo paradigms of 
the third “debate”. There is the distinction between the Liberal and Realist takes on the field here. The 
Liberal position is one which grows out of the work of Keohane100 and Axelrod101 developing along the 
lines of institutionalism. This is coupled with approaches grounded in Doyle’s102 understanding of how 
to proliferate peace in IR.103 These key texts ground the development of later thinkers such as 
Ikenberry104 and Slaughter.105 This Liberal position coagulates in the forth “debate” under the banner 
of positivist ‘problem-solving’ IR. The Realist position grounded in the work of Waltz,106 as I have 
argued previously, also draws inspiration from Gilpin107, Krasner108 and Walt.109 This Realist position is 
again one that is broadly positivist in nature. Although with work such as Williams110, Lebow111 and 
Lobell et. al’s edited collection: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy112 move away from 
the strict scientism of Neo-Realism and a return to Classical Realism.  This movement is interesting as 
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it highlights how within the fourth “debate” the positions of positivist and post-positivist IR only serve 
to broadly structure the “debate” and field. In actuality within different “sides” of the narrative there 
is closer cohesion in the assumptions taken by schools than the large categories of positivism/post-
positivism.  
We can see this in the way in which schools cut across the narrative of a positivist/post-positivist divide 
in the English School and Constructivism. Both approaches cohere around their respective 
assumptions about IR but necessarily cut across the division of the debate. Within the English School 
we can see this from its starting assumptions, which have their heritage in Grotius113, and are laid out 
by Bull114, Vincent115 and Buzan116, this crosses the boundary between positivist problem solving and 
post-positivist reflection. The English school’s working through hegemony117 and notions of order118 
problematizes the fourth “debates” clean division of the field. The Constructivist tradition also skirts 
the distinction between positivist and post-positivist.  Kratochwil119, Onuf120 and Wendt121 provide 
some of the grounding texts for this understanding of IR. We can see in work by Kratochwil and Onuf 
a commitment that is less positivist than that provided by Wendt. With the move to securitisation 
within the work of writers such as Balzaq122, Salter123 & Bigo124 Constructivism engages in a more post-
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positivist reflection on the assumptions that have structured IR. Within the Constructivist and English 
School approaches to the fourth “debate” we can see how it bleeds out of the third “debate” but also 
how the narrativized categories of positivist and post-positivist are not stable. This is a distinction that 
grounds much of my contribution to IR as outside of the positivist/post-positive frame of the 
constructivist and English schools understanding of IR. I am writing my argument and contribution 
away from and against this mode of thinking IR. 
From taking the positivist approaches in IR we can see how the fourth “debate” appears most clearly 
as a series of small running battles.125 This isn’t due to the impossibility of sustained critique between 
the differing approaches but rather how the “debate” configures itself. The lack of coherent and stable 
categories caused the debate to collapse back into itself. The “debate” then cannot sustain a clear 
division between positivist IR and post-positivist IR. This is a breakdown of the narrative produced by 
the predominantly Realist hegemonic constellation; the categorisation of IR retreats away from the 
broad lines of positivism and post-positivism and becomes defined along the lines of school and their 
requisite assumptions. We can see this in the way in which the “debate” situates structural Marxism 
as a reflectivist/post-positivist approach to the field when it is more rationalist/positivist in its own 
understanding.126 The position of the differing schools in relation to each other and their assumptions 
then becomes increasingly important given the way in which the meta-narrative of the “debate” can 
no longer effectively bind the field together. This has effects on the status of anarchy which while it 
remains an ordering principle, is unmoored from a binding narrative leaving it both empowered as a 
concept and opened up to fresh contestation. It is in this area for contestation that my thesis moves 
to make its contribution to post-positivist IR theory. This gap and division sites the location for my 
critique of and contribution to IR.  
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In an approach critiqued by the Torsten127 & Suganami128 Jackson attempts to make sense of the way 
in which the ontological and epistemological ordering of the field lies in the debates aftershocks,129 
opening up questions around the “correct” manner of ontology and epistemology in IR. By organising 
these assumptions Jackson and Nexon highlights how the foundation of positivist IR can occlude other 
modes of theorisation130 and questions if IR has to be considered a science.131  In opening up the 
assumptions which divide the field Jackson highlights the way in which there is a division between the 
positivist drive towards “scienceing” IR and the post-positivist drive towards critique of its 
fundamental assumptions. While some IR theorists defend the research programmes approach132 this 
methodological underpinning forms the basis for this drive. We can see the division along 
epistemological and methodological assumptions as a return to some of the questions raised by the 
second “debate”. The fourth “debate” again is not separate from the other debates but exists in the 
interregna cause by the previous debate’s (ir)resolution. With regard to providing a narrative to the 
field the fourth “debate” doesn’t construct a clear position but rather opens up a space in which the 
diversification of epistemological and ontological assumption becomes essential. In doing so this 
results in the field becoming more diverse but also more disparate. As I foregrounded in the 
introduction my contribution in this thesis is written in the spirit not only of this diversity but also in 
response to the disparate character of the field after and during the first debate. Here my contribution 
lies not only in my articulation of Rancière but the way in which my reading of Rancière challenges the 
functionality of ontology in IR.  
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The fragmentation of IR across epistemic and ontological lines is the core effect of the fourth “debate”. 
It has serious ramifications both immediately and meta-theoretically for how IR can be conducted. As 
I have argued the previous debates structured the field through ensuring the position of anarchy as 
IR’s ordering principle. The fourth “debate” cannot do this in the same way as its dispute takes place 
at the level of assumptions. Rather the “debate” serves to provide a mechanism around which the 
field can maintain its existence as a discipline while undergoing a loss of internal cohesion. The division 
caused within IR theory by the fourth “debate” has led to the project of theory133, metatheory134 or 
the discipline as a whole135 being pronounced to be on its last legs and Jackson’s represents the mode 
of much of the engagement taking place in the fourth “debate”.  For example, Rengger looks at how 
the divergence of schools into assumption-based camps is causing the field to list and be subsumed 
into broader political theory.136  This fracture is where my argument is able to be heard as it gives the 
handholds through which I can pull my Rancièrian articulation through onto the field.  
Schmidt through looking at the work of Kuhn/Lakatos writes about how “scientific consensus” can be 
produced within IR.137 By parsing the story of IR into two narratives, one historical and another 
analytical, Schmidt highlights the potential location of cracks in the discipline.138 In his dissection of 
the field into these two stories we can see the potential power of counter-narratives to the central 
understanding of IR. Rather than the “debates” forming a key that unlocks the secret and true history 
of IR they should be viewed as a political narrative which conserves the predominantly Realist 
hegemonic constellation. Sørenson argues that the discipline should be less concerned with its 
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fragmentation and more concerned with the material and ideational forces that are at work within 
it.139 This mode of argumentation seeks to look at the material and ideational forces that enable the 
field’s possibility. While this provides a solid foundation for progressing the field it requires an already 
extant and coherent set of assumptions that would make this possible. Such a set of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions are not a reality given the disparate nature of IR in the fourth “debate” 
and thus provide the location for my theoretical contribution to the field.   
The Fourth “Debate”: Post-Positivist IR Theory  
The other side of the narrative of the fourth “debate” is Post-positivist IR. I make my contribution to 
the field to this location. Although I recognise normative IR as being grounded in emancipation as 
having value here I am not writing towards them. Rather my contribution is aimed at Post-positivist IR 
theory which I delineated, building on my introduction here. This delineation in the field has been 
taken by the fourth “debate” to include the reflectivist position outlined by Keohane140 and 
characterised by Sylvester as part of the pushback against the positivist framing and understanding of 
IR as brought about by the end of the cold war.141 We can see in this the failure of the story of the 
“debates” to encompass and explain the material conditions of IR, the Post-positivist reading of IR 
being a response precisely to the prevalence of this narrative of IR as well as to the predominantly 
Realist hegemonic constellation’s increasing inability to explain contemporary experiences of IR both 
as a discipline and as something actually occurring in the world. Although there has been some 
pushback against the fourth “debate” as productive for IR142 I maintain and argue for its value in 
shaping the narrative of the field.  
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As I argued in the previous section the post-positivist understanding of IR can be seen as fragmented 
given the fourth “debate”. Kristensen has argued, telling the story of IR through “debates” has been a 
tool by which Realism and more broadly positivist IR has strengthened its hold within the field,143a 
mode of “stocktaking” which organises the discipline along political lines.144 Understanding IR as not 
only proliferating but performing politics is something that has been central to the post-positivist 
understanding of the field.145 This approach146, seeks to understand the central tenets that have 
informed the current formation of IR147, unpicking the field’s ontology148, epistemology149, 
methodology150 or “self-evident” assumptions151 and in working through the assumptions that have 
grounded the field post-positivist IR actively challenges the narrative of the “debates”. In relation to 
the positivist understanding of IR post-positivist IR doesn’t build into the (in)coherent hegemonic 
narrative but rather seeks to highlight the incoherence of such a position and challenge this 
understanding of narrative.152 While this has interesting implications for anarchy as an organising 
principle my contribution to IR is aligned in highlighting specifically how anarchy is constructed as 
such.153 
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As we have seen, the traditional predominantly Realist, hegemonic constellation is entrenched in the 
assumptions of the field. Such a constellation cannot communicate with an approach which challenges 
or even simply questions the assumptions that render it sensible. In this thesis, in order to articulate 
my understanding of Rancière with IR I focus on writing my contribution and my argument in line with 
the Post-positivist questioning of political154 and axiomatic155 underpinnings. As I argued in the 
introduction I have identified three distinct literatures within the fourth “debate” that, I propose, my 
contribution to and reading of Rancière can be best articulated with.  
The first of these is Narrative IR Theory which rose to prominence as part of the constructivist156 & 
post-positivist turn157 within the fourth “debate”. This work is often historicist in nature158, as in the 
work of Suganami159 and not explicitly concerned with politics or the political. Similarly, Roberts while 
recognising overlap with post-positivist understandings of narratives but advocates a distinct 
phenomenological understanding of the concept160 which, he believes can (re)ground core 
assumptions and maintain the coherence of the field. But what interests me here is political nature of 
specifically post-positivist Narrative methodology.  This approach to IR seeks to challenge the 
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fundamental assumptions of IR offering a political (ac)count of the field and seeking reposition 
academic practice. As such my conception of politics fits nicely in thinking how Narrative politics both 
conforms to and challenges the methodology that can deployed in IR.  
One example of this within the literature is the introduction of autoethnography. Löwenheim charts 
this initial movement161 and seeks to bring the method through. Brigg and Bleiker follow this thread 
looking at the way in which the academic in IR becomes a source of knowledge.162 We can see this 
movement carried through in the work of Doty163 and Auchter.164 In reading IR not only as an external 
world to be subject to examination but also as a set of practices lived and experienced by the 
researcher and their subject Narrative IR theory critiques of IR’s hegemonic understanding of itself 
and, by turning the understanding of IR onto the researcher themselves, politicises the study of IR. 
This is also interesting when thinking of my allies within the field such as Bleiker who, as mentioned 
in the introduction has considered and deployed this method which unsettles the way in which the 
field has been considered both as a site of academia and material reality forcing a rethink of what 
constitutes IR and the study of it. This necessarily cuts across and challenges the founding assumptions 
of the field both epistemologically and methodologically and gives my argument a location for 
articulation to the field.  
Interestingly this leads to aesthetic experimentation which is another point of similarity between my 
own argumentation and the approach of Narrative IR. For example, Jackson not only looks at the way 
in which the self can be a mechanism through which to know IR but also experiments in the form of 
academic writing.165 We can see the subversion of traditional academic prose also in the work of 
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Ling.166 In challenging the mode by which IR can understand itself Narrative IR Theory offers a reading 
of the frameworks of IR in its (re)performance as well as scholarship. Work by Dauphinee167 and 
Muppidi168 follows this narrativized format. Much like the turn towards an autoethnographic 
methodology the move towards challenging academic form offers a cross cutting critique of the 
foundations of IR. By breaking down the structures in which IR scholarship is (re)performed Narrative 
IR Theory opens up a political space in which these assumptions can be challenged. By reading IR as a 
site for aesthetic contestation it becomes possible to forward a perspective that enables a differing 
understanding of IR. This again is fertile ground for my contribution to germinate. 
Another place we can see the political contribution of Narrative IR theory is within the Journal of 
Narrative Politics.169 Publishing their first issue in 2014 the journal offered a reading of the field that 
was challenging in two ways. Firstly, it was founded on diverse ranges of scholarly form as well as style. 
This has ranged between shorts170, poetry171, film172, photography173, and interviews.174 In taking this 
approach to academic knowledge and prose the Journal of Narrative Politics offers and explicitly 
political re-rendering of IR. This is a movement we can see not only in the work published there but 
also in the mechanics of the journal. By using a double-open peer review system175 the journal 
                                                          
166 See, L. Ling, ‘Journeys Beyond the West: World Orders and a 7th Century Buddhist Monk’, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 37, (2010) pp. 225-248 and L. Ling, Imagining World Politics: Sihar & Shenya, A Fable 
For Our Times, (Routledge, London, 2014) 
167 E. Dauphinee, The Politics of Exile, (Routledge, London, 2013)  
168 See, H. Muppidi, Politics in Emotion: The Song of Telangana, (Routledge, London, 2015) and H. Muppidi, The 
Colonial Signs of International Relations, (Columbia Uni. Press, New York, 2012) 
169 Home Page, Journal of Narrative Politics, available at: https://jnp.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/default/index 
(Last accessed 26/04/2018)  
170 N. Kumarakulasingham, ‘Bloody Translations: The Politics of International Compassion and Horror’, Journal 
of Narrative Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2014) pp. 61-75 
171 N. Viernes, ‘The Poetics of Recording: Zakariya Amataya in Thailand’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 
2, (2016) pp. 145-159 
172 G. Kalyan & Rohan Kalyan, ‘Letter to the City yet to Come’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, (2016) 
available at: https://jnp.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/default/article/view/56/57 (Last accessed 26/04/2018) 
173 See, E. Dauphinee & Roland Bleiker, ‘Animal Politics? A Visual Provocation’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 
2, No. 1, (2015) pp. 1-10  and R. Bleiker, ‘Roland Bleiker’s Birds’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Available at: 
http://journalofnarrativepolitics.com/new-encounter-imagery/ (Last accessed 26/04/2018) 
174 E. Dauphinee, ‘Interview Forum: Feminist and Post-Colonial Thought’, Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 
2, (2016) pp. 72-117-128 
175 Peer Review Process, Journal of Narrative Politics, available at: 
https://jnp.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/default/about/editorialPolicies#peerReviewProcess  (Last accessed 
26/04/2018) 
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challenges the dominant academic hegemonic constellation in IR. This mode of challenging the 
institution of academic IR is interesting and potentially political. My arguments reading of Rancière 
into IR gives a way to for me to read this literature and its impact on the field politically. It also 
explications the way in which Narrative IR theory can be seen as political through my reading of 
Rancière into the field. Here we can see again as foregrounded in the introduction how my 
contribution relates to the field of Narrative IR theory. 
The second literature which I foregrounded as a site of interested to my argument and to which I am 
writing towards is Post-Positivist Feminist IR theory. Feminist IR theory is by its nature political, 
unpicking the hidden assumptions of the field and opening up space within which new subjectivities 
and voices can become apparent. Sjoberg in her research into the immunity principle argues for a 
gendered analysis of phenomena in IR theory.176 In her critique of Carpenter177, Sjoberg highlights the 
needs for a political understanding of these issues.178 Feminist IR becomes a point at which we can 
bring through the political dimensions of IR that are excluded through the mainstream discourse.  
In response to this I focus on Feminist theory, which is avowedly political. In this sense I highlight how 
Feminist IR has looked to unpick both the ontological179 and methodological180 assumptions of the 
field. By understanding how gender and sex are (in)visible within IR Feminist theory gives the 
opportunity for the emergence of new understandings and subjectivities. This as I argue in the thesis 
at length is fertile ground for the understanding of political.181  The approach of Post-Positivist Feminist 
IR Theory has been to break down the assumptions which structure IR with particular focus on gender 
                                                          
176 L. Sjoberg, ‘Gendered Realities of the Immunity Principle: Why Gender Analysis Needs Feminism’, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 4, (2006) pp. 889-910 
177 C. Carpenter, ‘Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups: Gender, Strategic Frames and the Protection 
of Civilians as a Transnational Issue’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 2, (2005) pp. 295-335 
178 L. Sjoberg, ‘Gendered Realities of the Immunity Principle: Why Gender Analysis Needs Feminism’, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 4, (2006) pp. 891 
179 T. Lawson, ‘Ontology and Feminist Theorising’, Feminist Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, (2003) pp. 119-150 
180 B. Ackerly, ‘Maria Stern & Jacqui True’, Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, (Cambridge Uni. 
Press, Cambridge, 2006) 
181 Ibid. 
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& sex.182 Tickner highlights the way in which IR has been resilient to respond to critique of its 
assumptions along these lines.183 Enloe184, Harraway185 and Shepard186 give us different techniques by 
which the ground has been cleared to the emergence of a new subjectivity. Carver highlights the way 
in which this understanding of the world is not unique to IR although it can have unique benefits.187 A 
Post-Positivist Feminist mode of IR Theory offers the potential to both understand the 
decomposition188 and breathe new life189 into the field.  Thinking of the ways in which IR is lived and 
embodied190 has opened up new horizons for thought.191 This has carried through challenges to the 
theoretical192 and practical understanding of IR.193While there is a significant contribution and section 
of theorisation to which I am writing within post-positivist Feminist IR there are also moments in which 
Police action organises and foregrounds this reading. As highlighted in the introduction I write towards 
this field with an open and honest contribution but recognise the limitations and significance of my 
potential use value.     
                                                          
182 S. Narain, ‘Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives of J. Ann Tickner’, Indian Journal of Gender 
Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2014) pp. 179-197 
183 J. Anne Tickner, ‘You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists’, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, (1997) pp. 611-632  
184 C. Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics, (Uni. Of California 
Press, London, 2014) 
185See, D. Harraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the Late Twentieth 
Century, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 2016) and D. Harraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The 
Reinvention of Nature, (Routledge, New York, 1991) and D. Harraway, Staying With the Trouble: Making Kin in 
the Chthulucene, (Duke Uni. Press, London, 2016) 
186 L. Shepard, ‘Marysia Zalewski. Feminist International Relations: Exquisite Corpse’, International Feminist 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1, (2014) pp. 161-163 
187 T. Carver, ‘Gender and International Relations’, International Studies Review, Vol. 5, (2003) pp. 287-302 
188 C. Sylvester, ‘Experiencing the End and Afterlives of International Relations/Theory’, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2013) pp. 609-626 
189 C. Weber, ‘IR: The Resurrection or New Frontiers of Incorporation’, European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1999) pp. 435-450 
190 L. Wilcox, ‘Making Bodies Matter in IR’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1, (2014) pp. 
359-364 
191 R. Shinko, ‘Ethics After Liberalism: Why (Autonomous) Bodies Matter’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2010) pp. 723-745 
192 L. Sjoberg, ‘Towards Trans-gendering International Relations’, International Political Sociology, Vol. 6, (2012) 
pp. 337-354 
193 C. Eschle and B. Maigiascha, ‘Rethinking Globalised Resistance: Feminist Activism and Critical Theorising in 
International Relations’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 9 (2007) pp. 384-301 
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A third literature which is of special interest and important for my contribution is Post-Structural IR 
Theory.  Given Post structural IR’s unpicking of the core values of the field it is a literature that is194  
concerned with working through and deconstructing the way in which the field has congealed around 
its core assumptions, as I argue and have argued its arkhè of anarchy. Ashely195, Walker196, Hoffman197 
and critical theorist Linklater198 all produced (ac)counts by which these assumptions can be challenged 
and to which I am writing towards. My mode of understanding the field focuses on response to the 
failure of positivism to produce a cohesive narrative to and from IR.199 In working through the 
assumptions of the field my contribution to Post-Positivist IR Theory opens up a space in which the 
grounding principles of the discipline are broken down and challenged.200 This ties in with the 
contribution I offer the field as my reading of Rancière gives us a way of understanding what is political, 
and through my deconstruction of IR, the field itself that avoids many of the pitfalls around ontology.  
My argumentation offers a substantive critique of the underlying assumptions of the field but also 
gives a clear definition of politics which can be deployed by these modes of theorisation and is written 
in service of this mode of theorisation.  
This literature, I am writing towards, focused initially on opening up a meta-theoretical critique of IR’s 
hegemonic constellation.201  Ashley and Walker brought together the seminal early works in this 
                                                          
194 R. Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 
Vol. 30, No. 3, (2001) pp. 509-533 
195 R. Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique’, Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, (1988) pp. 227-262 
196 See, R. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 
1993) and R. Ashley & R. Walker,’ Introduction: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in 
International Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, (1990) pp. 259-268 
197 M. Hoffman, ‘Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, (1988) pp. 91-95 
198 A. Linklater, ‘The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical Theoretical Point of 
View’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, (1992) pp. 77-98  
199 C. Murphy, ‘The Promise of Critical IR, Partially Kept’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 33, (2007) pp. 117-
133 
200 See, P. T. Jackson, ‘Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism and IR Theory’, Review of International Studies, 
Vol. 34, (2008) pp. 129-153 and P. T. Jackson, ‘Hunting for Fossils in International Relations’, International Studies 
Perspectives, Vol. 9, (2008) pp. 99-105 
201 See, J. De Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement, (Blackwell Press, London, 1987) and 
M. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography and Policy Analysis, (Uni. 
Of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988) 
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approach to IR in their edition of International Studies Quarterly.202 The Post-Structural IR Literature 
used this meta-theoretical critique to unpack the assumptions around state identity as well as foreign 
policy.203 In breaking down the disciplinary assumptions, such as anarchy, that hold mainstream IR 
together, post-Structuralist IR offers a way of cutting across and breaking down this understanding of 
the field. Walkers Inside/Outside is a key text which looks at the way in which the field can be 
conceived politically.204 I give a closer analysis of Walker’s text later in the thesis. But we can see in 
this mode of analysis, the breaking down of the field’s core assumptions in order to highlight areas 
that have but occluded. As I have signalled earlier we can see a similar vein in work by Bleiker205 but 
that of Der Derian.206 Der Derian’s reading of networks as well as unpicking the role of the quantum 
in IR offers and alternative reading of the fields understanding and underpinning within physics 
provides another ally to which I am writing this thesis. By unpacking the assumptions that enable a 
conception of IR and consciously exploring the way in which the field organises itself politically Post-
structuralist IR aligns with the contribution of my thesis. This enables my contribution of a Rancièrian 
theory of IR to be read as a new way of configuring our understanding of the field. I offer a contribution 
to this literature as my thesis offers a modality of understanding IR and its relationship to practical 
material international relations that questions how such a rationality is projected.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn out my argumentation through the historical trajectory of the great “debates” 
in IR. I have foregrounded my contribution and analysis of anarchy by charting its history. This, in light 
                                                          
202 R. Ashley & R. Walker, ‘Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing in the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of 
Sovereignty in International Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, (1990) pp.367-416 
203 See, R. Bleiker, Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
2005) and D. Cambell, ‘The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire and the Sports Utility Vehicle’, American Quarterly, 
Vol. 57, No. 3, (2005) pp. 943-72 
204 R. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 
1993) 
205 R. Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2000) 
206 J. De Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network, (Westview, 
London, 2001) 
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of the introduction, can be read as me foregrounding my contribution, location and voice within the 
field. I have in this chapter given an (ac)count not only of my own position but where and to who that 
position could have value. This analysis, specifically of anarchy is then carried over into the next 
section which addresses the particulars of IR’s theorisation of anarchy. Broadly we can see this chapter 
as giving a literature review which highlights not only the location of my contribution to IR but where 
and to whom I am writing in IR.  
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Chapter Two: 
Anarchy as an Organising Principle of IR 
Introduction 
In Chapter One I charted and organised my contribution to the field. I showed how anarchy developed 
across the field as an organising principle. In this chapter I build on the analysis developed in the 
literature review and argue that understanding Anarchy will also prefigure my Rancièreian framework 
which shows how anarchy constructs IR’s distribution of the sensible. That is to say, I mark out my 
own understanding and build on my justification for moving Rancièrian thought into IR through 
understanding anarchy as providing a basis for the distribution of the sensible in IR.  
I begin with an exploration and an immanent critique of anarchy in the field. The second section of 
this chapter cements this reading of anarchy within a close reading of Waltz. I argue that the concept 
of anarchy, by virtue of its function of ordering the field is also a point at which politics can be 
leveraged. This is important for thinking my contribution to the field. I discuss some extant critiques 
in the literature and argue that if we are to understand anarchy as an ordering principle than this will 
have an impact on what can be understood as politics in IR through my Rancièrian lens.   
Anarchy in IR Theory  
Anarchy is often understood taken as the organising principle of IR,1 both a starting point for 
understanding it but also central to theories of it.2 As I charted in the literature review, anarchy has 
been central to the Realist understanding of IR as well as the development of the field. It is not a 
theoretically neutral term but, rather, comes from a particular theoretical and thus political 
                                                          
1 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, London, 1979) pp. 88-89 
2 K. Booth, ‘Security In Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practise’, International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3 
(1991) pp. 527-528 
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orientation.  Within this section I will work through how anarchy can be understood to act as the 
organising principle in IR theory.  
While anarchy is central to the Realist understanding of IR it has been challenged by a variety of 
approaches.3 Lake, for example, looks at thinking through hierarchy as an alternative organising 
principle for IR.4 This mode of analysis is similar to that employed by Donnelly5 in thinking through the 
structural and hierarchical nature of IR theory. By reading hierarchy as the organising principle of IR, 
as opposed to anarchy, these authors seek to problematize the field’s latent understanding of anarchy 
as a central, elective6 tenet. Lechner argues that such approaches don’t actually tackle the concept of 
anarchy itself but rather look to challenge theories of anarchy.7 She argues that the movement 
towards hierarchy as an organising principle fails to recognise the way in which hierarchy is extant 
within Waltz’s and Bull’s theorisations of anarchy.8 Following Lechner I contend that by working 
through how anarchy orders IR and IR theory, we can see that anarchy operationalises both a material 
and conceptual hierarchy. As such I don’t focus on hierarchy as the ordering principle since it is 
coterminous with anarchy.9 It is important for me to draw this distinction here not to dismiss the 
                                                          
3 D. Lake, ‘Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions’, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1, 
(Summer 2001) pp.130 
4 See, D. Lake, ‘Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions’, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1, 
(Summer 2001) pp.130 and D. Lake, Hierarchy in International relations, (Cornell Uni. Press, New York, 2009) 
and D. Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’, International Studies Review, Vol. 5, (2003) pp. 
303-323 and D. Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy In Its Century, (Princeton Uni. Press, London, 
1999) 
5 See, J. Donnelly, ‘The Discourse of Anarchy in IR’, International Theory, Vol. 7, No. 3, (November 2015) pp. 393-
425 and J. Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2000) and J. 
Donnelly, ‘Rethinking Political Structures: From ‘Ordering Principles’ to ‘Vertical Differentiation’- and Beyond’, 
International Theory, Vol. 1, No. 1, (March 2009) pp. 49-86 and J. Donnelly, ‘The Elements of the Structures of 
International Systems’, International Organisations, Vol. 66, (Fall 2012) pp. 609-643 and J. Donnelly, ‘The 
Differentiation of International Societies: An Approach to Structural International Theory’, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1, (2011) pp. 151-176 
6 M. Kim & S. Wolford, ‘Choosing Anarchy: Institutional Alternatives and the Global Order’, International Theory, 
Vol. 6, No. 1, (March 2014) pp. 28-67 
7 S. Lechner, ‘Why Anarchy Still Matters for International Relations: On Theories and Things’, Journal of 
International Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2017) pp. 342 
8 Ibid. 343 
9 See, P. Haldén, ‘Heteronymous Politics Beyond Anarchy and Hierarchy: The Multiplication of Forms of Rule 
750-1300’, Journal of International Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2017) pp. 266-281 and P. MacDonald, 
‘Embedded Authority: A Relational Network Approach to Hierarchy in World Politics’, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2017) pp. 128-150 
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approach of hierarchy but to make clear my focus the reasons for which are given in more detail in 
this chapter. 
We have to look at how anarchy is read in the field, at the distinct meaning the term has (contrasting 
with lay or popular understandings but also with political philosophy and theory.10 Pritchard and 
Havercroft argue that there are tensions in how anarchy is read in IR.11 They open up the way in which 
it has been read across the field as both order and alternative modes to theorisation outside of order.12 
Pritchard13 and Pritchard and Cerny14 look at the way which anarchy changes over time within the 
field. Anarchy in IR theory doesn’t have the same connotation of disorder that it connotes in the public 
vernacular15 or the anarchist tradition.16 Rather within IR it is constructed both as the absence of a 
centralised authority but also as the material condition of IR. Sjoberg drawing on Pritchard states that 
the substantive existence of anarchy is separate from the approach taken by theorists.17 Sjoberg uses 
Pritchard’s four categories across anarchy as a virtue, an object to be tamed, a condition to be 
ascended and worthy of having its virtues reconsidered.18 I argue, like Sjoberg19, that rather than 
reconsidering the virtues of anarchy we need to move towards thinking about the rationale between 
anarchy and its ordering of IR. While Sjoberg looks to the formal and substantive distinctions within 
anarchy,20 I focus on its function as an ordering principle and the consequences this has for politics in 
IR.  
                                                          
10 E. Cudworth and S. Hobden, ‘Anarchy and Anarchism: Towards a Theory of Complex International Systems’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2, (2010) pp. 400-401 
11 J. Havercroft & Alex Pritchard, ‘Anarchy and International Relations Theory: A Reconsideration’, Journal of 
International Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2017) pp. 252-265 
12 Ibid. pp. 255 
13 A. Pritchard, ‘Collective Intentionality, Complex Pluralism and the Problem of Anarchy’, Journal of International 
Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2017) pp. 360-377 
14 P. G. Cerny & A. Pritchard, ‘The New Anarchy: Globalisation and Fragmentation in World Politics’, Journal of 
International Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2017) pp. 378-394 
15 H. Leira, ‘Anarchy in the IR!’, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 8, No.1, (2007) pp. vi-vii 
16 S. Newman, ‘Crowned Anarchy: Postanarchism and International Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, (2012) pp. 259-278 
17 L. Sjoberg, ‘The Invisible Structures of Anarchy: Gender, Orders and Global Politics’, Journal of International 
Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2017) pp. 327-328 
18 Ibid. pp. 328 
19 Ibid. pp. 328 
20 Ibid. pp. 328 
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To think further about how anarchy is understood in IR we have to start with its Hobbesian character.21 
In Leviathan Hobbes presents anarchy as the human-condition before the social contract.22 He goes 
as far to describe nations as ‘in the state and posture of Gladiators, having their weapons pointing and 
their eyes fixed on one another’.23 Anarchy in IR is conditioned by Hobbes along lines of fear.24 Thus 
anarchy is not just a material fact of the world for Hobbes but also part of a psychological condition in 
its subjects. We can see this line of understanding carried through in Foucault’s understanding of war 
in Society Must Be Defended.25 For Foucault Hobbes’ understanding of the anarchic condition of war 
is a way of bracketing out actually occurring material warfare via a mode of representation.26  This is 
not an easy transition and there is tension between Hobbes’s characterisation of anarchy and the way 
in which he is read into IR.27 However, as Bull28 and Donnelly29 elucidate in their readings of Hobbes it 
is possible to reading this mode of anarchy across the Classical Realist tradition and, as I explore in my 
close reading, the latter Neo-Realist turn. The understanding of Hobbesian anarchy is then 
foundational for the way in which anarchy is understood in the field. From this survival becomes 
understood as the predominant motivation for states within IR30 as well as the racialization of 
hierarchy.31 Hobbes’s construction of anarchy applies only in relation to the sovereign at the domestic 
                                                          
21 T. Christov, ‘The Invention of Hobbesian Anarchy’, Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2017) pp. 296-
310 
22 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2012) pp. 86-90 
23 Ibid. pp. 90 
24 See, N. Boulting, ‘An Architecture of Fear: the Relevance of Hobbes’s Tripartite Contribution’, Distinktion: 
Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 12, No. 2, (2011) pp. 135-155 and A. Karatzogianni, ‘Schizorevolutions 
Versus Microfascisms: The Fear of Anarchy in State Securitisation’, Journal of International Political Theory, Vol. 
13, No. 3, (2017) pp. 284-285 
25 M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège du France 1975-76, (Allen Lane, London, 2003) 
pp. 97 
26 Ibid. pp. 50 & 97 
27 D. Armitage, ‘Modern International Thought: Problems and Prospects’, History of European Ideas, Vol. 41, No. 
1, (2015) pp. 116-130 
28 H. Bull, ‘Hobbes and International Anarchy’, Social Research, Vol. 48, No. 4, (1981) pp. 720-722  
29 J. Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2000) pp. 13-15 
30 L. Odysseos, ‘Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorising in International Relations’, 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, (2002) pp. 403-418 
31 See, P. Moloney, ‘Hobbes, Savagery and International Anarchy’, The American Political Review, Vol. 105, No. 
1, (2011) pp. 189 – 204 and J. Hobson, ‘Back to the Future of ‘One Logic or Two’? : Forward to the Past of ‘Anarchy 
vs. Racist Heirarchy’?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4, (2007) pp. 581-597 
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level and the anarchic within IR.32 This distinction is important for how anarchy is read into the field 
as it forms a constitutive absence which organises state relations. Without the void of anarchy IR 
would be necessarily compressed into a singularity of sovereignty and the field would melt into that 
of domestic politics. Anarchy structures the field not through a surplus but rather through an absence. 
That is to say, in contrast to a constitutive presence or condition such as sovereignty anarchy operates 
is a constitutive absence. Let us look at this further.  
Anarchy structures the field through setting the conditions for sensibility of IR. This means, especially 
in light of and for the Realist tradition, that it provides a background ontology against which states 
construct their own identities, capabilities and self-understanding. Anarchy delimits the possibility for 
state action as it organises the space in which states find themselves. While this may seem like a 
Constructivist claim it can be seen to operate within the Realist tradition.33 Indeed, anarchy operates 
as a constitutive absence throughout Realism. As I argued in Chapter One Carr, who established 
Realism via a self-orchestrated34 challenge to Idealism35, arranged the Realist position as against a 
utopian or idealist understanding of IR.36 His Classical Realism is constructed on an understanding of 
IR backlit by Hobbesian anarchy. Through rejection of the utopic idealised understanding of Idealism 
Carr grounds his argumentation in a notion of reality.37 This is a reality structured along historical lines 
which internalise and subsume anarchy.  Importantly here anarchy referred to the empirical fact of a 
lack of a visible world government or centralised authority.  Carr, then, constructs anarchy not as a 
                                                          
32 J. Garner, ‘Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Relations’, American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 19, No. 1 (1926) pp. 8  
33 See C. David LaRoche & S. Frankel Pratt, ‘Kenneth Waltz is Not A Neo-Realist (And Why That Matters)’, 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 24, No. 1, (2018) pp. 163 and J. Mackay & Christopher David 
‘LaRoche, The Conduct of History in International Relations: Rethinking Philosophy of History in IR Theory’, 
International Theory, Vol. 9, No. 2, (2017) pp.203-236 
34 B. Schmidt, ‘Anarchy, World Politics and the Birth of a Discipline: American International Relations, Pluralist 
Theory and the Myth of Interwar Idealism’, International Relations, Vol.16, No.1, (April 2002) pp.8-31 
35 M. Cox, E.H. Carr: a Critical Appraisal, (Palgrave, New York, 2000) 
36 P. Howe, ‘The Utopian Realism of E. H. Carr’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, (July 1994) pp.277-
297 
37 P. Wilson, ‘The Myth of The First Great Debate’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5, (December 
1998) 
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structural consideration but rather an internal factor, inherent within “human nature”. This fixation 
on “human nature” serves as a positivistic driver of an implicitly Hobbesian anarchy.   
We can see this again in Morgenthau who reads “human nature” as threefold: biological, rational and 
spiritual.38 At the centre of this understanding is human embodiment. This gives IR an ontological basis 
in “human nature” as well as its driving force of animus dominandi (the desire for power). This is for 
Morgenthau both a Hobbesian and ontological condition of human existence.39 Kostagiannis highlights 
for Classical Realism how the individual condition of anarchy becomes a collective condition for IR.40 
Anarchy then, and the climate/feeling of fear that accompanies it, becomes central to the way in which 
statesmen and states understand their relations to each other. Here the way in which anarchy 
constructs IR becomes clear in that it establishes the condition by which IR becomes intelligible to 
those carrying it out and those interpreting it. For Classical Realism, and as I have argued in the 
literature review the rest of the field, anarchy is a facet of the international system which must be 
understood, operationalised and respected in order for IR to function. Anarchy is then constitutive of 
IR in the same way that a chess piece’s move-set is based on its ontology. While there are a vast array 
of strategies and tactics one can pursue with such pieces the framing of their movements is pre-
ordained. Similarly, states must act within the reality that produce. Anarchy then becomes an 
ontological status linked to the human condition and delimits the possibilities of IR. Anarchy is not 
simply a structure within/of the system but that which actively structures the system itself. A structure 
that is not a presence but rather an absence.  
The Classical Realist understanding of anarchy is particularly in the way it highlights and makes clear 
how anarchy acts not only as an ordering principle but also as an ontological grounding for the field. 
The Neo-Realist understanding of anarchy is particularly important for seeing how the concept 
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structures the field. As I show through a close reading of Waltz this approach separates anarchy from 
the individual condition of humanity and instead makes it a structural feature of the system. The 
negativity of anarchy as a constitutive absence becomes the permissive cause of state behaviour and 
thus assumes an active ontological reality. It begins to exert causal effects on states. Anarchy operates 
at a central position in relation to the other assumptions of Neo-Realism and while these do contribute 
to the creation and performance of Neo-Realist theory this rests upon the permission of anarchy. The 
assumption of a permissive cause necessitates a hierarchy between the body which permits and the 
agent who acts. Anarchy then, while always silent, is nonetheless permissive and adopts a preferential 
position, above other modes of causation, within this reading of IR.  
I argue that Anarchy is a constitutive absence structuring the field through setting the conditions for 
the sensibility of IR. In thinking anarchy as an ordering principle, we can see how it is read in the Realist 
tradition as an ontological feature of IR theory this is significant for both my argument and 
contribution.  
Anarchy in Man the State and War  
I read through Kenneth Waltz’s Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis in order to highlight 
exactly how anarchy can be seen within IR. I chart the movement of anarchy throughout the text and 
highlight how, rather than just being a third image phenomenon, it is immanent throughout animating 
the text as a constituent absence. Waltz contended that the book ‘did not present a theory of 
international politics’ but simply laid its foundations.41 I argue that this produces the foundation for 
theorisation the text rests upon a specific theorisation of anarchy as a constitutive absence. This line 
of thought forms a central station for my contribution and argument. 
Before I move to the reading it is important to justify my selection of the text, its context and location 
within Waltz’s work.  I have chosen to read Man, The State and War, as opposed to Theory of 
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International Politics42, or Realism and International Politics43, as this text is the one in which the 
notion of permissive causality is at its clearest. Man, The State and War, like The Origins of War in 
Neo-Realist Theory44 and Structural Realism after the Cold War45 looks at how anarchy acts as the 
permissive cause in IR. Within Waltz’s work Man, The State and War is an earlier text (based on his 
dissertation)46 and it directly articulates his theorisation of war. This is important as work such as 
Evaluating Theories47, The Stability of a Bipolar World48 and Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory49 
provide accounts of Waltz’s theory that don’t necessarily focus on the relationship between anarchy 
and IR. Man, The State and War gives this articulation clearly and with a focus on the way in which 
anarchy structures the field. The other text that is important to bear in mind is Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics, an important and robust theorisation of Waltz position but one which, given its 
aims of articulating a thin holistic theory of IR, doesn’t have the detailed analysis of the way in which 
anarchy has causal power in IR that we find in Man, The State and War.  
The text is structured by three different “images” of the international system. Each chapter on an 
“image” is followed by one discussing its implications. In this reading I focus on the articulation of the 
“images” themselves but will discuss some of the relevant implications. Waltz takes each “image” as 
providing the separate functions that become visible from that viewpoint.50 The notion of the “image” 
is interesting in itself - images are not bound by a necessarily strict hierarchy but rather can be viewed 
both separately and simultaneously.51 The use of “image” also highlights the way in which there is an 
overlap between these categories. These for Waltz a way of “seeing” IR that is eminently sensory. 
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While Waltz denies there is a strict or necessary hierarchy between these “images” it becomes clear 
that there is at least a latent one which privileges the third “image” and by extension anarchy within 
the text. Each of these “images” is meant to give a potential cause of war in IR. The first looks at human 
nature, the second the composition of the state and the third the structure of the international system 
(anarchy). In their presentation Waltz draws up the “images” as theoretical approaches which are 
substantiated by examples from history, economics and politics. The text has been read as targeted 
at liberal understandings of IR52 and it is part of the movement from Classical Realism to Neo-Realism 
as is clear from Waltz’s critique of Morgenthau53 as well as the move towards game theory.54  
Waltz begins the book with an allegory between war and natural disaster.55 He rejects the 
essentialisation of warfare as divine or natural and asserts that there are three possible cause of war.56 
Each of these becomes one of the “images” that act as Waltz’s mode of analysis. Each is a ‘nexus of 
important causes’.57 Thus, Waltz reduces the complexities of empirical reality so as to make visible a 
distinct understanding of IR. Just as changing the focus on a camera can reveal and obscure details in 
the subjects of the photo so too can the differing “images” of international relations reveal and 
obscure causes of war.   
Anarchy and the First Image 
Waltz begins by looking at the claim that the causes of war are found in the nature and behaviour of 
individual humans.58 The first image, then, locates War within “human-nature”. Among those who see 
with this image ‘there are both optimists and pessimists’.59 Waltz reads philosophical pessimism as the 
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mode of understanding expressed within Morgenthau, Malthus and Milton.60 For the Waltzian 
pessimist ‘the forces of evil may be contrived but the expectation of a generally and permanently good 
results is prevented by constant awareness of the vitiating effects of an essential defect’.61 For the 
optimist reality is ‘good, [and] society basically harmonious’.62 Waltz draws out here an ontological 
distinction between two viewpoints on reality which each give an ethical colour to it. Waltz divides 
these two first “image” approaches into distinctly ethically charged categories and in doing so stakes 
out two separate ontological positions.  
The optimist then becomes written into a universe that is inherently ethical at the ontological, the 
pessimist into one that is inherently defective. In establishing this distinction between optimistic and 
pessimistic readings of the first “image” Waltz begins to privilege the position of the pessimist. This 
move has an interesting character as it works through devaluing the notion of Spinozan anarchy.63 
Anarchism here differs from its usual form as a lack of government. Within this deployment of anarchy 
in the first “image” there is already a simplification – one which obscures the fact that between the 
optimist cosmology and pessimist cosmology anarchy is contested. For the optimist, the moral 
orientation inherent in the world means that the absence of laws in a state of anarchy is not a lack of 
law qua law; natural moral law is inscribed in the universe. But this is not how the concept must 
function within Waltz’s thought. There, anarchy is implicitly inscribed with a lack of moral character. 
Through the division of the first “image” into the separate ontological categories Waltz sneaks in the 
assumptions he later relies on to disavow the optimist framing of the first “image”. More importantly 
he sets up the pessimist ontological framing as the a priori condition of the international system and 
anarchy then becomes a term loaded with “pessimistic” connotations. This is how the meaning of 
anarchy can shift from something harmonious, as in Spinoza,64 to something inherently discordant.65 
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This is really important for our understanding of anarchy in IR. This movement which enmeshes 
anarchy into the pessimist orientation shapes how the concept works in the field.  
The first “image”, which is concerned with the nature and behaviour of “human nature” as the cause 
of war, builds on the established distinction between optimist and pessimist to set up a difference in 
the way in which causation works.  In this distinction Waltz establishes a simple maxim which can be 
tested: war can be eliminated if humans can be changed.66 This becomes the stakes of the first 
“image”. Drawing on Spinoza, Augustine, Niebuhr and Morgenthau, Waltz establishes the condition 
of war, and anarchy as related to reason and passion.67 Following this distinction between rationality 
and passion Waltz links the causal explanation of war to “human nature” and therefore a panoply of 
human activities.68 Although for Waltz these activities and our “nature” are outside of our ability to 
change them69 it is possible to reduce the play of human’s passions.70 Rather than the first “image” 
serving as a cogent explanation of the cause of war, Waltz instead begins to argue for the transition 
to a different “image”. The first “image” then becomes inherently unable to explain the occurrences 
of war in the international system other than by claiming responsibility for the wars themselves. This 
logic Waltz highlights has been employed both by his optimists and pessimists through firstly, noticing 
conflict, secondly asking themselves why it occurs and, thirdly, pinning the blame on a small number 
of behaviour traits.71  
Waltz smuggles in the conception of anarchy as the cause of war not only through ontological claims 
but also through shifting usage of the terminology. Initially he identifies the term as a positive 
condition, as in Spinoza.72 But quickly it gathers negative connotations of lawlessness and chaos.73 
These are possible only because Waltz has already adopted his own pessimistic ontological structure. 
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He does not make an argument for the pessimist condition he tacitly endorses. Instead it is always 
already assumed in order for the state to act as a buffer against the tide of war. The arguments he 
does give for the adoption of the pessimist condition are linked firstly to the denegation of the optimist 
position74 or adopted as a mechanism by which to argue against the adoption of a world state.75 
Waltz, then, is not simply analysing the role that human nature and activity have in the occurrence of 
war but instead setting up the preconditions for his theoretical structure. He smuggles anarchy into 
the first “image” through the conclusion that the immutability of human nature means it is subject to 
mutable institutions.76 “Human nature” is taken as natural and therefore outside of our agency 
whereas states and the international system are not natural and therefore subject to our agency. The 
fact that agential activity can be inscribed on the state means that as causes of war that can be 
influenced/explained by humans it is a more powerful cause. This is Waltz shifting the image already 
within the first “image” away from the individual and into institutions. This prefigures the structural 
move to anarchy. It is why he requires the chapter arguing and excluding the behavioural sciences 
from the field.77 The claims made there are precisely that the human form is mutable not just by 
contingency but through human technique.78 I won’t spend to the time to work through the 
argumentation of this chapter here as it doesn’t bear as closely on the role of anarchy as the chapters 
on the “images” do.  
The arguments surrounding the first “image” do more than just highlight its unserviceability as an 
explanation for the cause of war. They are in fact concerned with establishing - through a series of 
assumptions and negations -the preconditions of Waltz theory. His division between pessimist and 
optimist enables his ontological framework which then orients the international system against 
progressive understandings of history and loads anarchy with an inherently amoral if not always 
                                                          
74 Ibid. pp. 38 
75 Ibid. pp. 66 
76 Ibid. pp. 41 
77 Ibid. pp. 42-79 
78 Ibid. pp. 47 
Page 78 of 278 
 
immoral content. Importantly this sets the terms of anarchy for the rest of the text and more broadly 
for Waltz’s theoretical project. It is through this conclusion that Waltz manages to redirect the first 
“image” away from the site of human nature and onto the melding of human nature as by its 
institutions. The cause of war then already becomes enmeshed with international anarchy.79 By raising 
the spectre of world-government, which is untenable given the pessimist ontological orientation, 
Waltz moves the question from “human nature” in relation to the human to the international system 
in relation to “human nature”. This highlights how Waltz is not concerned with the actual condition of 
“human nature” but instead with how humanity is shaped by its relation to the international system - 
which is anarchic. The first “image” wasn’t about the role of “human nature” but instead the role of 
the anarchical international system and its relation to that “human nature”. The third “image” is 
hidden behind the first and IR is ordered by a constitutive absence. Waltz represses and reformulates 
anarchy within the first “image” precisely so he may impregnate that “image” with anarchy. This is the 
theoretical condition for the later claim that that ‘those who, seeing the cause of war in men, seek to 
change them80 and inevitably come to see ‘world government’ as the “psychological” foundation for 
peace.’81 Anarchy, the third image, is the condition of possibility for the first.  
Anarchy and the Second Image  
In developing his concept of the second “image” Waltz takes the relation between the state and the 
individual as metonymic.82 A human being is like a liquid: ‘water running out of a faucet is chemically 
the same as water in a container, but once the water is in a container, it can be made to “behave” in 
different ways.’83 The state, then, is a metonymic container for “human nature” – one which has 
effects on behaviour. To develop this images Waltz asks two sets of initial questions about the causes 
of war. The first look at the nature of international politics, the second at the nature of the state.84 
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Waltz raises this notion of international politics openly but diverts it to the third “image” and 
delineates the nature of the state as the level of analysis for the second “image”. The argument is that 
the internal nature of states will determine the likelihood of their engagement in war. The metonymy 
to the first “image” is increasingly apparent here as states act as like units to humans.   
Waltz initially develops this as a positive claim through the work of Bodin.85 He considers the claim 
that a reformation of state “nature” could, just as if you could change “human nature”, lead to the 
reduction or elimination of war.86 Within both the first and second “image” warfare is a pathology. 
The defective humanity of the defective state act as the causal drivers for war. Thinking back to the 
initial division of war as separate from the natural and divine phenomena we can see how this barrier 
is already broken down. If war can be considered a pathological state of being, then it is in a sense 
already outside of the control of human agency. Waltz here makes war a phenomenon outside of the 
remit of human action and places it in the bounds of the state.  Waltz draws out two examples of 
theories of potentially “good” states: Kant and Marx87 (although there remains much of Hobbes 
throughout).88 Waltz’s understanding of the “image”, then, is not of states as war-wagers but, rather, 
states as war-producers. This means that the condition of war emerges not from the actions of states 
but from their “nature”.  
Waltz attacks this thesis but in doing so has already shifted the relationship by deferring the agency 
of states to the third “image”. Cycling this deferral back to the first “image’s” location of human nature 
as linked to international politics we can see a pattern by Waltz relies on anarchy to sustain his 
argumentation. By delineating the questions between state action and structure Waltz applies the 
pressure of the third “image” before he has defined. If there was no third image with which to credit 
the agential capacities of states, then the second image would cease to be about the nature of states 
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but instead focus on their capabilities.  This movement would then stop war being a pathology of 
states very being and become a method for state action. However, Waltz’s reliance on anarchy means 
that only in the third “image” can IR distinguish war-as-method-in from war-as-symptom. 
While this is given as an explanation of the second “image” it is only understandable if viewed 
implicitly from the third “image”. The state here engages in warfare out of a desire to alleviate its own 
pathology as opposed to the pathology driving the state. The shifting between the agency of states 
and their relation to the system and war already shows how anarchy seeps into the constitution of 
the second “image”. To go back to the analogy given by Waltz, the second image isn’t truly about 
looking at the differing sizes and shapes of pots in which water boils. Rather it is about looking at the 
ways in which containers can be shaped to affect the boiling of water. By re-reading Waltz’s metaphor 
like this we can see that the second “image” is already doing more work than simply explore how 
states are internally constructed: it is foregrounding and reliant upon anarchy.  
We can see this reliance traced throughout the commentary on the second “image” in that it is 
concerned with the projection/establishment of a political theory and in particular a theory that is 
grounded in an understanding of anarchy. Waltz draws on Hobbes for this foundation.89 As I have 
argued earlier in the chapter we can see how the Hobbesian understanding of anarchy is baked into 
the formulation of anarchy here. It is worth also thinking about the pessimistic understanding 
presented in the first “image” and how that relates to thinking IR. Waltz carries the inherently negative 
connotations of anarchy through his established pessimist ontology. It is against this backdrop - the 
state as the saving grace of the first image from the inherent negativity of anarchy - that the second 
“image” becomes clear. With the metonymic state as his unit Waltz paints the liberal position as 
making the argument that good states equal a good system.90 From this Waltz unfolds two core 
questions that all socio-economic systems need to answer. The first questions is about what states 
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need to understand what makes them function. The second question is about what makes states 
function well. Returning to my initial reading we can see here how Waltz manages to pathologise the 
state. Waltz’s state then imbibes the liberal prescription but without the potential for the mitigation 
of anarchy.91 States become internally ordered but constituted within a pessimistic cosmology. Within 
the second image then, sovereignty of the state is an essential assumption by which the international 
location of the state is given to appear. State’s become the organiser of the international system 
ordering both themselves and their relationships to each other through their own healthy or 
pathological existence. Although this may seem to lend power to the states the capacity to organise 
and order is itself ordered through the pessimist ontology of anarchy. This constitutive absence shapes 
the way in which states can possibly relate to one another.  
This is the form by which Waltz arranges the second image in which the right of states springs 
unendingly from themselves and the international is arranged by virtue of their salubriousness.92 It is 
important to note here that war, the object of the text’s analysis, becomes an arbiter of state dispute 
and the ordering methodology open to states. As mentioned previously this opens up two divergent 
and conflicting notions of warfare:  war-as-method-in and war-as-symptom-of. This is part of Waltz’s 
critique of the Liberal argumentation that goes unspoken but assumed. War is operating in conflicting 
ways within the second “image” because it cannot take the appropriate distance from the third image. 
The second image serves then to establish through the liberal argumentation a mechanistic state. This 
means the state is formulated through an economic analogy93 and is a like-unit to all other states. This 
mechanistic state is useful for Waltz when zooming up to his third image informed by game-theory. 
By establishing through liberal argumentation, a state that is fundamentally a mechanical actor he can 
carry the metonymy from first to second; to second to third. The ground is laid for a state which can 
be taken as a monolith, essential for Waltz’s political understanding of the third image, and in doing 
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so the constitution of states is moved from their units, whose arrangement is the indicator of good 
health, to their environment.  
The theoretical moves made by Waltz here establish the relationship between the internal 
composition of states and the rationality between states, as well as the assumption of anarchy. Waltz’s 
theoretical aim is to step away from the condition of states themselves and move to looking at how 
anarchy forces their arrangement. Before it is possible for Waltz to highlight how anarchy is the 
permissive cause behind war he first has to eliminate the notion that war springs from the sickness of 
the state. Thus, in critiquing the Liberal frame of IR the second “image” serves his argument in much 
the same way as the first: it establishes the preconditions for the third.   
Within the second “image” the internal ordering of a state becomes detached already from the 
constitution of the state. If political (re)organisation isn’t sufficient to cause war then the cause of war 
must be constituted externally from outside the state i.e. anarchy. With the assumptions given in the 
first “image” and built on through the second it becomes clear that anarchy provides the cause for 
war. The relationships between states under anarchy cannot be coloured by the internal ordering of 
states rather it must be constituted by their outside.  
Anarchy and the Third Image 
The third “image” of the international system is where Waltz brings anarchy to the fore and it becomes 
clear that the cause for war is the structure of the system: anarchy. Conflict becomes not a patho-
logical feature of the construction of states but rather a structural consideration.94 The text constructs 
the existence of sovereign states as an inherently lawless system.95  Waltz here carries through the 
metonymic understanding of the state as individual through to the international system. The 
difference with the third “image” is that the focus shifts to the conditions which shape the 
interrelation of states. There’s a distinction here between the first and second “image” in which the 
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agent has access to differing mechanisms for resolution. In the third “image” agents (states) have no 
recourse to any resolutions outside of their own means. Waltz articulates anarchy to this 
understanding by his adherence to his own pessimist ontology. He states that ‘in anarchy there is no 
harmony’.96 Waltz builds this assertion out of Machiavelli97 and Rousseau98 and it is worth spending a 
little bit of time working his relationship to Rousseau.   
Waltz’s reading of Rousseau is focused solely on the latter’s example of the stag-hunt99 and heavily 
shaped by the former’s pessimist ontology, making the third image into a game of balanced interests, 
rationalities and passions. This then makes anarchy tied to a numerical analysis.100 Anarchy then 
becomes the rules by which IR can be ordered and “played”. Anarchy bridges the gap between the 
understanding of the second “image” state and the problem of action in IR. Waltz builds on this to 
understand that states and state behaviour are only recognisable as such in light of anarchy.101 This 
movement grounds the third “image” in Waltz’s understanding of IR. Through this grounding, states 
become essentialised undifferentiated actors ordered by anarchy. By focusing on anarchy as the 
permissive cause of war in IR Waltz establishes the construction of states as understandable only as 
monolithic entities. We saw this in the second “image” of IR with the distinction being understood 
through a pathologisation. This movement means that the relationship between states and war moves 
from war-as-symptom to war-as-method – as part of the agency of states. States then have the choice 
to go to war based on and because of the condition of anarchy. In making this move Waltz empowers 
the anarchy as permissive condition of action in IR but can only do so as long as it is mute otherwise 
it would be effective. Anarchy by its nature is absence: the absence of harmony102 or law.103  Anarchy 
then is not an inscribed set of conditions or dictates but rather the assertion of its own permissibility.  
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The “silence” of anarchy is important for how Waltz builds his theory of IR. Anarchy orders IR precisely 
as a silent partner. It is the environment within which the immediate causal mechanics of states 
operate.104 Waltz, in developing the distinction between the immediate cause of war and its true, 
permissive, cause – anarchy - gives the environment and thus anarchy itself a privileged position. The 
immediate causes are given in the first and second “image” and organise war-as-symptom-of the 
internal pathologies of human nature and state structure. These immediate causes are, however, 
secondary to the permissive cause of anarchy.105 There is an explicit causal here.106 The environment 
of anarchy shapes and renders sensible the immediate causes of warfare. Anarchy then has 
jurisdiction over the plausibility of war. This is always for Waltz a jurisdiction that is silent in and of 
itself. Anarchy, like Hobbesian liberty, is always permissive. Given the pessimist ontology Waltz 
establishes this makes the silence of that anarchy a-moral. Anarchy then must always be permissive 
in its jurisdiction and not restrictive for Waltz. This isn’t to say that anarchy isn’t restrictive in and of 
itself as it delimits the understanding of IR that is sensible to itself. Anarchy in the third “image” 
doesn’t positively produce the arrangement of IR directly but, rather, is a constitutive absence 
producing IR through its negativity.  
This is an important distinction to draw for my larger argument. Anarchy is like the “dark energy” of 
IR, constantly shaping the system but undetectable and indecipherable. It is essential for the 
functioning of IR yet remains an unobservable and immeasurable quality. This isn’t to say that anarchy 
is a progressive or material force in IR - in actuality it is a silent void which permits state action. But in 
establishing such a void Waltz is free to then fill it with his own a priori. The lacunae of anarchy 
becomes the entry way for Waltz’s own understanding of the functionality of IR. This constitutive 
absence is then a byword for the structural ordering of IR through the permissive and silent causality 
of anarchy.   
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This has an important consequence for sovereignty within IR. Waltz’s mode of (ac)counting IR isn’t 
concerned with the positivity of particular qualities but, rather, the space into which such qualities are 
allowed to unfold. The absence of boundaries and limits becomes constitutive of the system and gives 
licence for the actions of states. The permissive quality of anarchy is therefore doubly potent as it is 
also tied into the causality of the actions carried out by states.  Anarchy doesn’t just allow actions to 
occur in IR but it also allows and enables that action to take place. This isn’t to say that because Waltz 
makes anarchy a void that it is neutral. Rather he maintains that it is devoid of harmony. Anarchy’s 
silent primordial character is constitutive for the system of IR that comes out of it.107 Anarchy is not a 
simply amorphous substrate but is committed to the pessimist orientation Waltz imbues it with. The 
third “image” gives us anarchy as an ordering principle that is a constitutive absence. Anarchy 
structures the sensibility of the field while being imperceptible to it. This is something I take forwards 
in the final section of this chapter. In looking at how anarchy acts as the ordering principle of IR I argue 
this has implications not only for the order(ing) of IR but also for how politics can be understood in IR.  
Anarchy as Opening up Space for Politics 
As I outline in the next chapter in Rancière’s political theory political action is linked to the ordering 
principle of a ‘distribution of the sensible’. As such my argument is that anarchy constructs the 
distribution of the sensible in IR. I begin to explore the consequences that the Anarchy has as an 
ordering principle for IR. This is important when thinking of my location within the field but also how 
my Rancièrian argumentation structures not only my argument in the thesis but my positionality and 
articulation to the field as a whole.  
Havercroft and Pritchard argue that as a concept there has been little work in IR that has sought to 
understand how anarchy is defined within it.108 They seek to break down and understand the ways in 
                                                          
107 Ibid. pp. 238 
108 J. Havercroft & Alex Pritchard, ‘Anarchy and International Relations Theory: A Reconsideration’, Journal of 
International Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2017) pp. 254 
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which it can be mapped within IR.109 In thinking anarchy in IR, they acknowledge how it is assumed 
automatically as the organising principle of the field but want to see a richer understanding of the 
concept fleshed out.110  They offer us understandings grounded in Deleuzian assemblage theory or 
mediaeval heteronomy.111 The move to open up the theorisation of anarchy in IR is not unique to 
Havercroft & Pritchard.112 In thinking through anarchy as an ordering constituent absence it is 
interesting how Sjoberg states the concept is under-theorised.113 Anarchy for Sjoberg operates as an 
invisible structure that orders IR114 this is in line with some of the previous iterations I’ve given. What 
is interesting about Sjoberg’s argument is that the problem of anarchy isn’t just a theoretical one but 
a sensory one also.115 It isn’t just that anarchy structures the field but that it is invisible in this 
structuring.116 
As Sjoberg states, the problem isn’t that ‘Waltzian anarchy presumes that there is no structure within 
anarchy because no structure is visible in global politics.’117  This means that anarchy is not just an 
issue in terms of the theorisation of IR but an issue for sensing within IR. The theoretical and sensory 
apprehensibility of the field itself is determined by anarchy. As she states, her ‘goal is to understand 
the invisible ordering principles that populate anarchy, and then, in turn to, understand anarchy with 
order over a simplistic, empty, version of anarchy that is often the cornerstone of analysis of global 
politics.118’  Sjoberg’s argument is interesting and important for my argument in two ways. Firstly, she 
breaks with the conception of anarchy as empty but rather looks at the way in which it (re)produces 
overlapping modes of order(ing).119 This breaks down the anarchy-hierarchy distinction and looks at 
                                                          
109 Ibid. pp. 253-257 
110 Ibid. pp. 262 
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112 L. Sjoberg, ‘The Invisible Structures of Anarchy: Gender, Orders and Global Politics’, Journal of International 
Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 3, (2017) pp. 327-328 
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how anarchy can be in and of itself hierarchical.  As I demonstrate in the next chapter this has an 
interesting overlap with the concept of arkhè within Rancièrian thought. Secondly Sjoberg’s argument 
charts anarchy as a sensory problem. This, as I have mentioned previously, means that the structuring 
of the field is not solely about theoretical consistently or correlation to empirical reality. Rather 
Sjoberg recognises the way in which anarchy is effective at the level of apprehension. This is important 
for my argumentation as for my reading of Rancière all modes of order(ing) are carried out at the level 
of the sensory. By reading anarchy not only as a concept that enables the propagation of multiple 
modes of hierarchy but also as (re)produced at the level of apprehension my Rancièrian reading of IR 
aligns with Sjoberg’s own reading. This harks back to my introduction which highlights the alliances 
and contribution my thesis is drawing out here.  
In order to articulate Sjoberg’s argumentation to my own it is worth considering the conception of 
hierarchy she deploys. For her, anarchy orders the field formally through its (non)presence but also 
substantively through invisible ordering principles that constrain and constitute the identities and 
behaviour of agents in IR.120 In particular she takes gender as an invisible ordering principle of IR. The 
problem in terms of anarchy and its relation to IR then is a sensory one but also a visual one. For 
Sjoberg politics in IR is linked into making the role of the invisible hierarchies visible. Following on from 
Dingli121 I argue that while Sjoberg is correct in unpicking the sensory nature of anarchy this issue is 
not a purely visible problem. Rather anarchy has a distinctly silent and silencing character. If for 
Sjoberg anarchy is a problem of visibility then for my argument it is not only a problem about what is 
visible but also what is hearable and more broadly sensible. This sensory distinction is worth playing 
out as it is important for the way in which I conceptualise not only the distribution of the sensible but 
for how I argue for the articulation of Rancière to IR. I have shown here how Sjoberg is both a clear 
ally along with which I am writing but also a tension between our argumentation.   
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121 S. Dingli, ‘We Need to Talk About Silence: Re-Examining Silence in International Relations Theory’, European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 4, (2015) pp. 721-742 
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Another ally in the writing of my thesis is Dingli, whose thorough breakdown of the concept and 
literature surrounding silence in IR explicitly draws on Rancière to highlight the political dimension of 
silencing.122 In thinking through silence as a political sensory condition apprehensible only in relation 
to a distribution of the sensible Dingli paves the way for my thinking of Rancière in IR. She also draws 
attention to the way in which the sensory is a political issue in thinking not only IR but, more broadly, 
the international as a whole: ‘the exclusion of women’s experiences from established IR paradigms did 
not mean that women were invisible; rather it illustrated the establishment’s thoughts on their 
significance in international politics.’123 This linkage is important in that it highlights how issues 
surrounding the distribution of the sensible are not just matters of sensibility but are also always 
political. Apprehension structures the way in which IR can be considered a political discipline and the 
politics of IR understood and acted on. This distinction between the way in which (in)visibility is 
deployed in both Dingli and Sjoberg isn’t a distinction between their conceptions of the political but 
rather a distinction between how the political relates to the sensory. In Sjoberg visibility is a political 
reality constructed in relation to hierarchical structures. Anarchy delimits visibility along the lines of 
hierarchies it establishes. (In)Visibility is then a matter of (re)presentation and of the ability to see that 
which is (re)presented in IR. Sjoberg’s critique of anarchy in IR is political, on her terms, as it is a 
political act to render an “invisible” hierarchy visible. Dingli’s politics has a Rancièrian character, it isn’t 
about the (re)presentation of imperceptible yet extant hierarchies but about the ways in which the 
hierarchies are (re)producers of sensible categories. This is an important distinction to draw, not least 
as it highlights the distinctions between my own thought and that of Dingli and Sjoberg Dingli’s 
presentation of silence makes the political act not a question of (re)presentation within IR but rather 
a question of the sensory mechanisms that render subjects apprehensible to IR. This is important as 
when we should think IR both as silent and silencing in the way through which it constitutes the 
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apprehensibility of what subjects can be said to be seen, heard, touched and tasted in IR. The sensory 
nature of anarchy delimits what can be said to be apprehensible.  
This is important to realise for politics in IR as if we don’t understand the way in which anarchy 
organises the field, not only at the formal or substantive level but at the sensory we cannot grasp the 
relations that a Rancièrian understanding of IR opens up for us. In order to think IR as political but also 
politics in IR we need to be attentive to the conditions of apprehensibility that exist in IR. This is where 
my argument about anarchy as essential for understanding how politics can occur in IR comes to the 
fore. I contend that anarchy as the ordering principle of IR constructs its distribution of the sensible. 
Anarchy as an ordering principle establishes the conditions of apprehensibility in IR as well as a series 
of self-evident facts about what can and can’t be taken as apprehensible within IR. Again, this isn’t 
about the material presence of objects within IR, nor is it about their (re)presentation.  Rather this is 
about their apprehensibility, the level at which objects and subjects are sensible within IR.  
Once we understand anarchy as the ordering principle within IR questions of the nature and manner 
of the order are important to raise. As Waltz demonstrates anarchy orders the field as a constitutive 
absence. Such an order isn’t a delineable positive quality. Rather anarchy structures IR as its organising 
principle. This isn’t only just a matter for the sensory and political but rather given this reading of 
anarchy it must also be the location for critique. This is something we see directly in the work of 
Feminist, Narrative and Post-Structural IR theory.  The movement to unpick anarchy requires a 
reworking of the organisation of the field and the sensory possibilities that establish and propagate 
IR. These literatures each serve as an example of the way in which politics can be seen to occur within 
IR as they challenge the structure of the field. Part of this challenge must always be articulated in part 
towards the centrality of anarchy as an organising principle. This is important for my argument as by 
understanding the way in which these literatures challenge the centrality of anarchy but also 
foreground the sensory conditions of possibility under anarchy gives them new political possibilities.  
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Through a discussion and comparison of the work of Sjoberg and Dingli I have highlighted the way in 
which the ordering of IR is not simply a theoretical issue but also a sensory one. I also draw a linkage 
through to the introduction and my position in the field.  I  go on to look specifically at the way in 
which anarchy organises IR in terms of the sensory and the implications this has for thinking a politics 
in IR. This foregrounds my answers to both research questions in that it situates anarchy as the 
organising principle of IR and opens up a space into which I can articulate the work of Rancière into 
IR.  
Conclusion  
I highlight here how anarchy has been the organising principle of IR while also drawing through and 
explication my positionality with IR. My substantiation of my argument with regards to anarchy 
through my close reading of Waltz highlights the distance between my allies and contemporaries I am 
writing alongside and those against which I am writing. This also foregrounds my argument and 
reading of Rancière.  This is something which I carry through in the next chapter where I begin to 
explicitly draw out my own position in relation to IR and cement the justification and use of my 
Rancierian framework in IR.  
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Chapter 3: 
Jacques Rancière & the Distribution of the Sensible   
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I concentrate on my reading of Rancière. I explicate and critically discussing the key 
concepts that define my relationship to Rancière’s thinking. I begin by outlining the shape of Rancière’s 
thought, and some key themes to bear in mind when approaching it. This clears the way for a second 
section which is an extended consideration of the concept of the distribution of the sensible (le 
partage du sensible) while a third introduces and explores three other key Rancierian concepts of 
particular importance for our thinking about IR: arkhè, the Police and politics. The final section, prior 
to the conclusion, explores his notion of wrong. Across these sections I highlight the useful and 
influence of Rancière on my thought as well as the tensions that can be drawn out here. As I argue 
this connects closely to questions about the conditions within which politics takes place. Overall the 
chapter develop my reading of Rancière which I then go on to articulate to IR theory.  
Approaching Rancière 
In this section, I outline a general approach to his work, its relationship to aesthetics, to politics and 
to ontology. I do this through a brief consideration of some key debates about his work.  
Rancière has been read within many fields but in particular Politics and Aesthetics. As we shall see, 
aesthetics and the question of the ‘apprehensible’ are central to my reading of Rancière’s political 
thinking – his text The Politics of Aesthetics acts as a skeleton key to his core ideas.1 His work which 
focuses on artistic forms includes Mute Speech which charts the emergence of literature,2 The 
                                                          
1 J. Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, (Continuum, London, 2011). See also The Aesthetic Unconscious (Polity 
Press, London, 2009), Modern Times: Essays on Temporality in Art and Politics, (Multimedijalni, London, 2017) 
and Aisthesis, (Verso, London, 2013). 
2 J. Rancière, Mute Speech, (Colombia Uni. Press, New York, 2011) pp. 29 
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Emancipated Spectator, concerned with aesthetic and intellectual emancipation,3 and work on 
Cinema such as Chronicles of Consensual Times,4 The Intervals of Cinema5, Film Fables,6 The Future of 
the Image7 and sections of Short Voyages to the Land of the People.8 These works have led to a broad 
and divergent secondary literature applying Rancière to such varied subject matter as dance9, global 
aesthetics (and its inadequacy)10, music11 (including Bruce Springsteen12), body art13, voice14, 
aesthetics and autonomy15, the aesthetics of class struggle16 as well as its democratic character.17  
While this work is broadly relevant, my concern in this thesis is not with how art and politics are 
intertwined but, rather, with the aesthetic nature of politics (as opposed to the aesthetic as politics).18 
As both Davis and Panagia have shown Rancière’s conceptualisation of ‘sensibility’19 can be translated 
as ‘sensory’. Aesthetics and the aesthetic for Rancière are not external to political phenomena which 
are always related to our sensory capacity for encountering the world. The concepts and practices of 
                                                          
3 J. Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, (Verso, London, 2009)  
4 J. Rancière, Chronicles of Consensual Times, (Continuum, London, 2010) 
5 J. Rancière, The Intervals of Cinema, (Verso, London, 2014) 
6 J. Rancière, Film Fables, (Bloomsbury, London, 2016) 
7 J. Rancière, The Future of the Image, (Verso, London, 2008) 
8 J. Rancière, Short Voyages to the Land of the People, (Stanford Uni. Press, Stanford, 2003) 
9 A. Lepecki, ‘Choreopolice and Choreopolitics or, the Task of the Dancer’, The Drama Review, Vol. 57, No.4, 
(Winter 2013) pp. 13-27 
10 B. Bosteels, ‘Global Aesthetics and its Discontents’, Parralax, Vol. 20, No.4, (2014) pp. 384-395 
11 J. Moreno & G. Steingo, ‘Rancière’s Equal Music’, Contemporary Music Review, Vol. 31, No. 5-6, (October-
December 2012) pp. 487-505 
12 R. Harde, ‘“Living in Your American Skin”: Bruce Springsteen and the Possibility of Politics’, Canadian Review 
of American Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1, (2013) pp. 125-144 
13 S. Guènoun, ‘Parody and the Politics of Incarnation: Jacques Rancière’s Politics of Aesthetics and Michel 
Journaic’s Body Art’, Parallax, Vol. 17, No. 2, (2011) pp. 8-20 
14 D. Nowell-Smith, On Voice in Poetry: The Work of Animation, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) 
15 S. Lütticken, ‘Autonomy as Aesthetic Practice’, Theory Culture & Society, Vol.31, No.7/8, (2014) pp.81-95 
16 M. Blechman, ‘Anita Chari & Rafeeq Hasan, Democracy, Dissensus and the Aesthetics of Class Struggle’, 
Historical Materialism, Vol. 13, No. 4, (2005) pp. 285-301 
17 E. O’Rourke, ‘For the Love of Democracy: On the Politics of Jacques Rancière’s History of Literature’, Qui Parle: 
Critical Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 1, (Fall/Winter 2013) pp. 223-234  
18 See, Jacques Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 115-184, Jacques Rancière, The Politics of 
Aesthetics, (Continuum, London, 2011) pp. 12-20. For debates on the aesthetic politics of Cinema see Jacques 
Rancière, ‘When We Were On The Shenandoah’, Grey Room 52, (Summer 2013) pp.128-134; Thomas 
Brockelman, ‘Action Versus Movement: A Rebuttal of J.M. Bernstein on Rancière’, Humanities, Vol. 3, (2014) 
pp.687-698; Elodie Laught, ‘Why Emma Bovary had to be Killed on Screen: From Flaubert to Chabroliva’ Rancière, 
Forum for Modern Language Studies, Vol. 49, No.3, (May 2013) pp. 272-285; Adrian Rifkin, ‘JR Cinéphile or the 
Philosopher Who Loved Things’, Parallax, Vol. 15, No. 3, (2009) pp. 81-87 
19 Davide Panagia, ‘Partage du Sensible: The Distribution of the Sensible’, Jacques Rancière Key Concepts, 
(Acumen Press, Durham, 2010) pp.95-103 
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Art, Rancière argues, are structured by different ‘regimes’.20 These are not periods or set historical 
epochs but rather overlapping forms within a distribution of the sensible,21 structuring and structured 
by the way in which art is encountered and understood22.  He names these distinct regimes: the ethical 
regimes of images23, the representative regime of art24 and the aesthetic regime of art.25 This way of 
understanding art and artwork is not wholly necessary for understanding the political implications of 
Rancière but is coterminous with his thinking on the distribution of the sensible and, as I argue later 
in the chapter, the aesthetic is linked inexorably to the sensory for Rancière. My argument and 
contribution highlight that it is important to bear in mind the relationship politics has to the sensible 
as well as to art.    
Within political thought Rancière has been seized upon in a variety of ways. Todd May, is a prominent 
example, appropriating Rancière’s political framework for the anarchist political movement and 
tradition, using it to develop an argument about the ontological and epistemological conditions for 
political agency,26 a blueprint for planning political action and for ordering the common social world27 
and as a way of undertaking the historical analysis of political equality.28 That is to say, May doesn’t 
delve into and explicate Rancière’s writing so much as use the theory to help his politics. But as 
Chambers argues, May’s reading rests on the assumptions of a “pure” politics29 which, cuts across 
                                                          
20 Ibid. pp. 20-30 
21 J. Rancière, Mute Speech, (Columbia Uni. Press, New York, 2011) pp.6-9 
22 J. Rancière, Aisthesis, (Verso, London, 2013) pp. xii-xiv  
23 J. Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, (Continuum, London, 2004) pp. 20-21 
24 J. Rancière, Mute Speech, (Columbia Uni. Press, New York, 2011) pp. 50-51 
25 J. Rancière, Aisthesis, (Verso, London, 2013) pp. xii-xiv 
26 T. May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality, (Uni. Of Edinburg Press, London, 2008) 
pp. 62-65 
27 T. May, Contemporary Political Movements and the Thought of Jacques Rancière: Equality in Action, 
(Edinburgh Uni. Press, London, 2010) pp. 115 
28 This can be seen primarily in his work The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality, (Edinburgh 
Uni. Press, London, 2008) and Contemporary Political Movements and the Thought of Jacques Rancière: Equality 
in Action (Edinburgh Uni. Press, London, 2010) as well as his journal articles such as Jacques Rancière and the 
Ethics of Equality in SubStance Vol. 36, No. 2 (2007) pp.20-36.  
29 S. Chambers, ‘Jacques Rancière and the Problem of Pure Politics’, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 
10, No. 3, (July 2011) pp. 303-326  
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Rancière’s own writing. It identifies a utopian threshold (be it an anarchist local co-op30 or the Zapistas 
in Mexico31) against which contemporary political praxis and theorisation should understand itself. For 
May, then, this isn’t simply about the methodology or theorisation of political praxis but also its ethical 
orientation. By situating Rancière within the particular ethical, ontological and methodological 
orientation of Anarchism May offers a reading which, with its ‘purist’ conception of politics and 
Manichean division of politics from the Police, cannot be justified by Rancière’s own writings.  
May’s work does, however, contain useful insights into the Rancièrian conception of equality. He 
draws out, effectively and in detail, the way in which equality is both particular and operationalised 
within Rancière’s work. He distinguishes between what he terms “passive”32  and “active”33 equality, 
developing a critique of the former. He highlights that equality when read in its “passive” form is 
always a product of governance -  that is to say it is both governing and governed34 and thus 
distinguishes between the concept as employed by theorists such as Rawls, Nozick, Sen and Young35 
and Rancière’s ‘active’ conception for which the affirmation of equality is foundational for politics. 
This is a helpful distinction, which we will return to, but overall May’s reading involves a trade-off, 
sacrificing Rancière’s the nuance of theoretical argumentation and rejection of political philosophy in 
order to enable the application of his thought to anarchist political discourse.   
In contrast to May, Chambers’ reading and explication in The Lessons of Rancière is lucid, forceful and 
attentive to both the detail and the application of the analysis.36 This is especially so in his reading of 
the concept of ‘subjectivation’37 which he reads as a potential challenge against anthropocentrism.38 
                                                          
30 T. May, Contemporary Political Movements and the Thought of Jacques Rancière: Equality in Action, 
(Edinburgh Uni. Press, London, 2010) pp. 113-117 
31 T. May, Contemporary Political Movements and the Thought of Jacques Rancière: Equality in Action, 
(Edinburgh Uni. Press, London, 2010) pp. 72-101 
32 T. May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality, (Uni. Of Edinburg Press, London, 2008) 
pp. 1-37 
33 Ibid. pp. 38-77 
34 Ibid. pp. 3 
35 Ibid. pp. 6 
36 S. Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière, Oxford Uni. Press, Oxford, 2013)  
37 Ibid. pp. 98-108 
38 Ibid. pp. 106 
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Through the demarcation of speech and disagreement Chambers elucidates the way in which Rancière 
unpacks the functionality of speech as the mode through which subjectivation occurs. Also important 
is how Chambers configures Rancière’s understanding of ontology, taking Rancière’s own hesitation 
to provide an ontological foundation for his theorisation seriously.39 I follow in this vein arguing that 
Rancière, in particular within Disagreement, does not set out a strict ontology for his theorisation40 
and he actively distances himself from what he terms ‘ontologies of superpower’.41  
By this he means that he is not engaging in a mode of charting rupture that is then reducible to the 
emergence of a truth.42 This distinction is important, especially in contrast to May’s reading: Rancière 
is emphatically not a philosopher and he argues very clearly in Disagreement43 and The Philosopher 
and His Poor44 that there is a difference between political theorisation/argumentation and philosophy 
& sociology. Within political philosophy/theory there is a focus on the ontological (super)power of 
rupture, in particular the rupturing power of the true over the false provides a point of anchor for our 
locale.45 To explain this further we can helpfully compare Rancière with his contemporary Alain 
Badiou. Badiou46 whose concept of ‘the state of the situation’ is sometimes likened to the distribution 
of the sensible.47 I draw this comparison not to test its validity but rather to highlight how I configure 
Rancière’s relationship to ontology. In reading this section it is worth thinking about the limitations I 
charted in the introduction with regards to Rancière’s project.  
                                                          
39 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 217 
40 S. Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière, Oxford Uni. Press, Oxford, 2013) pp. 193 
41 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 217 
42 Ibid. 216 
43 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. ix-xiii 
44 J. Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, (Duke Uni. Press, London, 2003) pp. 226-227 
45 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 215 
46 N. Power, ‘Which Equality? Badiou and Rancière in the Light of Ludwig Feuerbach’, Parallax, Vol. 15, No.3, 
(2009) pp. 63-80 
47 While the state of the situation can be read in a similar light to the partage of the distribution of the sensible 
the two are explicitly different. The state of the situation takes its philosophical efficacy from its foundation 
within set theory. It is grounded in a series of mathemes that are ontological propositions. Mathematics for 
Badiou is ontology and the state of the situation arises only out of a set of onto-mathematical conditions dictated 
by the logical relation between sets. The counting of Badiou is literal whereas the (ac)count for Rancière is not 
reducible to a matheme or logical set but rather stems from an arkhè, the logic which makes them 
apprehensible.  
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In Being and Event. Badiou sets out a philosophical framework grounded in a rigorous and logical 
account of mathematics as ontology48, and orientated towards the unmasking of a true understanding 
of the world.49 Badiou’s promise, at the end of Being and Event,50 to expand this framework and work 
through its implication for politics is delivered on in Metapolitics and The Rebirth of History and Ethics51 
and it is here that distinction between Rancière’s and Badiou’s theory of ontology becomes apparent. 
For Badiou ontology is a foundation upon which philosophy must necessarily be built on. For Rancière 
ontology is a form of organising principle fulfilling a Police function.  Badiou characterises the 
Rancièrian understanding of ontology as anti-platonic52 and founded on a ‘negative ontology’.53 This 
reading of Rancière is possible only if one has already accepted Badiou’s assertion that all philosophy 
and anti-philosophy is only possible given a firm grounding in ontology. Badiou, then, in giving primacy 
to the ontology and thus reducing thought in part to it, aligns his own definition of the state of the 
situation with Rancière’s distribution of the sensible.54 In doing so he collapses the aesthetic “fullness” 
of the allocation of parts under Rancière’s distribution of the sensible into his own philosophical 
categorisations of void55 and event.56 Badiou in imposing a framework of “negative ontology” on 
Rancière reduces his theory into, at best, a spectral rendering of Badiou’s own ontological truth. This 
reduction renders Rancière a ‘conjuror of shadows’.57  
What is at work here is the subjection of Rancière’s thought to Badiou’s own ontological frame. In 
order for Badiou to make his critique of Rancière he draws a line of equivalence between the truth 
proposed by his ontological framework and the anti-ontological position of Rancière. Through this line 
of equivalence, it becomes possible to subsume Rancière into the wider philosophical truth of Badiou’s 
                                                          
48 A. Badiou, Being and Event, (Bloomsbury, London, 2016) pp.4-9 
49 Ibid. pp. 455-457 
50 Ibid. pp. 457-458 
51 This can be seen in his texts Metapolitics, The Rebirth of History and Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of 
Evil. 
52 A. Badiou, Metapolitics, (Verso, London, 2005) pp. 114 
53 Ibid. pp. 115 
54 Ibid. pp. 119 
55 A. Badiou, Being and Event, (Bloomsbury, London, 2016) pp.55-64 
56 Ibid. pp. 181-201 
57 A. Badiou, Metapolitics, (Verso, London, 2005) pp.123 
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narrative. Rancière himself dismisses this comparison separating himself from Badiou both historically 
and theoretically. He charts the emergence of Badiou’s argument as a function of reading Lacan that 
valorises ‘the all-powerfulness of the true’.58 My reading of Rancière is not limited to unpacking the 
epistemological relationships within Badiou, at least not directly, but rather an investigation into how 
truth becomes a function of ontology for Badiou. The latter isn’t attempting to draw out a distinction 
between truth(s) and falsehood(s) but rather to translate the terrain of their debate onto that of 
fidelity. Truth for Badiou is an ontological relation which forms the basis of his ethics59, politics60 and 
philosophy61 and his claims in each of these realms are only potent given his ontological framework 
and argumentation. I have argued here that Badiou is, as it were, the archon of ontology providing an 
ethics, politics and philosophy that is an ontological body with an ontological heart.  
Badiou understands Rancièrian thought as nothing other than the shadows cast by a philosophical 
tree62 because, he sees Rancière’s in his rejection of the (super)power of ontology as a break with 
philosophy’s understanding of itself. For my argument true politics is accident as opposed to a knightly 
quest for being.63 What he refers to as the “nights of labour”, which is the writing undertaken by 
working people - are important for both Rancière and myself; not because of their revelation of a 
hidden ontological truth - that workers possess aesthetic autonomy - but because they highlight what 
Rancière calls ‘disagreement’, a break within a sensory regime which specifies who can express what 
and how. Rather than offering a complete and totalising ontology, my argument and reading charts 
that which makes politics (im)possible and how philosophy has articulated itself to, in part to preclude, 
politics.  
Understanding this separation from ontology is important for the present thesis as it opens onto a 
way of thinking which isn’t linked into the quagmire of ontological disputes in which the field is 
                                                          
58 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 216 
59 A. Badiou, Ethics An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, (Verso, London, 2012) pp. 40-57 
60 A. Badiou, Metapolitics, (Verso, London, 2005) pp. 141-152 
61 A. Badiou, Being and Event, (Bloomsbury, London, 2016) pp. 345-358 
62 A. Badiou, Metapolitics, (Verso, London, 2005) pp. 123 
63 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 218 
Page 98 of 278 
 
currently stuck. As we saw in the introduction this conception of ontology is important for my 
contribution but also represents a threshold within Rancière that I am working through. In placing 
Rancière’s thought in conversation with the theorists from the introduction and now Badiou I move 
towards my arguments displacement of the centrality of ontology within IR. Through articulating my 
reading and conception of Rancière to IR (as we will see in the next chapters) I further this 
development while giving it a stronger theory of politics. Bearing this in mind, it is important to 
remember my reading of Rancière is concerned with the sensory, and with a politics that cannot be 
contained by philosophy or ontology.  I now turn to develop my reading of Rancière’s key concepts 
starting with the ‘distribution of the sensible’.  
The Distribution of the Sensible (le partage du sensible) 
The distribution of the sensible is a central concept in both the aesthetic and the political works of 
Rancière. It is also central to my argument in this thesis.  
The distribution of the sensible is given in French as le partage du sensible. In terms of understanding 
the concept the core is within both the French terms partage and sensible. Partage in the French can 
be taken to mean separation, disruption, distribution and even sharing.64 Each of these individual 
concepts are rolled up into the notion of partage. This is important as there is not a clear division 
between dividing and disrupting within the concept of the distribution of the sensible. A partage for 
Rancière is both dividing and connecting.65 This is a core conceptual point with regard to the 
distribution of the sensible.  The distribution of the sensible is a partage that not only “cuts-up” the 
sensible it also makes legible the relationship between its parts.66 Partage is how things are spread 
out and allocated in including the creation of the spaces for and of allocation.  The relationship 
between distribution both as the allocative and relational property with regard to the sensible is 
                                                          
64 S. Chambers, ‘Walter White is a Bad Teacher: Pedagogy, Partage and Politics in Season Four of Breaking Bad’, 
Theory and Event, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 2014) 
65 S. Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière, (Oxford Uni. Press, Oxford, 2013) pp. 70 
66 Ibid. pp. 70 
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important to understand as it configures how the distribution of the sensible works conceptually. 
Partage describes not only the distribution of something but also its division into parts so that they 
can be distributed and their relation to each other. It is a “process” of sorts, not only in the way in 
which things are broken up in order to be distributed but also in how the distribution takes place. The 
breaking up and allocation are completely connected as it involves establishing categories for 
exclusion and inclusion not only in who receives the distributed parts but also in how the distributed 
body is broken apart.  
Sensible also has a large amount of leeway in its translation. Chambers67, Panagia68 and Davis69 read 
the term as meaning sensory/sensitive and sensible. This breadth in the translation of sensible to 
sensory/sensitive/sensible is well documented70 and important for how the concept has been received 
in English. Julie Rose in her translation of sensible opted for perceptible when she translated le partage 
du sensible into the configuration/partition of the perceptible.71 Rose gives preference to the visibility 
of sensibility over the other sensory effects of the sensible. My understanding of the term moves away 
from this restriction to perceptibility in order to highlight the ways in which it relates to a broader 
category of the sensory. In doing this I hope to flesh out my two core concepts that I draw from 
Rancière in relation to sensibility: aisthesis72 (feeling) and aisthēton73 (what is apprehensible to the 
senses). These two terms are essential for my understanding of how sensibility operates. Aisthesis 
(feeling) is important as it relates to the way in which the external world can be encountered and 
understood in relation to and by ourselves. In drawing out these two distinctions I mark a point of 
slight departure from Rancière’s own work and my reading. The preference I place on thinking these 
                                                          
67 S. Chambers, ‘Walter White is a Bad Teacher: Pedagogy, Partage and Politics in Season Four of Breaking Bad’, 
Theory and Event, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 2014) 
68 D. Panagia, ‘Rancière’s Style’, Novel, Vol.47, No. 2, (2014) pp.284-300 
69 Oliver Davis, Jacques Rancière, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010)   
70 D. Panagia, ‘Partage du Sensible: The Distribution of the Sensible’, Jacques Rancière Key Concepts, (Acumen 
Press, Durham, 2010) pp.95-103  
71 This can be seen throughout Disagreement and has been unpicked in great detail by the work of Chambers 
both in his article Walter White is a Bad Teacher and the broader problems with Rose’s translation in Lessons of 
Rancière (pp. 90-97). 
72 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 2 
73 J. Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, (Continuum, London, 2004) pp. 85  
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concepts, while wholly consistent with Rancière’s own though, is an argument I make, partly to push 
beyond the tensions explored in the introduction but also to align my contribution to IR.  
My deployment and reading of aisthesis is important as it sets up my understanding, which comes out 
of Rancière, of how apprehensibility as connected to how the total sensory ‘field’ is broken up and 
expressed through logos. We can see this in the Rancière when he argues: ‘The manner in which this 
organ exercises its function, in which language expresses a shared aisthesis is another’.74 This is an 
argument I take forwards in my own argumentation. Aisthēton (what is apprehensible to the senses) 
is important as it highlights what is viable to be felt by the subject in question. This distinction between 
feeling and that which is apprehensible to the subject is amalgamated within the distribution of the 
sensible as it conditions both aisthesis and the aisthēton of the subject – how both the feeling of the 
subject and what is available for being apprehended and thus felt by the subject are possible. It also 
the condition the possibility of subjectivity. These two terms essentially condition my understanding 
of sensibility that I forward in this thesis. In particular sensibility isn’t just perception or perceptibility 
but rather apprehensibility.  
Apprehensibility in this sense prefigures perception. What is at stake isn’t just what can be perceived 
but what can be recorded both internally and externally as having been perceived. The aisthēton 
enables perception - if an object lies outside apprehension then it cannot be perceptible. Thus, the 
sensible is broader than just perception; it is all sensory objects and their capacity for and feeling of 
their apprehension. By understanding le partage du sensible as a synthesis of partage (the division 
and relation of parts) and sensible (the aisthēton: what is apprehensible to the senses & aisthesis the 
feeling of what is apprehensible to the senses) we can see that it is clear that the term describes both 
the division and the relation between what is apprehensible to the senses.  
                                                          
74 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 2 
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I now develop along Rancierian lines this notion of sensibility into my reading of the distribution of the 
sensible. The first point of clarification is that the distribution of the sensible doesn’t mean “good 
sense” or appropriateness. Instead the distribution of the sensible describes a social implicit law that 
organises the places, apportionment, and relations of the shared experience of the world. This is done 
through establishing the mechanisms of sensory apprehension that are self-validated. From this 
validation the distribution produces assumed facts which delimit what can be seen, done, said, 
thought or made.75 As such the distribution of the sensible conditions the apprehensibility of our 
shared world and our engagement with it. The distribution of the sensible then isn’t concerned in the 
mechanics of sensibility as appropriateness. Rather it sets the very condition through which 
appropriateness can come to be understood as appropriate. We can see this relation between 
sensibility and appropriateness through an example. Imagine that we are going for a hike over a small 
hill. When you arrive, I ask you “did you bring sensible shoes for today’s hike?” Here sensible functions 
as a measure of appropriateness not apprehensibility. By formulating and asking you this question I 
am asking if the shoes you are wearing are capable of withstanding the hilly terrain and such that you 
will be comfortable walking across that terrain in them. Now imagine you have arrived for the hike in 
stiletto heels, this of course would not be sensible for the journey. This doesn’t mean that your heels 
are not apprehensible. They are still subject to my sense. I could see, feel, smell and taste them. This 
example traces out the way in appropriateness is contained within sensibility. Your heels are 
apprehensible as sensible not only in the fact they are presented to my senses but also by the way in 
which they relate to the context in which they can be rendered apprehensible to my senses. The way 
in which heels may or may not be sensible footwear isn’t contained wholly within their existence as 
objects apprehensible to my senses but also the context in which they are apprehensible.  
The apprehensibility of things in the world is related to the notion of appropriateness. While stiletto 
heels are of course an inappropriate mode of footwear for a hike it is the distribution of the sensible 
                                                          
75 J. Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, (Continuum, London, 2004) pp. 85 
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that establishes the criteria against which we can make that judgement. This is important to 
understand as the distribution of the sensible is the organising scaffolding which makes the sensory 
world apprehensible to us. This means that our apprehension of the world it isn’t purely a product of 
our physical senses of sight, touch, smell and taste but also of the “rightness” of the situation at hand.76 
We can see this in Disagreement where Rancière discusses the feeling of a blow: ‘The division of their 
aisthesis is not so obvious: where exactly do we draw the line between the unpleasant feeling of having 
received a blow and the feeling of having suffered an “injury” through this same blow?’77 The personal 
quality of feeling the blow and the social quality of having been dealt an injury are linked. In order for 
this distinction to be recognised, understood and tuned it, there must be a third thing which maintains 
the apprehensibility of the blow, the personal quality and the social quality. Not only this but this third 
thing must also have established a series of relations between these differing qualities. It is the 
distribution of the sensible which establishes a series of “right” relations between these parts.  
Following on from Rancière, I argue that the distribution of the sensible not only already contains the 
categories78 of sumpheron (useful) and blaberon (harmful)79 but also the relationships they have to 
each other and the world.  Taking this forward, it becomes clear that the appropriateness implicated 
by the distribution of the sensible is to prior to thinking of the sensible as good judgement. The 
distribution of the sensible provides the deeper social apprehension or feeling (aisthesis) of the 
appropriateness that makes good judgement possible. The distribution of the sensible then 
establishes the conditions of “goodness” and “judgement”, via a series of self-evident facts. This is 
possible precisely because of the partage by which the distribution of the sensible divides up and 
organises the experience of a common world. The distribution of the sensible is what establishes the 
relations between the partitions of that common world. It creates both the singular qualities felt in 
                                                          
76 “Rightness” here is no ethically charged but instead is used to convey a feeling (aisthesis) of what is 
appropriate and natural. 
77 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 2 
78 Which are already false categories. They are not in some sense permanent or ontological categories but simply 
always designated through their naturalisation via the Police as “right” categories.  
79 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 3 
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the apprehension of the world as well as the common qualities that are laid out, and apprehensible, 
to the subject as well as configuring the relations between them. Through the distribution of the 
sensible not only does the individual proportion become evident but also how such a proportionality 
relates to a broader shared community and communal share.80 This is because, as I have alluded to 
previously, the distribution is at the level of the community. Without the distribution of the sensible 
there cannot be communal relations at the level of apprehension. A distribution of the sensible must 
be extant in order for commonly shared apprehensive links between sensory phenomena and our 
feeling of that phenomes to be possible.  
This is the foundation that enables me to show in more detail how the distribution of the sensible 
impacts on our understanding of the apprehensible world. The first thing that is of interest in this 
interpretation is the concept’s Kantian heritage.81 The distribution of the sensible is, for the individual, 
similar to a conceptual scheme. That is to say the distribution of the sensible is and “acts” a priori. This 
is important for thinking about how the distribution of the sensible influences society and politics. This 
isn’t agential or intentional action but rather what limits and delimits society and politics through 
establishing limits to the objects of apprehension (aisthēton) and our capacity to apprehend them 
(aisthesis). This does not mean that the distribution of the sensible is contained or operates solely at 
the level of the individual subject. The distribution of the sensible operates and delimits the 
experience of the whole social formation. As it sets the possibilities for apprehension it is held 
communally as well as organising as world that is held in common.82  This isn’t to say that individuals 
don’t engage with or experience the distribution of the sensible but, rather, that their experience and 
apprehension is made possible and structured by it. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter Rancière’s 
work on art and aesthetics details the modes of engagement and encounter with art that depend on 
                                                          
80 It is important that I means something to which I return later in thesis: that this division is never perfect. 
Rather this division always a mis- or double count founded that is made possible precisely because of this mis- 
or double counting. I flesh this out in more detail in the sections on politics/the Police.  
81 J. Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, (Continuum, London, 2004) pp.13 
82 Ibid. pp.14-15 
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and transform the distribution of the sensible.83 This is also an important moment when the limitations 
of Rancière’s thought become apparent. It is both this Kantian and Aristotelian heritage that sets 
Rancière’s anthropocentric bias in place. As highlighted in the introduction this is a bias against which 
I am writing but it is important to draw on and at least note the way in which this notion becomes 
clear within Rancière’s own work.   
Partly in response to this limitation I argue it is worth thinking of the distribution of the sensible as a 
form of communally held a priori, self-evident facts84 which formulate the possibilities of 
apprehension within that shared world. Looking back to this Kantian heritage its distinction from 
conceptual schema becomes clear here as it is the partage of the distribution of the sensible that 
enables the communal relations that enable and delimit the communal world. This is distinct from the 
physical and conceptual sensory mechanisms that enable apprehension as the partage also conditions 
that apprehension via these a priori facts, which are held in common. Despite this distinction the 
Kantian heritage of the concept is important in the fact that it is tied to Rancière’s reading of Kantian 
aesthetics, and aesthetic judgement which places feeling (aisthesis) at its centre. It is clear that this is 
due in part to Rancière’s distain for ontological principles.85 Feeling (aisthesis) is established and 
establishes the distribution of the sensible. To be precise it is the conditions of feeling (aisthesis) as 
well as the feeling (aisthesis) of that which is apprehensible to the senses (aisthēton) that are 
established through the distribution of the sensible. I, following Rancière, argue that the distribution 
of the sensible organises and establishes the very notions of sensibility itself. However contra to 
Rancière, and as I charted in the introduction, I don’t place a necessary human limitation on this notion 
of sensing. The distribution of the sensible then, organises what can and cannot be apprehended and 
                                                          
83 An account of this mode of aesthetic engagement with art is given the best account in works such as Aisthesis, 
Mute Speech, The Emancipated Spectator and the sections on the aesthetic in Dissensus. It also worth thinking 
back to previously in the chapter where I mentioned the regimes which structure our reception of art.  
84 The use of the term fact here is not to suggest it is an empirical one. Rather I use the term facts given their 
self-evidence in relation to the distribution of the sensible and out of fidelity to Rancière’s own terminology. The 
factuality of these self-evident facts is linked both to their position as given but also their relationality to the 
distribution as a whole.  
85 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp.217 
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the means of the apprehension that is appropriate to both the individual and the community.86 To 
turn back to the Rancièrian terminology again I contend that it should be understood that the 
distribution of the sensible distributes (nemein) the “laws”  (nomoi) of sensing.87 Turning back on my 
previously identified concepts this can be rewritten with an eye to my previously established 
understandings of feeling (aisthesis) to be read as: the distribution of the sensible having distributed 
(nemein) the objects of apprehension (aisthēton) into feeling (aisthesis). It is this relation between 
aisthēton and aisthesis that is essential in understanding how the distribution of the sensible organises 
the condition by and for apprehension of the community. 
This organisation of sensing makes the aisthēton into an almost tautological basis for sensing.88 This is 
because sensing cannot be reliant on any form of justification outside of itself. The justification for 
apprehensibility comes from within the distribution of the sensible. Aisthesis and the aisthēton are 
self-evident facts produced in relation and by the distribution of the sensible. They become apparent 
due to their own apparition. A tendency here can be to combine the distribution of the sensible with 
the notions of the natural. This is not a recourse to an absolute or an essentialist base rather that the 
distribution of the sensible due to its establishment of facts about the apprehensible that are self-
justifying is often taken as “natural”. This has ramifications when thinking about the commonality of 
the self-evident facts established by the distribution of the sensible.  
As the distribution of the sensible distributes sensing in and of a common world it isn’t simply a matter 
of the individual modalities of sensing but also apprehension at the level of the social. The socio-
political world is inexorably linked to the sensible as opposed to divorced from it. This isn’t an activity 
                                                          
86 A point of clarification I need to draw is that this is not to imply that the distribution of the sensible organises 
a strict hierarchy of sensing. While it could be sufficient for a distribution of the sensible to institute of a hierarchy 
that privileges one mode of sensing over another it is not necessary for the distribution of the sensible to do so.  
87 Another clarification I need to make is that when I talk about laws I do mean the term in the context of judicial 
writ or the diktat of a singular society but rather in the broader sense of the laws of nature. There is a disjunction 
here between the socio-political instantiation of juridical practice and the way in which our reality of things is 
understood to function. As I go on to highlight in the section on Police. One mode of Policing that is prevalent 
within archi-politics is to fold this disjunction into a singularity: the community as the expression of a singular 
ethical virtue.  
88 J. Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, (Continuum, London, 2004) pp.85 
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that a society engages in but rather what makes a society possible. The distribution of the sensible 
grounds the objects of apprehension (aisthēton) and their distribution (nemien) through its partage 
of the “laws” (nomoi) of sensing (aisthesis). This isn’t simply to do with physical sight or touch or smell 
or taste but also the apportioned social and political location - not only how these positions are 
apprehensible but also the “naturalness” of their appearance. Thus, the distribution of the sensible is 
also a distribution of bodies and positions specific to those bodies.89 This is the establishment based 
upon the partage of the distribution of the sensible.  
Rancière fleshes out the way in which we can see this in his article Then Theses on Politics. He explores 
the way the policeman’s mantra: ‘Move along! There is nothing to see here! 90’ operates. This mantra 
is not just a tool by which public order can be maintained but is also a (re)performance of the 
distribution of the sensible. When a policeman tells you to move along they are enacting an assertion 
of the politico-aesthetic laws (nomoi) that are established through and within the distribution of the 
sensible.  
Taking Rancière’s understanding forwards into my own I draw out this example in more detail. Imagine 
there was to be a tragic and bloody murder on a bustling street. The Police arrive at the scene and the 
first thing they do is to cover the body and cordon of the scene. In this act of covering the body and 
erecting a cordon they (re)position and (re)purpose some of the space of the street from being a street 
into a crime-scene through their usage of police tape. They change the conditionality of the space. 
This delimitation of the purpose of the street and the crime scene is dictated and understood through 
conditions established by the distribution of the sensible. Due to the presence of the police tape 
onlookers already and immediately apprehend and recognise the difference in space between the 
street (a space for circulation) with that of the crime scene (a space for investigation). This division is 
achieved through (or as) the establishment of a different understanding of the objects of 
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apprehension (aisthēton) that are available for sensing (aisthesis) within both the street and the crime 
scene. Each delineated space has a different set of self-evidencing facts which render them sensible 
to the people in and around them.  While the police tape formulates a barrier and a relation between 
these spaces it is not a total or absolute one. It could be torn down, cut or leapt over. This doesn’t 
change the fact that there exists a delineation between these spaces made possible and rendered 
apprehensible by the distribution of the sensible. The very possibility of dividing up the space like this 
is made possible because of the distribution of the sensible’s instantiation of both the objects of 
apprehension (aisthēton) and feeling (aisthesis).  
Continuing with this example, the simple act of dividing these spaces is not sufficient to stand on its 
own: it has to be maintained.91 Due to the graphic nature of our hypothetical murder bystanders flock 
to take in the grisly scene. At this point one of the police officer’s steps forwards and tells them ‘Move 
along! There is nothing to see here!’ Within my example of course this makes no sense. There is 
something to be seen behind the police tape, namely the body of the murder victim and the crime 
scene. The policeman doesn’t mean that there is nothing worth seeing behind the tape or that the 
object behind the tape are invisible: this would be lunacy. The statement also isn’t nonsense, it has a 
real meaning that the people rubbernecking understand and act upon. This is because the policeman 
isn’t invoking a literal claim to the invisibility of the scene beyond the tape but rather he is instantiating 
the division of the spaces. This is not the instantiation of a division that solely flows from the power 
of a policeman’s orders. Rather it is the designations of the scene as something that we cannot look 
at anymore. This division of spaces rests already upon our understanding of what is appropriate for 
the street.  When the policeman orders bystanders to move along he is reasserting the distributions 
of the sensible division of spaces: namely the space of the street. The feeling (aisthesis) of the street 
is supported by a series of self-evident facts that preclude looking and sensing within it. The street is 
                                                          
91 This will be spoken about more in the section of the Police as how the distribution of the sensible can be 
understood and maintained.  
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a space of circulation, so the people must circulate.92  Thus, the policeman’s statement that “there is 
nothing to see here!” is in actuality a statement about the role of sensing within the space of the street 
as delimited by the distribution of the sensible. It reads in effect: ‘The Street is a space of circulation 
and not seeing. Therefore, you must stop seeing and start circulating. Move along!’  
This of course is already apparent to the bystanders in the example. They know instinctively that the 
street is a space of circulation and thus that they can be moved along by the policeman. In the example 
of the policeman’s locution it is clear how the distribution of the sensible creates the self-evident facts 
upon which space is delimited with regard to what can be seen, thought, made and done within it. 
Through this establishment there is erected a grid of apprehensibility which channels the always 
excessive reality into an apprehensible common world. As I go onto explore later in the chapter this is 
not a conscious act of power or a false consciousness. Rather it is an understanding of what it means 
for there to be an apprehensible common world and of the way in which this world is made possible 
in relation to the distribution of the sensible. It is not the power of the policeman’s locution that 
divides the space but rather in order for there to be a power it must be rendered apprehensible 
through relations proportioned by the distribution of the sensible. This isn’t a false reality that 
occludes a singular truth whose rupture would enable us to dismantle this false distribution. Instead 
it simply the statement of what must the case in order for a common world to be apprehensible.   
In presenting my example I have argued for how my reading of the conception of the distribution of 
the sensible conditions what can be apprehended within a common world. The distribution of the 
sensible is what establishes the ways in which we can understand what is (in)visible, (un)thinkable and 
(im)possible93 within the community.94 This can be carried through and thought further in terms of 
the ways of doing and making that are possible within an apprehensible common world. As I argued 
                                                          
92 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp.37 
93 I require the parentheticals here to highlight that the distribution of the sensible does not just establish what 
can be positively presence but also what is negative in terms of apprehension. The distribution of the sensible 
establishes the condition of apprehensibility and so establishes the relations between visibility and invisibility. 
Of what can be seen but also what cannot be seen. This is true for all aspects of the sensory.  
94 J. Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, (Continuum, London, 2004) pp.13 
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earlier, the distribution of the sensible sets the condition of such an apprehensible common world but 
it also creates a series of positions and dispositions specific to those positions: a distribution of bodies 
and disposition specific to those bodies.95 The distribution of the sensible makes possible any/all social 
order through its establishment of the conditions of apprehensibility of a common world. As I have 
argued within this section the distribution then makes apprehensible and possible any/all social 
orders, as it makes possible a commonly shared apprehension of the world. This is a basis on and 
against which all social orders must rest. Without an apprehensible common world, social order would 
be impossible. The distribution of the sensible is therefore key to how Rancière understands the social 
and political orderings of existence.  
Arkhè, Politics and the Police  
In this section I explicate my reading of Rancière’s concept of arkhè, specifically in relation to the 
distribution of the sensible. This will be especially important when I move to look at and understand 
my framework in relation to IR. From arkhè I turn to argue how a differing (ac)count96 of the social 
order can be taken in both the counts of politics and the Police.  
Arkhè97 comes from the Greek and can be literally translated as “the point/moment of 
commencement”. The term this has within it a sense or priority and prioritisation. Derrida gives a full 
and comprehensible etymology of the word in his article Archive Fever.98 He links the definition both 
to the moment of commencement and commandment.99 This definition is similar to the one given by 
Rancière.100 One difference between the two, however, is that Rancière focuses on commencement 
                                                          
95 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 36 
96 While this concept might seem poorly worked through I highlight the specificity of the term and the relevance 
of the parenthetical later within the chapter. Broadly speaking the parenthetical represents the fact that every 
count (understanding of the total amount of parts within a system) is also an account of that system. Both in the 
sense of an accounting of as well as a justification for.  
97 My choice of the –khè translation as opposed to arche is made here to highlight the Rancierian allusion back 
to arkhèin. While both choices are synonymous and equally valid the –khè translation avoids a reliance upon the 
connotations of the archons implicitly.  
98 J. Derrida, ‘Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression’, Diacritics, Vol. 25, No.2, (Summer 1995) pp. 9-63 
99 Ibid. pp. 9 
100 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 30 
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over commandment, emphasising priority. Within the Rancièrian usage arkhè is divorced from its 
direct etymological heritage with the archons and tied into the notion of arkhèin - to begin, to lead or 
to rule). This linkage and reading is most prominent in Rancière’s Ten Theses on Politics.101 Arkhèin is 
the form of action that enables commencement:102 it is the active referent of an arkhè. This 
relationship is central to understanding how the concept of arkhè functions within my thesis. It is the 
commencement that is also the foundation for and of any community, its starting point and basis, this 
is central to both my argument and contribution to IR.103 While this might seem like a potential 
contradiction given what I have said about the distribution of the sensible but, as I will go on to argue, 
arkhè is not separate from the distribution of the sensible. Rather I read the two concepts as tied very 
tightly together. Arkhè, for Rancière and myself, is linked to the distribution of the sensible as it 
provides a singular logic around which an apprehensible common world can congeal.   
Before I can flesh out my argument fully I need to first examine the way in which the term’s classical 
heritage shapes and orientates Rancière’s and my own understanding of the term. Understanding this 
heritage is essential for making apparent the way in which I develops Rancière’s concepts and 
arguments. Rancière’s conception of political and the social is most apparent at the level of the city (-
state). 104 The delimitation of space here is useful in thinking about the referents that underlie 
Rancière’s understanding of order (although this doesn’t mean that Rancière’s work cannot be 
translated beyond an individual city). Here of course city should be read a polis, in which the social is 
a bounded space both territoriality and metaphorically. For Rancière the city-state can be read 
smoothly across into the nation-state. This isn’t to step over the historical differences between the 
classical understanding of the city-state and the Westphalian nation-state but rather to emphasise 
that both are territorially bounded and produced by and are productive of a distribution of the 
sensible. This is clearly a limitation for how I can think and understand Rancière in IR. As I go on to 
                                                          
101 J. Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, Theory and Event, Vol. 5, no. 3, (2001) pp. 1-7 
102 Ibid. pp. 28-29 
103 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 13 
104 J. Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, (Duke Uni. Press, London, 2003) pp. 3-30 
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later in this chapter and the next I move to develop Rancière’s thought through its application to IR 
and move beyond his framing of the level of politics at that of the polis.  
In The Philosopher and His Poor Rancière begins with a critique of Plato’s Kallipolis (beautiful city105).106 
This critique consists of showing how the Platonic city primarily rests on the proposition that labour, 
and labourers must be singular in their duties and position and always be available for work.107 The 
positions held by the labourers are singular in the sense that a shoe-maker must only be a shoe-maker. 
The ordering of the city thus determines not only the occupation of the labourer but also the 
limitations of who the labourer can be. Being a shoe-maker within the order of the city isn’t only a 
position but also a disposition. As Rancière highlights, the artisan is conceived of as aspiring towards 
the virtue of sōphrosunē (moderation). For Aristotle gives sōphrosunē is the virtue108 of the labouring 
classes,109 but it isn’t just the virtue of moderation or temperance; it is also about knowing one’s place 
within the social order. The labourers within the city, by the singularity of the labour must be singular 
in their being and social position; the virtue of the labourers lies with their recognition of their own 
singularity. Sōphrosunē entails the understanding that the shoe-maker must only be a shoe-maker and 
not an artist or weekend roofer. We can see here to connection with the distribution of the sensible 
allocations which, we saw, not only positions but also dispositions. In thinking through the relationship 
between a shoe-maker as only ever a shoe-maker we can see how this is created in relation to a 
partage of time – a time spent only in making shoes. From this I argue that the virtue of sōphrosunē 
can be linked back to the distribution of the sensible precisely as a virtue that is the recognition and 
exemplification of that distribution of the sensible. In order for a labourer to possess that virtue of 
                                                          
105 This is also taken as the name for the Socrates utopic city of “gods and men” in the Republic. This is different 
to “real” mythical city of Magnesia in The Laws. 
106 J. Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, (Duke Uni. Press, London, 2003) pp. 3-30 
107 J. Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, (Duke Uni. Press, London, 2003) pp. 22-23 
108 This is not to be confused with the division between the Aristoï, Oligoï & Demos and their requisite qualities 
as explored by Rancière in Disagreement and On The Shores of Politics. Rather here Rancière in reading Aristotle 
is delineating a virtue, as opposed to a quality of the labourers within the city. He is looking at what a good 
labourer should be as opposed to what quality delineates a labourer.  
109 J. Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor, (Duke Uni. Press, London, 2003) pp. 25 
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Sōphrosunē and thus be a “good” labourer they must recognise their existence as only a labourer, the 
partition allocated to the labourer within and by the distribution of the sensible.  
How does this link to arkhè? The virtue of Sōphrosunē, of moderation, is a “double virtue” or “empty 
virtue” in the sense that it isn’t just for the labourers but for all parts of the polis. Every singular 
(dis)position partitioned by the distribution of the sensible must understand and embody their 
singular relation to the whole: they must recognise and internalise the distribution of the sensible as 
such as well as their part in it. The distribution of the sensible is the logic which allots the partition and 
apportionment of the common world.  For the labourer to be a labourer the distribution of the 
sensible must be configured in which a way as to enable to the apprehensibility of labourers and their 
virtue (sōphrosunē). An arkhè is what enables that partition.  
Rancière discusses this in the Ten Theses on Politics with reference to Plato’s Laws.110 Plato establishes 
seven different qualifications to rule and in doing so charts seven different scenes.111 In looking to six 
differing modes of rule Plato establishes conditions grounded in specific qualities. He sets out the rule 
of creators over the created, of the noble over the ignoble, the old over the young, masters over 
slaves, the strong over the weak and the wise over the ignorant. These six qualifications are 
established as conditions for rule based in singular logics.112 Each expresses a mode of rule based in a 
qualification – such as age, strength or wisdom. But Plato allows a qualification for rule which is an 
exception. This is a seventh qualification: God’s part or allotment (which I will discuss in more detail 
later). Each of these qualifications for rule, then, represents an arkhè by which the polis can be 
ordered. That is to say, arkhè in the Platonic sense serves as the logic within which rule can be seen to 
be exercised.113 In its active iteration as arkhèin it literally means who walks at the head.114 Now, 
                                                          
110 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 30-31 
111 This is done to make clear the relationship between and inherence of the aesthetic scene to the work of Plato. 
This can be viewed not only in his critique of poetry or writing but also in the very formation of Kallipolis: it is 
written on a painter’s slate.  
112 Plato, The Laws, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2016) pp.100-130 
113 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 30-31 
114 Ibid. pp. 30 
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turning this understanding of arkhè back on the distribution of the sensible we can see that it is the 
logic which enables the partitioning of the polis. As I have argued previously the distribution of the 
sensible not only grounds the apprehensibility of a common shared world but also allots (dis)positions 
specific to that world. An arkhè is the shared logic of allotment and position as rendered 
apprehensible; it is the logic that enables the partage of (dis)positions through the distribution of the 
sensible.  
We can see now, then why arkhè is such an essential concept for my argumentation. Each of Plato’s 
arkhès is a distinct account of a different distribution of the sensible. Of course, from these arkhès 
aren’t necessarily mutually exclusive; rather there is an eminent arkhè, at the moment of 
commencement, which gives the account of the distribution of the sensible. A good way to think about 
this is through the example of a polarising lens. If we are thinking of the distribution of the sensible as 
a polarised pane of glass, enabling only the correct orientation of light to remain visible, then arkhè is 
that which sets the glasses orientation: it polarises. It this through this action of orienting and 
polarising that arkhè establishes the apprehensibility of a common world: the distribution of the 
sensible. Each distribution of the sensible, then, contains arkhè which initiates its logic and which in 
turn establishes the self-evident facts and (dis)positions within our common world that make it 
(in)visible, (un)thinkable and (im)possible. 
As I go on to argue my understanding of arkhè can be employed in answering my research question: 
‘how anarchy construct IR’s distribution of does the sensible?’ as it makes clear that this is a question 
of the arkhè of IR. In the previous chapter I argued that anarchy acts as the organising principle of IR. 
I can now argue that being the organising principle of IR means to give the field a logic:  anarchy is the 
arkhè of IR’s distribution of the sensible. In doing so I am responding to the tension I highlighted both 
in my introduction and above. I am not simply carrying forwards Rancière’s argument but rather 
developing it through my theorisation of IR. This is something I will go into in more detail in my next 
chapter.  
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This concept of arkhè as the moment of commencement which enables the formulation of a logic for 
the distribution of the sensible leads us onto the concept of Police (la Police). The first distinction that 
I need to draw is between the police in their everyday vernacular sense and the Police in my Rancièrian 
theorisation. Rancière terms the everyday agents of law enforcement the ‘petty police’.115  These are 
the plain-clothes and uniformed enforcers of the state. This definition encompasses more broadly the 
institutions of policing itself such as the courthouse or the prison. The petty police and their 
institutions are just a particular form of ordering which arises from the distribution of the sensible. 
The details of the organisation of overt and covert agents of state power have varied over time. From 
night-watchmen and men at arms to our modern day Peelite “Bobbies” the vestiges of particular 
organisations of policemen aren’t what Rancière or myself are concerned with when we talk about 
the Police. I am deploying the terms in in a more general, Foucauldian, sense116 which carries with it 
the nineteenth-century usage that stretched in its scope from humanity to the organisation of the 
common good.117 This is to say that the Police for my reading of Rancière is about maintaining order 
and coherence. It isn’t policing with reference to the organisations and institutions of state power but 
to the forces that enable consistency and coherence within a given field. This can include the 
delimiting and enforcement of these limits to a field. In this reading for Rancière and myself the Police 
first and foremost maintain an order. I argue that the Police aren’t agential or directed. Rather the 
Police is best thought of as an (ac)count of the social order.118 The Police are a specific mode of 
(ac)counting. Rancière describes the core feature of the Police as that they are devoid of void or 
supplement: they are total. The Police in this (ac)counting enact the distribution of the sensible. They 
are not a force separate from the distribution but rather are linked inexorably to it.  
                                                          
115 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp.28 
116 Ibid. pp. 28 
117 Ibid. pp. 28 
118 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 36 
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Before I can work through the linkage between the Police and the distribution of the sensible I have 
to touch on the notion of counting itself. Counting119 I argue following on from Rancière is the modus 
operandi of the distribution of the sensible. There is a linkage between an (ac)count and the partage 
of the distribution of the sensible. As I have argued previously the distribution of the sensible delimits 
the apprehensibility of the social order and creates (dis)position. The (dis)position or parts of the social 
order are delimited as both distinct and natural. I have argued earlier that the naturalness of these 
(dis)positions is given through the self-evident facts that underwrite and are produced by the 
distribution of the sensible. This naturalness in turn springs from the distribution’s arkhè (its 
“polarisation”) which is the logic that discerns and justifies the locales and relations between the 
requisite parts produced by the distribution of the sensible. In creating and justifying these parts the 
distribution of the sensible gives a count in an arithmetic sense. It formulates the number of parts that 
can be apprehended within its commonly apprehensible world. It also gives a count in a geometric 
sense. It formulates the relationships between the parts that can be apprehended within its commonly 
apprehensible world. It also gives an account of these parts: a justification for their number and 
relations, why they exist and how they are held in relation to each other. The distribution of the 
sensible then is an (ac)count of the social order: the commonly apprehensible world which it creates.  
An (ac)count then is never just a count but an ordering. An (ac)count not only gives the number of 
parts but also their self-justified relation. The important thing is that this (ac)count isn’t value neutral, 
but rather as the distribution of the sensible is arranged through and by an arkhè has a singular logic 
infused within it. At this point the Police becomes understandable in full. As the distribution of the 
sensible appears total it is worth thinking about how such a totality is understood. Any total (ac)count 
                                                          
119 This terminology is discussed in more detail in the section of the chapter on wrong and speech. To summarise 
briefly any count of something is also an account of it. By playing with this terminology Rancière highlights the 
way in which rendering the polis to its constitutive parts is always also an occluding gesture: it hides the 
uncounted.   
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of societies’ (dis)position should120 give all the parts within that society a part of that society. This is 
reinforced by the distribution of the sensible delimiting the conditions for apprehensibility. If a part of 
our commonly apprehensible world isn’t allocated a part, or (dis)position within its partition/portion, 
of the social order then it cannot be apprehended. A distribution of the sensible can be understood as 
a Police distribution when it is total in its (ac)count. This is synonymous with the Police being a 
totalising count. From this it is clear that the Police is not a social force in the manner of the petty 
police but rather a way of (ac)counting. It is a distribution of the sensible which is without void and 
supplement. 
At first glance, then, it appears that Police is the name of all distributions of the sensible and that these 
are total in nature. The Police count is the most prevalent and standard (ac)count of the social order. 
This has deep seated and serious implications for how it is possible to understand the relationship of 
the Police to politics. Consider a total Police (ac)count. How can disputes can be raised and rectified 
within it? The totality of the Police (ac)count is total and any redistribution between these parts 
reinforces the relations between them. Even if there is a radical redistribution between the parts of a 
social order the Police count goes unopposed. The Police count may be replaced by a different but still 
Policing count. This could be radical or wide sweeping change. If the arkhè of the social order changes 
from the rule of the strong over the weak to the wise over the ignorant, then so does the actuality of 
the Police order.  This may be preferable and an improvement for each of the parts of the social order, 
but the totality of the Police count remains unchanged. There are still the same (dis)positions or parts 
of the social order, organised in a totality between and with each other. All of this is still the Police – 
it is not Politics. Politics is more that the rearrangement of parts within a distribution of the sensible. 
It is a shift in the Police count itself, one which necessitates the emergence and subjectivation of a 
void or supplement always already present within the Police (ac)count.  
                                                          
120 I use the term should here to foreground the claim that every (ac)count of the social order is always already 
a mic-counting of that order. The claim and capacity to award a total (ac)count relies upon the exclusion of a 
part that has no part. This is something I work through in more detail in the section on politics and wrong.  
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To call something a Police count isn’t inherently pejorative. It may not be a negative practice. The 
Police are ethically a priori as they set the apprehensible basis for ethical argumentation within a social 
order. There could be a meta-ethical judgement between different Police counts. From this meta-
ethical statement, it could be possible to conclude that there are better or worse Police counts.121 As 
Rancière highlights our existence in contemporary capitalist society is in every way preferable to the 
life of a blinded Scythian slave. But in making these meta-ethical comparisons between Police orders 
we do not overlook the fundamental character of the Police count: inequality.  
It might seem initially disingenuous to talk about the Police count as being fundamentally grounded 
in inequality. At first glance it appears that the Police count is grounded in equality in the sense that 
it paints everything with the same brush. By ordering our commonly apprehensible world the Police 
establishes the relations between parts with regard to its own arkhè. As Rancière jokes, just as ‘at 
night all cows are grey’122 so is the Police a levelling force. By delimiting the horizons of our 
apprehensibility and organising the social order in accordance to its arkhè the Police give everything 
its (dis)position and place by “turning down the lights”. In one sense the Police does provide an 
equality in terms of commonality. But the (ac)count distributes portions and so doing apportions a 
tangible inequality: it sets up bodies to be rulers and bodies to be ruled; it establishes and justifies the 
inequalities within any and all social orders.  
Importantly here, it isn’t just the apportioning of power or material categories under the Police count 
that is established but also the apprehensibility of speech (logos) itself. As I argued above the Police 
count, as a distribution, establishes the conditions of apprehensibility. The Police count then enacts a 
specific distribution of the sensible which apportions what (dis)position or parts can be apprehended 
as speaking and thinking. The Police through their count of the distribution of the sensible constitute 
some as possessing speech (logos) but others have only voice (phonē). The valorisation of some and 
                                                          
121 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp.30 
122 Ibid. pp. 30 
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the reduction of others forms the foundation of any Police count. By distributing the sensible the 
Police render the apportioned parts apprehensible and the unapportioned parts, which are still 
materially present within the world, inapprehensible. This is the inequality at the heart of all Police 
counts: they render thinking and speaking individuals mute.123 
This inherent inequality is important because it also reflects back on the totality of the Police count. If 
there are thinking and speaking beings which are written out of thinking and speaking, then the Police 
isn’t giving in fact a total (ac)count but instead a mis-count. This fundamental mis-counting is key to 
understanding both the Police and counting. Any totality in the distribution of the sensible is always 
false. This is not an omission on the part of the Police count but is in fact its very foundation. We can 
see this if we go back to Rancière’s treatment of Plato’s seventh arkhè as it is this which reveals and 
undermines the foundation of the Police count. Plato titles the seventh arkhè in The Laws: the ‘choice 
of God’ or ‘the drawing of lots’.124 It isn’t a singular ordering logic like the other six. The other arkhè 
are organised on the basis of singular and particular qualification for rule whereas the seventh is the 
complete absence of any qualification. I argue, following from Rancière that this reveals the absence 
of qualification at the heart of any ordering. If it is as justifiable to have those randomly allocated to 
rule ruling as those who possess the qualities that orientate them for rule this means that the 
qualification is not important. This is the scandal of a superiority based on no qualification other than 
the absence of any superiority.125 The seventh arkhè, that of chance, makes the fundamental equality 
of all thinking and speaking beings its grounding principle. The very fact that anyone could rule and 
the equation, of the seventh arkhè’s rule, to the other six forms of rule make it clear that these arkhè 
are grounded in a foundation of inequality. 
                                                          
123 This doesn’t mean that people once distributed lose their vocal cords or material capacity for speech. Rather 
it is about how speech and be understood and apprehended within the social order and the forms of speech and 
speaking that can be articulated. Speech (logos) entails reason and the understanding of what is beneficial and 
harmful. Voice (phone) only is capable of vocalising the pleasurable and the painful. While the Police count 
doesn’t physically stop the uncounted from talking it stops their communication as being apprehended as 
speech: their conversation is reduced to lowing.  
124 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 31 
125 J. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, (Verso, London, 2014) pp. 41 
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The Police count is, therefore, only understandable, as ordering our commonly apprehensible world 
if it rests on a fundamental inequality. All Police counts are unequal as they divide speech (logos) and 
voice (phonē) within our commonly apprehensible world. There is no escape to be found from a pure 
totalised Police as the Police count is foundationally tied to its initial mis-counting. You could in part 
argue for a distribution of the sensible grounded in the seventh arkhè. On the surface such a grounding 
would appear to offer a foundation in equality. But for a total count to rest in this arkhè there would 
no longer be the divisibility of parts. There cannot be a total partage of all. This would be in effect 
reduce the social order to a singular natural oneness. This is nonsensical from the point of view of the 
distribution of the sensible in that it undoes its own singularity and thus the possibility of its own and 
any other distribution. The problem for the Police order lies in its apparent totality. In order for a count 
to be without void or supplement it must necessarily occult a portion of the commonly apprehensible 
world it orders: it must be a mis-count. But this is where Politics comes in.  
Politics, for Rancière, is the re-counting of our commonly apprehensible world. Politics is both a 
peculiar and slippery thing for Rancière as, like the Police, it has a meaning separate from its common-
sense understanding. Politics is a specific and technical term which explicitly refers to an (ac)count of 
our commonly apprehensible world which takes into account the Police (ac)counts uncounted 
remainder.126 This is a specific mode of counting grounded in the seventh arkhè. Politics does not aim 
for a total (ac)count of our commonly apprehensible world but rather is an intervention in what is 
(in)visible, (un)sayable and (im)possible within the distribution of the sensible.127 Politics operates as 
the revelation and effect of the Police’s mis-count. We can find evidence for this reading within 
Disagreement. There Rancière shows how Aristotle’s division of the polis into three parts - the rich 
(Oligoï), the noble (Aristoï) and the people (demos) - rests on an “empty qualification”. Each part of 
the social order is apportioned a share of the social order in accordance with their own quality. The 
rich have their wealth, the nobles have their excellence/virtue (aretê) and the people have freedom 
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(eleutheria). The discrepancy is that these qualities are inherently unequal. As qualities (axiaï) wealth 
and excellence/virtue are particular to their requisite parts but freedom is shared by every part. It is 
the fact that freedom is an “empty qualification” assigned to a singular portion but shared by all 
portions that it has a double purpose. Through its “emptiness” freedom provides the conditions for 
the erasure of the people from allotment and apportion in the social order.128 The “emptiness” of 
freedom is the mis-count within the Aristotelian Police (ac)count. It is a germ from which the invisibility 
of the people is enacted. The people can then be reduced to have no portion, or part, within the social 
order they exist in. Their status as uncounted and uncountable forges them into, as Rancière puts it, 
a part without a part.  
The part without a part is an important concept within my theorisation of Rancière. A simple definition 
is that the part without a part is the indivisible and uncountable remainder of the Police count. They 
are necessitated by the fact that the Police (ac)count is always a mis-counting. The part without a part 
is a kind of transcendental political subject. It is transcendental in the sense that is exists prior to its 
own subjectivation into a particular immediate subject-position within our commonly apprehensible 
world. It is worth spending some time breaking down this concept here. Politics, as I have argued 
above, is necessarily a re-counting of the Police count to enable the recognition of the Police count’s 
fundamental mis-counting. Politics is in part a statement in speech (logos) by those who had been 
rendered the possessors of only voice (phonē). In other words, it is the part without a part speaking 
as if they were a part that had a part. This rests on the fundamental equality between thinking and 
speaking beings: the seventh arkhè.  
In this act of seizing the capacity of speech (logos) to which the part which has no part has no proper 
claim they highlight the fact that they were always speaking and thinking on equal terms with those 
who were apportioned apprehensible speech and thought. It is this moment of the recognition of the 
speech of the part which has no part that is the subjectivation that I spoke of earlier. The political 
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instance and politics is when those who are uncounted become a subject i.e. a part that can be seen 
and counted as a part. This is the process by which the part which has no part becomes apprehensible 
as a part. Therefore, the political moment should be read as an instant in which the part which has no 
part articulates a social wrong129 (the Police’s fundamental mis-counting) and becomes understood 
and apprehended as a part. There is a difference in the way in which the subject is played out across 
these terms. Firstly, there is the transcendental subject of politics. This is the part which has no part. 
As I argued earlier this is transcendental in the sense that it is the a priori political subject that has yet 
to be subjectivated into a particular subjectivity within the distribution of the sensible.  As such it is 
an atavistic subject, its only characteristic is its own incalculability and its being mis-counted. Thus, 
the transcendental political subject, the part which has no part, is no singular political subject i.e 
workers or women but rather is the feeling (aisthesis) and relation to the distribution of being 
uncounted. Politics is the litigious process by which the Police count is recounted. This recounting 
transforms the part which has no part into a named and apprehensible part. Through politics the 
incalculable part which has no part becomes countable and thus gains a name such as ‘workers’ or 
‘women’.  
This is how I have read and developed Rancière’s understanding of politics. From this understanding 
it becomes immediately apparent that most of what we understand to be politics in our common or 
academic vernacular doesn’t fall under this definition. Any form of negotiation between visible parts 
cannot be considered as politics. This is because negotiation between apprehensible subjects is not 
about the emergence and subjectivation of a part which has no part. Rather such negotiation is about 
a redistribution of the apportioned portions under the Police count. This is a shift in Policing not in 
apprehensibility itself.  Politics, in mine and Rancière’s terms, is a rare occurrence, one in which the 
distribution of the sensible’s conditions of what is apprehensible are changed.  
                                                          
129 This term has a particular meaning in the work of Rancière. I go into this in more detail in the section on 
disagreement, speech and wrong.  
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Thinking back to my previous argumentation about the comparison between Police counts we can see 
that the criteria for making meta-ethical judgements between differing Police is not necessarily about 
the distribution of resources between named parts. Rather one criteria for judging a Police count is 
the openness to politics: in the sense of the subjectivation of the part which has no part. A Police order 
can be seen to be judged as better than another in terms of its openness to the speech (logos) of the 
part which has not part.130 The rarefication of politics this isn’t a move designed to temporalize politics. 
Politics is not about the singularity of a rupturing event or the efficaciousness of mutual relations of 
power.131 Rather politics and the Police are not distinct but muddily tied together.132 In contrast to the 
reading of Todd May (discussed above) my reading of politics charts it as  impure, not only in the sense 
that it is not a singular category, or that it is something perfectly expressed in a political event, but 
also that in that it can only ever exist in relation to the Police.133 The impurity of politics draws back 
on my previously argued understanding of politics as a re-counting. Thinking politics in this way 
highlights how it is never separate from the distribution of the sensible. It can never be broken down 
or distilled to the point where it departs from the Police totality. This also means that the Police is not 
something to be overcome in the way in which May desires. There cannot be a form of politics, social 
organisation or common apprehensible world outside the distribution of the sensible.134  Such a 
phenomenon would be like “mana from heaven”: a gift from beyond the apprehensible itself.  
The muddiness of politics’ enmeshment with the Police sets up the conditions for my understanding 
of the concept and the translation of the concept into IR. Politics is not external or separate from the 
                                                          
130 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp.31 
131 J. Rancière, A Few Remarks of the Method of Jacques Rancière, Parallax, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2009) pp. 118 
132 Ibid. pp. 118 
133 S. Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière, (Oxford Uni. Press, Oxford, 2013) pp. 40 
134 If we reflect back on the argumentation I have made earlier about the part without a part being the 
transcendental politics I can clarify that this is not an ontological claim. Rather than being a claim about an 
implicit hierarchy or understanding of being. The part which has no part is transcendental only through its status 
as a priori subjectivity. It is an unspecified, primordial and potentiate subjectivity yet to be rendered 
apprehensible through the fires of subjectivation’s kiln.  In this sense the part which has no part does not offer 
us any particular map, method or class by which to understand and direct politics. It is simply the incalculable 
clay to be sculpted by politics into a subject. It is not an ontological position rather a mode of feeling (aisthesis) 
in relation to its preclusion from apprehensibility (aisthēton). 
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Police but rather is always begin articulated to the Police along the lines of the fundamental equality 
between thinking and speaking beings. The wrong of the Police mis-count is the site along which 
subjectivation can occur. It is within and through the crucible of this wrong that the part which has no 
part can be articulated into an apprehensible part. I am not making an argument that formulates 
Rancière as a theorist of the event or of a moment of politics drowned thereafter by apathy135. 
Although this could be a tension against which to think my work I do not see this as an effective or 
convincing reading of what I have presented here. Instead politics is always germinal and, most 
importantly, a re-mapping of our commonly apprehensible world. Such a re-mapping can only take 
place with regard to the fundamental equality of thinking and speaking beings. There is the distinction 
between Rancière’s understanding of this reading and my own. Thinking and speaking for me is a 
potentially, although not always, broader category than that of the singularity of human beings. This 
is no the foundation or rupturing of a singular ontological principle such that Being can be better and 
more fully understood through politics. Rather fundamental equality is a crucial assumption, a quality 
(axiaï) that makes any and all social orderings and our common apprehensible world possible. Politics 
necessarily maps a common world through the assertion of a fundamental equality that makes the 
part which has no part into a part. The fundamental equality of politics and the fundamental inequality 
of the Police are thus tied together. These twinned forms, the Police and politics, are always both the 
head and tail of an ouroboric ordering. The distribution of the sensible is (re)distributed by the political 
(ac)count to allow foundational equality to be confirmed. Its litigation of the Police through the 
subjectivation of a new part to be recognised as having portion in the social order is, for my argument 
in this thesis and understanding of Rancière, politics.  
This understanding of politics and the Police will become important for my answering my second 
research question: ‘What effect does a Rancièrian theory of IR have on our understanding of 
International politics?’ I need to set out the conditions that my argument and understanding sets for 
                                                          
135 J. Rancière, ‘A Few Remarks of the Method of Jacques Rancière’, Parallax, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2009) pp. 118 
Page 124 of 278 
 
Politics. As I have foregrounded here but continue to argue in the next chapter: my Rancièrian 
understanding of politics forces us to rethinking our own categorisation of politics. Following on from 
the arguments I have made within the chapter it is clear my theorisation and articulation of a 
Rancièrian  theory of IR needs to identify not only a part which has no part for and in IR’s distribution 
of the sensible but also its subjectivation. It is also an appropriate moment to reflect back on this 
limitations of my framework and argumentation at this point. In thinking through the notion of 
politics, the Police and arkhè I have also forwarded a reading that develops and progresses Rancière’s 
own position. It is not a simply homology or repetition of Rancière’s understanding I have given by my 
own reading, understanding and argumentation. I have at points flagged moments where my reading 
is in direct tension and I push through, following the introduction, to develop my theorisation of 
Rancière that will be useful for IR. This tension between my writing and Rancière as well as my 
articulation of my theory to IR is an argument I will develop in the next chapter and through my case 
study section which looks in more detail at the theorising of speech and wrong further explicating the 
specific notion of counting, its linkage to disagreement and subjectivation as well as how it forms the 
basis for politics. The next section carries my argument forwards and looks in more detail at the 
theorising of speech and wrong further explicating the specific notion of counting, its linkage to 
disagreement and subjectivation as well as how it forms the basis for politics. 
 
Disagreement: Wrong, Speech and Politics 
In this section I give an account of my understanding of wrong and the process of subjectivation in. In 
working through the notion of wrong and subjectivation through engagement with Disagreement I 
finesse the understanding of Rancière’s theory which I am applying and developing across my thesis. 
I highlight and develop an argument about how this understanding of wrong and subjectivation 
reflects back on the notion of counting/(ac)count highlighting that politics is necessarily contingent on 
the process of subjectivation and emerges in relation to wrong itself.  
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Wrong can be understood as a specific form of disagreement. This understanding of disagreement is 
separate from a misconstruction.136 A disagreement is not a conflict between parties that think 
something should be different. Disagreement is situated within the terrain of speech and is a problem 
that arises when two parties, with regard to a common object, cannot apprehend the object being 
presented as they cannot understand the other part as emitting sounds that can be experienced as 
speech.137 This is important in that it indicates the location around which a disagreement can take 
place.  Given that a disagreement can only emerge as the product of an impasse within the objects of 
apprehension (aisthēton) it follows that it cannot take place wholly within the Police order. As a 
disagreement is a contestation over the apprehension of a form of speech that can only be heard as 
voice by the Police, rather than as speech, it cannot be within the Police (ac)count of our commonly 
apprehensible world. Rather a disagreement must be in part the germ around which politics takes 
place and can adhere itself to the distribution of the sensible. As I have previously argued politics is 
always enmeshed with the Police as opposed to being temporally and spatially distinct from it. As I 
alluded to earlier my reading is partially contentious. May looks to build his anarchist project precisely 
through the dividing of the Police from politics.138 For May politics then becomes an act of purity which 
is a countervailing force to the ignoble Police order.139 May’s reading of Rancière thus substitutes 
disagreement (a liminal dispute over the objects of apprehension as rendered by the Police 
distribution of the sensible) for a totalising dissensus. May, rather than looking at how the Police order 
shapes the objects of apprehension, sets up such shaping as Foucauldian power140 and for him 
disagreement isn’t about speech but rather a rejection of the Police that comes from the bedrock of 
anarchist politics. This is obviously a break from my reading of Rancière and that of May’s.  
                                                          
136 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. x 
137 Ibid. pp. xii 
138 T. May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière: Creating Equality, (Uni. Of Edinburg Press, London, 2008) 
pp. 53-55 
139 Ibid. pp. 117 
140 Ibid. pp. 122-23 
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For reasons I have laid out earlier May’s reading is not tenable. May misunderstands the sensory 
character of the distribution of the sensible. Against May’s reading Chambers gives a potent argument 
for avoiding this line of argument in his article Jacques Rancière and the Problem of Pure Politics.141 I 
agree with Chambers that rather than politics being separable from the Police it is always enmeshed 
with it. The nature of this enmeshment is both aesthetic, in that it is to do with the apprehensible, and 
foundational in that it affirms a fundamental equality. Taking Rancière and Chambers seriously on this 
point – and seeing the disagreement as fundamentally about both parties being capable of expression 
yet with one not apprehended as capable of expression is my starting point for politics and the 
quotidian activity of the Police.  
I argue that this helps us to better understand the nature of a wrong. As I have argued, politics is first 
and foremost a re-mapping of our commonly apprehensible world and the Police distribution of the 
sensible allocation of parts. It is a remapping that emerges from a part that has no part and the fact 
that the Police distribution of the sensible is founded on a double mis-counting. In this mis-counting 
the part which has no part is denied access to speech (logos) and is reduced to possessing only voice 
(phonē). This mis-counting is what makes politics possible but is also that which makes disagreement 
possible. Through an initial partage that is irrevocably arranged to remove the speech from some in 
order to order our commonly apprehensible world so that some may rule it becomes possible for that 
apprehension to occur. Through the arkhè’s arrangement of the Police distribution a part of the order 
becomes unable to take part in the order. This, while in part a recap of my previous argument, is the 
miscount that makes the part which has no part an essential characteristic of the Police distribution 
of the sensible. This arrangement is the wrong that enables politics: the essential and initial mis-
counting of the Police’s partage and distribution of the sensible.  
                                                          
141 S. Chambers, ‘Jacques Rancière and the Problem of Pure Politics’, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 
10, No. 3, (July 2011) pp. 303-326 
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Wrong, then, is an essential element within my Rancièrian definition, argument and understanding of 
politics. All orderings and distributions of the sensible are founded with regard to an arkhè which rests 
on a fundamental mis-counting. The fact that any and all Police distributions of the sensible rest on 
fundamental inequality via a miscount means that any distribution of the sensible has within it a mis-
count and so a fundamental wrong of the existence of a part which has no part. This is not an ethical 
failing. The distribution of the sensible sets the pre-conditions that enable ethical judgement and 
arguments about the wrong of any partage occur prior to ethics. As such the wrong is a wrong not in 
the sense of an ethical dispute between parts of a social ordering. It is a wrong in the sense that the 
Police (ac)count rests upon fundamental inequality. As I have argued previously the only meta-ethical 
critique that can be brought to bear is about the openness of a distribution of the sensible to the 
potential visibility of the part which has no part: to politics. Wrong then is not an ethical problem. It is 
an aesthetic one.  
In drawing this distinction - between wrong as an ethical approbation and as an aesthetic actuality - I 
open up a fruitful way of looking into its relationship to speech and therefore disagreement and 
politics.  Politics is about the subjectivation of a part which has no part. In the transition from a portion 
of the polis which takes no portion of the polis (from a part that is present within the polis but 
inapprehensible to it) to a part that has a portion of the polis and can be apprehended as having such 
a portion.  In this understanding wrong is the germ which is required for politics to ever be possible. I 
can flesh this out through the example of a common household science experiment by which a bottle 
of beer is placed into a freezer.  In doing so the temperature of the beer is lowered below freezing 
point.  Given the smoothness of the glass no ice crystals can take hold and the beer remains in its 
liquid form.  However, if you take the beer out of the freezer and slam it on a table this forms a bubble.  
The bubble enables ice crystals to form spread throughout the glass. This freezes the beer 
instantaneously before your eyes. In this analogy Wrong is like the initial bubble which enables the 
beer to freeze. The Police distribution is too smooth a space for any kind of politics to occur because 
it is without void or supplement. Like the smooth glass inside the beer bottle there is no space in which 
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a reaction can occur. Our common world, like the beer, contains within it (always-already) the 
miscount of the bubble. It is a latent characteristic which enables politics to take place.  
This idea is essential for understanding the relationship between wrong and politics, a contestation 
over apprehension. Wrong, just like the bubble enables the beer to freeze, is the catalyst which makes 
apprehensible the conditions of the Police distribution of the sensible and its mis-counting. If we 
understand wrong as the catalyst of an action, that action must be subjectivation. In order for a part 
to be apprehended as a subject there needs to be an axiom across which this equality can be 
articulated. I argue that there are two things that enable wrong to transform into subjectivation and 
thus for politics to occur. These two things are speech and equality. Speech is the quality of the part 
which has no part that is rendered inapprehensible by the Police distribution. Through the attribution 
of being unseen and unheard those which fall within the part which has no part become unable to be 
apprehended as possessing speech (logos) and as such they have only noise (phonē). As I have argued 
previously this reduction stages the ground for politics.  
An example of such a disagreement drawn out by Rancière, and one which informs my argument is 
the succession of the plebeians from Rome.142 Within the Roman Police order the plebeians had been 
completely deprived of speech. They were not apprehended as possessing speech capable of being 
heard and as such became “nameless”.143 It is specifically this separation from speech which meant 
that the plebeian could not take a part in or of the polis. This sets the terrain of the wrong as grounded 
around speech. If the plebeians could not make their demands heard, then they could not redress 
their share: they could not take part in the polis or take a part of it. They could only gain recognition 
through being subjectivated by having their voice apprehended as speech. This was done through the 
creation of their own symbolic order.144 Like with my previous example of the bottle it is only at the 
moment of dissensus that the wrong and be addressed. Without the succession or immediacy of the 
                                                          
142 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 23-4 
143 Ibid. pp. 24 
144 Ibid. pp. 25 
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wrong politics cannot take place. Just like bubble of air which enables the bottle of beer to freeze, it 
is the dissensus that enables the wrong to be rendered apparent. The politics which takes place in 
Rancière’s example makes speech the methodology through which subjectivation can occur. This is 
because speech provides the tool, language, through which a symbolic order can be written. It is 
possible to do this because of the fact that language is founded on (mis)communication. Language 
and in its apprehensible form, speech, is able to apply terms catachrestically.  The catachresis upon 
which communication is founded becomes not only the tool by which a partage can be applied but 
also the way in which politics and subjectivation are possible.  
The second condition for subjectivation, and therefore politics, to be possible is the prevalence of a 
fundamental equality. Rancière assumes the primary equality of thinking and speaking beings as 
revealed by Plato’s seventh arkhè.145 This equality is radically egalitarian in that it affix’s chance to 
rule. The fact that anyone could rule through allotment it reveals the falsity of the other arkhès. I turn 
now to an example to illustrate this point. If we suppose that there isn’t an inherent equality present 
within the partage but in reality, there is an actual apprehensible difference between those who give 
orders and those who receive orders then our common world disappears. It becomes impossible for 
there to be communication between the giver and receiver of the order; that is to say, the 
transmission of orders would itself be impossible.146 Without the equality common to our shared 
world then our shared world itself breaks down. Thus, all sensible orderings of the common world 
don’t rest upon their arkhè but on the fundamental equality which underwrites all modes of ordering. 
Arkhè serves to marshal the sensory through its Police partage and into a distribution of the sensible. 
The arkhè is what is necessary for that marshalling of that ordering. The ordering is the mechanism 
through which arkhè appears as natural when in fact it is contingent.147 If there is to be an axiom which 
makes possible an order it is not the privileging or preference of any part of that order over another. 
                                                          
145 J. Rancière, Dissensus, (Continuum, London, 2010) pp. 30-31 
146 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 15-16 
147 J. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, (Verso, London, 2014) pp. 41 
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Instead what makes that ordering possible, is the fundamental equality of those parts which makes 
them orderable. It is this axiom that is verified in politics. Verification is important here as it is the 
recognition of the axiom of equality as opposed to the implementation of an equality. The fact that 
the axiom is verified makes sense given the previous understanding and organisation of equality within 
my argument and is key for thinking through how equality and politics relate in my Rancierian 
theorisation.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has explicated my Rancièrian theorisation. I have explicated my approach to Rancière’s 
theory and have defended my reading of it. In particular, while concentrating on the core concept of 
the distribution of the sensible I have emphasised my focus on the sensory and the organisation of 
what can be apprehended, the link to an initiating arkhè, the importance of the count and the 
miscount, and the relation of this to the wrong, subjectivation and speech. I also linked back to the 
tensions between my mode of analysis and how this is at times in tension. I highlighted, with reference 
to the introduction where I develop and move beyond Rancière’s initial argumentation. This is 
something I develop in the next chapter what I highlight my understanding of IR through my Rancièrian 
framework.  
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Chapter 4: 
International Relation’s Distribution of the Sensible and 
International Politics 
Introduction  
In this chapter I develop my reading of Rancière into IR with a particular focus on my understanding 
of the concepts of the distribution of the sensible, arkhè, politics and the Police. I show how I 
understand IR theory and forward my contribution to the field. I excavate and examine what 
constitutes the Police within IR and at what could be classified as politics. I develop my core argument 
that IR should understand politics as subjectivation against a wrong, which is a (mis)count grounded 
in Police order which stems from its arkhè – anarchy – it is the moment of subjectivation through 
which non-state actors become apprehensible as actors for and in IR. 
“The International” and IR  
Within this section I explicate my linkage between “the international” 148 and IR. I argue that “the 
international” is an inaccessible set of material conditions149 which IR seeks to make apprehensible, in 
particular ways. My argument is developed through a reading of the specificity of IR which shows the 
distinction between “the international” as something outside of IR’s (ac)count and IR itself which is 
the apprehensible presentation of the “the international”.150 
 
                                                          
148 By “the international” I don’t mean a singular or pure notion of any type or modality of what is the  
international. In my use of this term I only mean the object for/of IR. This could be any object that is looked at 
or situated as the object for/of IR.   
149 The term material conditions has been selected here to avoid conflation with the literature surround 
“external worlds”. It has been used to mark a departure with Rancière from the “philosophising” of the Police 
order and to open up the approach to the radicality of politics and politically reading. The phrases material and 
condition have been selected to emphasise and recognise the historical linkage to Marxist thought within 
Rancière. They also stress the kind of raw materiality of being outside of sensibility and thus apprehension. The 
selection of condition(s) is important as even in their inapprehensible excessiveness they are conditional based 
on the distribution of the sensible.   
150 This will be developed in more detail throughout the section but it is important to note now that “the 
international” is precisely not limited to the conditions of apprehension imposed on it by IR but in fact is always 
excessive. IR through counting up its object will place limitations on what can be apprehensibly understood as 
IR given that this is always a relation that limits the inaccessible and excessive material conditions.  
Page 132 of 278 
 
I start by looking at the relationship between IR and political theory. In looking at this relationship I 
concur with Walker151 that the two are interrelated. This provides the foundation on which I examine 
how its disciplinary construction is designed separate from political theory but also to make the two 
relate in particular ways. I argue that as IR becomes a separate mode of political theorisation it comes 
to have its own distinct object which it names “the international” and which is contrasted to “the 
domestic”. I highlight how my Rancièrian reading separates the inapprehensible object of study: “the 
international”, from its apprehensible form through a distribution of the sensible.  
 
In making my argument with regard to understanding the relationship between IR and its object “the 
international” it’s important to look at the way IR considers itself. Most of the “core texts” within the 
field don’t focus explicitly on IR but rather on international politics. We can see this across works such 
as Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations152, Waltz’s Theory of International Politics153, Wendt’s Social 
Theory of International Politics154, Mearscheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics155, Bull’s The 
Anarchic Society: A Study of Order in World-Politics156 and Jervis’s Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics.157 Each of these texts orientates itself in relation to IR and politics in the manner 
that Walker conceives of as performing a mode of political theory in his Inside/Outside: International 
Relations as Political Theory.158 Walker situates his argument about IR with regard to the discipline’s 
positioning of and engagement with the state understood as a point of schism between ‘theories of 
political possibility within and theories of mere relations beyond the secure confines of the modern 
territorial state’.159 In drawing this distinction between political possibility within the state, which is 
                                                          
151 R. J Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Uni. Of Cambridge Press, London, 
1995) 
152 H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (McGraw Hill, London, 1985) 
153 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Addison-Wesley, London, 1979) 
154 A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge Uni. Press, London, 1995) 
155 J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (W.W. Norton & Company, London, 2014) 
156 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (MacMillan Press, London, 1995)  
157 R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton Uni. Press, Princeton, 2017) 
158 R. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Uni. Of Cambridge Press, London, 
1995) 
159 Ibid. pp. 6 
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nominally understood as politics, and the relations beyond the state, Walker clearly shows how the 
relationship between IR and politics is configured. Furthermore, through analysing the historicity of 
sovereignty160 and territory161 Walker shows how IR forms in relation to politics and understands its 
own thinking of itself. He thus highlights the way in which the field is the ‘celebration of a historically 
specific account of the nature, location and possibilities of political identity and community’.162  
For Walker, this celebration is, fundamentally, a product of a spatial and temporal reality that is 
(re)shaped through its own theorisation both in domestic political theory and IR. Of particular 
importance to my argument here are certain historical accounts of the emergence of modern nation-
state for which it crystallised in early-modern Europe, constructed by and made coherent through a 
series of answers to binary questions:163 ‘Identity/difference, self/other, inside/outside, 
History/contingency and immanence/transcendence.’164 Walker argues that these binary distinctions 
‘have permitted theories of international relations to be constructed as a discourse about the 
permanent tragedies of a world fated to remain fragmented while longing for reconciliation and 
integration.’165 He thus highlights how IR’s understanding of state relations is not divorced from 
political theory but is in fact an extension of it. This is to say that IR is not disconnected from politics 
but rather is itself a mode of thinking through political questions.  
Walker’s argument that IR should be viewed as a produced via political theory is convincing. But it is 
also important to bear in mind that IR isn’t solely produced through political theory. It is also a site for 
its production. This is to say there isn’t a strict isomorphism between political theory and IR but rather 
a reciprocal relationship. Thus, thinking IR as political theory necessarily charts political theory as 
thinking IR. The historical juncture of the emergence of the modern nation-state instantiates a division 
                                                          
160 Ibid. pp. 164-169 
161 Ibid. pp. 130-135 
162 Ibid. pp. 15 
163 Ibid. pp. 17  
164 Ibid. pp. 17 
165 Ibid. pp. 17 
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between political theory and IR,166 a separation that is, in and of itself, a de-politicisation of elements 
within political theory. In thinking IR as distinct from, although reciprocal to, political theory IR loses 
its own standing as politics. This movement, as Walker highlights, enshrines the state, and as I have 
argued, also anarchy as the core assumptions necessary for thinking IR. However, I want to argue that 
this distinction between political theory and IR also makes it possible for IR to develop a political life 
of its own, that the separation of IR from political theory makes it possible for IR to develop its own 
theoretical understanding of politics.  
To elucidate this point further we will return to Waltz. In Chapter One I showed that that Waltz is an 
important figure for instantiating anarchy as the ordering principle of IR. In asking the question ‘how 
can we conceive of international politics as a distinct system?’167 He delineates IR as a mode of 
theorisation. Waltz distinguishes between the third image of the international system, as permissive 
cause, and the second and first as effective. This distinction expresses the movement of causality from 
the state to the organisation of the international system. This shifting of causal power makes possible 
a political imaginary which necessarily includes a distinction between political theory and “political” 
IR theory, complementing IR as foreign policy, or the politics of state relations, with the view that it 
can be a distinct political theorisation in its own right. 
We can see a similar movement within the work of Morgenthau. As Paipais highlights Morgenthau 
seeks to de-politicise elements of his object of study as well as politicise others,168 ‘recognising those 
forces at play in the political and refusing to gloss over the logic of antagonism that permeates 
international politics’.169 It is precisely this twofold action of IR, attempting to think its own political 
theory and itself as a mode of political theory that enables and delineates these two modes of 
understanding IR. Walker shows us how and why political theory constructs the delineation of IR from 
                                                          
166 Ibid. pp. 182-183 
167 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Addison-Wesley, London, 1979) pp.79 
168 V. Paipais, ‘Between Politics and the Political: Reading Hans J. Morgenthau’s Double Critique of 
Depoliticisation’, Millennium, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2014) pp.354-275 
169 Ibid. 362 
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politics at the level of the state. Waltz and Morgenthau evidence how this delineation can be taken 
forwards in order to produce a political theory specific to IR. The separation between the internal and 
external boundaries of the state becomes the starting point for IR’s own political theorisation. By 
separating the inside from the outside170 politics and political theory becomes divided between their 
domestic and international iterations.  
As we saw in Chapters One and Two, from its inception this understanding is structured in relation to 
Anarchy. This separation then is not the death of a political reading of “the international” but, rather, 
its birth grounding IR as a discipline and giving it, for its own political theorisation, the object of the 
“international.”   
It is worth spending some time developing this division more fully. Distinguishing between the political 
theorisation of the domestic (political theory) and the political theorisation of “the international” (IR 
theory) is only made possible through and by the historical and material existence of the sovereign 
territorial nation-state. By taking this division between the domestic understanding of politics and the 
international understanding of politics it becomes possible to analogise the two. In terms of the 
distinction between the subject and object of study, political theory takes the polis or society and IR 
takes “the international”: the extra/intra-relations between and of polises or societies. While this 
analogy is useful,171 in order for its strength to be felt fully, we first have to look at how “the 
international” can be conceived of as the object of/for IR and thus also how conceive of IR in relation 
to its object. To do this I want to look at and write against the work of Patrick Thaddaeus Jackson 
whose The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations breaks down the philosophical underpinnings 
latent in IR’s approach to “the international”.  
                                                          
170 Not just as a simple distillation but rather a fractionation. Here the inside and outside are not immutable 
separate categories but always mixed together. By establishing the conditions for separation it becomes possible 
to understand the ratios and molarity between the inside and outside within and around the domestic.  
171 I work through and apply this analogy in more detail later within the chapter.  
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Jackson makes his arguments partly through looking at the question of the role/applicability of 
“science” within and to IR.172 With reference to Lynch he breaks down the philosophical commitments 
within his own research to ‘ontology: how do researchers conceptualise what they study? 
Epistemology: how do researchers know what they know? [and] Methodology: how do researchers 
select their tools?’173 “Science” can then be articulated with IR at the level of method giving Jackson 
space for the philosophical dimensions of ontology and epistemology.174 He then breaks IR down into 
four different mechanisms for knowing about the world:175 Neopositivism (mind-world dualism & 
phenomenalism), Critical Realism (mind-world dualism & transfactualism), Analyticism (mind-world 
monism & phenomenalism) and Reflexivity (mind-world monism & transfactualism).176 Jackson argues 
that each approach has, resulting from its philosophical commitments, a relation to the status of 
knowledge and procedure for the evaluation of claims.177 Jackson then establishes a grid through and 
against which research in IR can be categorised through the relationship of the theory to its object.178 
Through this approach to the field and IR, Jackson produces an (ac)count of IR that is totalising.  
There are two things I argue in response to this. The first is that the level at which Jackson’s claims 
operate is disciplinary. Jackson is not making an argument about the nature of IRs object, but only 
about how it is apprehended by the discipline. Secondly, and relatedly, Jackson’s arguments serve to 
categories the modes of research in IR not the objects of that research. Jackson assumes the 
homogeneity of the object across different approaches; Jackson orders in terms of different 
approaches the discipline takes to its object but assumes that the object remains the same: “the 
                                                          
172 P. T. Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry into International Relations: The Philosophy of Science and its 
Implications for the Study of World Politics, (Routledge, London, 2010) pp. 22-23 
173 Ibid. pp. 26 
174 Ibid. pp. 25 
175 Ibid. pp. 198 
176 Ibid. pp. 198 
177 Ibid. pp. 198 
178 Jackson sets up a totalising (ac)count of IR in that each and every philosophical approach can be broken down 
into his categories and gridded accordingly. Given his own framework Jackson’s project then is to articulate the 
specific modes of research in IR into bracketed social-scientific categories against which their contribution and 
potential can be measured. It is important to highlight already how in Rancièrian terms such a project cannot be 
political as its totalisation sets it up as a mode of Policing. I cover later in the chapter how Jackson’s intervention 
is that of policing via the deployment of a metapolitics.  
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international”. This is important for the argument I am forwarding in this thesis. As I highlighted in the 
introduction I am writing this thesis towards post-positivist IR. As such I am actively rejecting the 
framework put forwards by Jackson. This is not only because of my positioning within the field but 
also the weight that my critique of philosophy carries.  
Buzan is useful in clearing up this distinction through his argument that ‘IR is NOT just world politics: 
that is the macro end of political science’.179 For Buzan IR is not simply the extrapolation of the political 
to the level of the state but rather is the end point of analysis of a multiplicity of disciplines.180 In 
charting out the historicity of the discipline Buzan contextualises it as a product of historical and 
politico-theoretical discourses181 and stresses that the movement to reduce the field to the focus of 
nations/nation-states is a misstep.182 Buzan touches on the way in which taking “the international” as 
the object of study does not force IR into the position of studying only the macro-element of politics. 
Instead I contend that it gives such a mode of inquiry a unique character.183 This can help clarify how 
Jackson’s assumptions structure his engagement with IR and “the international”. He divides the field 
into four separate philosophical approaches. But this is not a purely philosophical action. It is also a 
political one. Drawing on Weber, Jackson homes in on the   role of science within the field and this 
leads him to construct his distinction between the ontologies of mind-world dualism and mind-world 
monism.184 These become, for Jackson, the core ontological dispute within IR: is there a world that is 
separate from our engagement with it. And this raises the question of whether or not there is an 
external “international” that can be accessed by theorists of IR. Jackson’s categories break down, at 
the level of ontology, the distinction between “the international” as an external object world (mind-
world dualism) and as only subjective experience (mind-world monism). This distinction between 
                                                          
179 B. Buzan, ‘Could IR Be Different?’, International Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 2016) pp. 156 
180 Ibid. pp. 156-157 
181 Ibid. pp. 157 
182 Ibid. pp. 157 
183 This isn’t to say that IR isn’t political or analogous to politics in the Rancièrian sense. Rather it shows that it is 
distinct from political inquiry more radically than as continuance of domestic narrative and understanding.  
184 Ibid. pp. 31 
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objective and subjective is a firm line between the philosophical underpinnings of engagement with 
IR, he says, cementing this through readings of Descartes and Kant.185  
To develop my argument, I want to briefly take a detour and consider the work of philosopher Quentin 
Meillassoux.186 Whose work is at the forefront of thinking through the implications of the ways in 
which the subject-object distinction has unfolded within philosophy since Kant. He has written on 
topics as diverse as poetry187 and temporality188 but his major work is focused on what he terms 
‘ancestrality’ meaning events anterior to the emergence of life on earth and thus separate from our 
species being, and the ‘arche-fossil’, material which indicates the existence of an ancestral existence. 
In his seminal work After Finitude189 Meillassoux characterises post-Kantian philosophy, with its 
division of the subject and object as correlationism. This is the proposition that cannot access thinking 
or being in themselves or separately but only as two things in reciprocal relation, where that relation 
is not simply one of division but of a correlation.190 Meillassoux argues that this correlationism, has 
been a staple in philosophy since Kant. And, indeed, we can see it in Jackson’s encounters with Kant 
himself.191 Through engagement with ancestrality Meillassoux formulates a “speculative realism” 
which challenges the viability of correlationism. We can’t address all of this here. The key point is that 
post-Kantian thinking such as that on which Jackson draws is not so much about the division oft subject 
                                                          
185 This is clear within The Conduct of Inquiry into International Relations as Jackson works through his four 
understandings of IR they each rest on either a fundamentally Cartesian or Kantian reading of the subject-object 
distinctions. By charting the relationality between these foundations Jackson draws out the philosophical 
underpinnings in terms of ontology for each of the theories at hand.  
186 M. Wark, General Intellects: Twenty-One Thinkers for the Twenty First Century, (Verso, London, 2017) pp. 
286-298 
187 Q. Meillassoux, The Number and the Siren: A Decipherment of Mallarmé’s Coup De Dés, (Sequence Press, New 
York, 2012) 
188 Q. Meillassoux, Time Without Becoming, (Mimesis International, London, 2014)  
189 Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, (Bloomsbury, London, 2015) pp. 3-
5 
190 Ibid. pp. 5 
191 Jackson doesn’t propose the he has a singular philosophical engagement with Kant but rather takes Kant as 
read by differing sources and approaches. Thus Jackson doesn’t give us a singular account of Kant and his ideas 
but rather how Kant is appropriated and read by differing discourses. Again here it is clear that Jackson’s 
engagement at the disciplinary level highlights his engagement as Policing. As I develop later in the chapter 
Jackson, through his philosophical engagement with IR, serves to Police and manage the discipline. This is not a 
criticism of his important work but rather a statement of how it should be read under a Rancièrian understanding 
of IR.  
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and object a separated as it is about their correlation. Badiou’s philosophy seeks to avoid this critique 
through a distinct negative ontology.192 By reading mathematics as the foundation for ontology and 
at a larger level philosophy, Badiou can effectively answer the charge of ancestrality.193  
Jackson however doesn’t have such a negative understanding of ontology. For him or Jackson “the 
international” is a series of differently weighted subject-object correlations that can be read 
differently depending on the ontology of the “beholder”. This disciplinary approach doesn’t take a 
position on “the international” but rather serves to give, in its strongest form, a taxonomy of 
approaches. Approaches for which the ‘actual’ object of IR is effectively unimportant or non-existent. 
There cannot be a consistent object for IR as there can be such a discrepancy between the ontological 
foundations of the object of IR itself. The common object for this mode of analysis in IR then, as I 
argued above, becomes the field itself as opposed to “the international”. This makes clear that Jackson 
is not giving us an argument about the nature of “the international” but rather marshalling the 
discipline itself. He gives us options as to what “the international” can be seen as but no definite 
answer as to its actuality.  
My theorisation of IR changes how we can and should understand “the international”.  As we have 
seen, our commonly apprehensible world is inaccessible without a distribution of the sensible to 
render its contents apprehensible. My proposition is that in the same way, “the international” is only 
apprehensible through a distribution of the sensible. I will develop this argument as on a twofold 
movement. Firstly, I shift the discussion away from competing ontologies and the debate around 
monism/dualism and subject/object; secondly I turn to look at the condition of politics within IR, 
something which is possible because I do not provide a philosophical (ac)count of our existence but 
rather an aesthetic and political one. This is important lest we mistake my Rancièrian politics in 
relation to the distribution as reading a self-other correlation liable to the same critique as Jackson. 
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Jackson is interested in taking the field at the level of discipline and as such wants to organise IR in its 
totality. In positioning my theory towards post-positivist IR I am breaking away from Jackson’s reading 
of the field. Because I am arguing for how politics functions in IR and an theorising it I am writing away 
from Jackson; who is giving us a philosophical account of divergent ontologies and methodologies in 
IR. My reading and forwarding of Rancière is producing for the field an account of politics for IR that 
is decisively set against political-philosophy and thus Jackson. My reading of Rancière and argument 
in this thesis is not concerned with the disruptive power of the emergence of the true but rather with 
understanding how politics must be understood based on the terms with which it is read. This brings 
my argument through to post-positivist and post-structural IR. The ontological truth of methodological 
intervention in the discipline or the truth of anscestrality don’t pose problems for Rancière as he has 
already delimited these critiques. As I argued in the previous chapter on Rancière and the distribution 
of the sensible, I move away from philosophy and the ‘ontologies of superpower’.194 This directs my 
argument and articulates this thesis clearly to post-structural IR. It also through this engagement with 
philosophy highlights my own voice as separate from that of Rancière. In making this claim forcefully 
and by looking at anscestrality I progress Rancièrian thought.  
As I have shown Jackson attempts to produce a philosophical understanding of IR in the form of 
catalogue or taxonomy of the differing superpowers gifted to ontology within IR. This is a useful 
project for understanding both the discipline and the field but such an engagement cannot be political. 
It is a Police action.  I have explicitly distanced myself and my approach from philosophy as I am not 
focused on engaging in the typical charting of rupture that becomes reducible to the emergence of a 
truth.195 By extracting my argument from philosophy my Rancièrian reading can’t be read as producing 
a total account of IR but rather an approach that has implications for politics in IR, one that is never 
complete or total. Jackson’s useful contribution to the field is his charting of the potential “ruptures 
of truth” through his reading of Post-Kantian philosophy. However, the ruptures Jackson is capable of 
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charting are already contained within the totality of the visible, hearable and possible allotted parts 
contained within IR. As such I am writing in this thesis a contribution to IR that goes against Jacksons 
reading and understanding of IR. 
My account evasion of the Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism by eschewing philosophy as a basis 
for approaching IR, sets up the conditions of and for my understanding of “the international” 
forwarded within this thesis. “The international” like the material relations behind our commonly 
apprehensible world is inapprehensible in and of itself. What is required to make “the international” 
apprehensible is a distribution of the sensible. As the partage of a distribution of the sensible enables 
the apprehensibility of “the international” it is non-sensible to talk of “the international” as existing 
outside of its relation to the distribution of the sensible. This is not a statement about the existence 
of a material and physical world or conditions outside of our distribution of the sensible. This a 
question that rests in philosophy. The distribution of the sensible requires a material and physical 
existence to exist in order for there to be objects moulded into apprehensibility. In thinking “the 
international” as the material conditions that must be (ac)counted by the distribution of the sensible 
to become apprehensible it becomes clear that “the international” is only meaningful and 
apprehensible through its relationship to the distribution of the sensible. This means that IR can only 
encounter its object through a distribution that rests upon an arkhè and produces self-evident facts 
about that object. Thus, the object of IR is only knowable when thought through IR’s distribution of 
the sensible. This represents not only a contribution to my argument and thesis but also a contribution 
to thought around Rancière as I am writing against the tensions I have with the Rancièrian framework.  
Rather I argue “the international” is conditioned by the discipline’s own formulation and arrangement 
of its distribution of the sensible. While this may seem like an odd claim I will work it through here. As 
I have argued previously the distribution of the sensible produces assumed facts, which delimit what 
can be seen, done, said, thought or made.196 The distribution of the sensible produces these same 
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facts out of “the international” into an apprehensible mode of thinking IR. The object of IR’s study 
then is not, a “pure” international. It is not the IR that we look at and apprehend in the world taken 
as true. Rather it is the IR that we look at and apprehend in the world that appears as true due to the 
fact it is structured through IR’s distribution of the sensible. But IR cannot set the conditions for the 
production of its own distribution of the sensible. Rather, as Walker hints at the distribution of the 
sensible for IR is always already produced in relation to the social, historical and political imaginaries 
that enable the formulation of IR as a specific mode of engagement with the world.  
The next sections looks at how I read the distribution of the sensible into IR. Here we can see the 
argument I give which highlights the linkages between my work and work by Bleiker197, Callahan198 
and Ciută199 which serves to bring the aesthetic and aesthetic texts into the workings of what we 
consider “the international”. As I highlighted in the introduction these texts are essential allies in 
rethinking IR however I forward a different reading and focus, partly through my reading of Rancière. 
My argument in this section defined my relationship between IR and political theory through my 
engagement with Walker. From this I argued that IR separates itself from political theory and arranges 
itself with regard to a separate object, “the international” as opposed to “the domestic”. Through an 
engagement with and critique Jackson I highlighted how my Rancièrian reading of IR requires the 
separation of the inapprehensible object of study from its apprehensible form through the distribution 
of the sensible. Finally, I concluded by proposing a distinction between “the international” as the 
material conditions and IR as the apprehensible (ac)count of “the international”.  
The Distribution of the Sensible in IR  
In order for me to apply the concept of the distribution of the sensible to IR I need to do a little bit of 
ground clearing first. There have been numerous attempts to think IR through the lens of political 
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theory200, with the most influential being Walker.201 I have argued in the previous section that Walker 
gives us an interesting account of the articulation between political theory and IR202 can and has been 
subsumed and utilised on behalf of political understanding. This helps to show how IR is understood 
as a method of realising and understanding “the international” but also as a political tool in shaping 
that understanding.203 The interlocking of political theory and IR is a useful point for the translation of 
Rancière into IR theory. I understand IR not just as a methodology or philosophy for theorising “the 
international” but as a way by which we can theorise politics within IR and how this can be conveyed. 
As Lake sets out, and I have alluded to in my literature review, the fourth debate constructs an eclectic 
basis of IR.204 This eclectic base has a double function. Firstly, it enables a field, or at least section of 
IR, that are conducive to the articulation of my Rancièreian understanding of IR theory. Secondly it 
operationalises a potential for moving IR away from understanding itself solely in relation to its own 
ontological foundations. This is important in thinking through the way in which my articulation and 
understanding of Rancière sits at a tension with ontology within Rancière’s own thought.  
In order to render this argument and my contribution possible I have to look through how the 
distribution of the sensible and be articulated to IR. As I have argued in the previous chapter in order 
for this to be meaningful there first needs to be an argument which accounts for the distribution of 
the sensible in IR. As I outlined in the previous chapter the distribution of the sensible sets the 
conditions of an apprehensible common world and creates a series of positions and dispositions 
specific to those positions.205 It also makes possible any and all orderings through its establishment of 
                                                          
200 A good example of this debate and thought can be seen in the Journal of International Political Theory. 
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the conditions of apprehensibility206 linked to the arkhè which ensures the coherence of the differing 
(dis)positions allotted and apportioned by the distribution of the sensible.207 My proposition is that in 
IR apprehensible common world and the requisite apportioned (dis)positions are established around 
the arkhè of Anarchy.  
Now, as we have seen Rancière’s frame of reference is the polis from which he extrapolates the 
situation of the nation state.208 In attempting to think “the international” as understood through its 
relation to the distribution of the sensible this could be problematic. Whereas Rancière makes clear 
and establishes the location of apportioned parts and their allotted portions within his political theory, 
their location within IR is not immediately clear. This is where I step outside of Rancière’s own 
argumentation and argue that with regard to the distribution of the sensible within IR we can see that 
it apportions its parts and their allotted portions with regard to “the international”. The location of 
these parts is given, as I showed in Chapter 3, at the level of relations between nation-states.  In order 
for this location to be clear I have to first look at how the distribution of the sensible sets the conditions 
for its understanding of apprehensible actants within IR. This is only possible given the partage specific 
to IR by which the distribution of the sensible carries out its (ac)count. In order to highlight the 
distribution of the sensible within IR I turn back to the work of Waltz, with regard to Wendt, to give a 
clear account of how IR has been rendered apprehensible through the distribution of the sensible.  
As I argued in Chapter 2 for Waltz, within the first image wars effective cause is the nature and 
behaviour of man.’209 There is already a linkage here between the three images of the causes of war 
and the (dis)position of its subject: states. As I explicated within my close reading the first image isn’t 
the cause of war as it is not war’s permissive cause.210 Waltz shifts away from specific personalised 
understanding of War as human nature cannot be changed whereas socio-political institutions can 
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be.’211 Humanity in and of itself is not a sufficient location for “the international” to be found and 
rendered apprehensible for Waltz. This argument for the understanding of IR, as I have hinted at in 
my close reading, requires that IR theorists ignore in part every feature of states except their 
capabilities. As Waltz argues IR theorists must ‘not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, 
authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states 
except their capabilities.’212 As I have argued previously this is not a rejection of the aesthetic character 
of politics but is instead a political choice designed to construct IR in a particular way. In taking the 
state not only as an empty unit, devoid of its first and second image concerns, and also as a neutral 
unit Waltz makes a statement as to the (dis)position of parts within the distribution of the sensible. 
This approach to IR takes and apprehends “the international” at the level of states through the lens of 
anarchy. In effect Waltz, as conditioned by the political, social and historical imaginaries around him, 
produces an (ac)count of IR which renders apprehensible an understanding of “the international”. We 
can see this in his statement that ‘among men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of 
government, is associated with the occurrence of violence.’213 As Waltz renders the state as the unit of 
IR it isn’t simply the state in isolation, nor is it the metonymic state of his second image.214 Rather it is 
the state as ordered by anarchy. This establishes for Waltz the apprehensibility of IR. This is a particular 
way of understanding and reading both Waltz and the distribution of the sensible. It is worth working 
through this in more detail so I can lift out a broader understanding of the distribution of the sensible 
within IR.  
Waltz makes the transition from an understanding of domestic politics to IR through looking at a 
distinction in what he calls organising principles. Waltz argues, as I have highlighted earlier, that he 
‘defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or 
ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions and third by the 
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distribution of capabilities across units.215. It is obvious here that for Waltz the stakes of how “the 
international” can be rendered apprehensible are inexorably tied to the capability and relations of and 
between states. Waltz relies in part here on an analogy to the domestic. To be more precise “the 
international” in understood by Waltz as threefold. Primarily there is the ordering principle of IR: 
anarchy. Secondly there is the character of the units: states. Finally, there is the capabilities of these 
states: their militaries and economic arrangement. From this tripartite distinction Waltz goes on to 
argue that the organising principle of IR is anarchy. He gives an account that within IR ‘none is entitled 
to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralised and anarchic.’216 In 
making this distinction Waltz highlights that the core character of IR is its anarchic nature. However, 
this is not a difference in system. Waltz thinks through IR as peculiar and particular in that it is an 
anarchic system. The prevalence of this organising principle is what gives IR distinction and establishes 
the conditions for its order(ing). However IR is not unique in terms of it being an order(ing). Waltz 
shows us that IR is structured by an organising principle that is different from the domestic 
understanding of the political. This structuring is not in and of itself unique but rather is consistent 
with modes of structure and order(ing). To carry this over to its Rancièrian understanding, there is a 
distribution of the sensible that renders IR from “the international”. The arkhè of this distribution is 
different from that of the domestic.  
For Wendt217, and those who follow him, however, the state has an ontological existence in its own 
right.218 Wendt is in agreement with Waltz that “the international” can be taken as analogous to the 
domestic. He agrees in taking anarchy as the arkhè of the distribution of the sensible but gives the 
state a social character. Wendt’s constructivism, then, is not a counter to Waltz’s argument and does 
                                                          
215 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Addison-Wesley, London, 1979) pp. 88 
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Page 147 of 278 
 
not change the relationship of the distribution of the sensible, its arkhè and relationship to “the 
international”. The state as actant is still a (dis)position made apprehensible via the distribution of the 
sensible.  
There is a problem here in that as a state and it subjects have already had the condition of their 
apprehensibility constituted through the distribution of the sensible, how can theory avoid positing at 
the level of the international a kind of “double jeopardy” in the distribution of the sensible ability takes 
place twice. How can we talk about the distribution of the sensible within IR without falling recourse 
to an infinite regression/multiplicity of distributions of the sensible?   
I argue that there is a singular distribution of the sensible that formulates our relationship between 
differing (ac)count and (ac)counting of apprehensible parts. This singular distribution of the sensible 
cuts across all different manners of understanding. We can see this distribution in that as we change 
the object of our focus so too changes the specific details of the distribution of the sensible’s 
apportionment.  This is to say that while domestic understanding and international understandings 
have different particulars they are both shaped by the distribution of the sensible. I am arguing here 
for IR to be considered an activity that differs to the regular attenuation of the domestic distribution 
of the sensible. This is not an argument for IR to be considered a completely distinct and abstract 
distribution onto itself. Rather I am arguing that when we shift the object of our focus to “the 
international” our common apprehensible world is apportioned by the distribution of the sensible 
differently. I am looking at the way in which our common apprehensible world within IR is apportioned 
and (ac)counted through the distribution of the sensible. This is a different task to looking at how our 
common apprehensible world is apportioned and (ac)counted through the distribution of the sensible. 
In making this distinction I am highlighting the divide between the apprehensible spaces of IR from 
the apprehensible spaces of domestic politics. In doing so it follows that the system of self-evident 
facts that are produced by the distribution of the sensible in relation to IR and constitute the 
apprehensibility of IR are different from domestic politics.  
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The distribution of the sensible is not universal. We can see this given the differing readings of Police 
order found in Disagreement. Rancière distinguishes between the Scythian “slave war”219 as distinct 
from the Roman (ac)count which enabled the Aventine secession of the plebs.220 Both of these Police 
orders have different sets of parts (ac)counted by and for their distributions of the sensible. I have 
already argued for a meta-ethical comparison between police orders also.221 In order for my argument 
to be consistent and for this to make sense there must be a distinction between the distribution of 
the sensible present in Scythia and Rome. This distinction isn’t only temporal but also spatial. The 
differentiation between states understandings of themselves depends on the states own 
understanding of a commonly apprehensible world. This in turn means that as state understandings 
differ over space and time the distribution of the sensible must also differ over space and time. This is 
not only uncontroversial but is also a necessary assumption for my arguments to have any weight.  
If the distribution of the sensible was not contingent across time or space then it would be unchanging 
and a fixed universal substrate to be uncovered. This uncovering would reduce my Rancièrian 
approach to understanding and politics to a mode of philosophy privileging the rupture of the true: 
another account of the superpower of ontology. Rancière, then, explicitly sets the location of the 
distribution of the sensible at the level of the polis. This is a tension between Rancière’s own work and 
my argumentation. I move against Rancière in arguing that by the fact that the distribution of the 
sensible is not a universal substrate or some unequivocal mode of being then it is a concept grounded 
in contingency. Just as the distribution of the sensible varies and is still meaningful across states and 
societies. It must also be meaningful to (mis)communicate between states and societies. Just as the 
individual parts of the polis are distributed through the partage of the distribution of the sensible 
made to cohere via its arkhè the distribution of individual part of “the international” must be 
distributed through the partage of the distribution of the sensible made to cohere via its arkhè. This 
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is me giving an argument to differentiate my own work from Rancière as well as the possibility for my 
argumentation within IR.  
My argument here for IR is the same as Rancière’s for the polis.  As the ability for individual parts to 
be apprehensible to each other within the polis they must also be distributed between polis’. 
Rancière’s foregrounding of the distribution of the sensible as enabling the conditions for 
apprehensibility at the individual level, and thus the establishment of apprehensible order, means if 
“the international” is rendered apprehensible into IR it must also be ordered by a distribution of the 
sensible: as we are capable of apprehending IR. This distribution of the sensible can be thought of as 
like a patchwork quilt. Rather than it being a singular uniform distribution which allocates 
(dis)positions in a homogenous fashion it is operationalised heterogeneously. The distribution of the 
sensible with regard to “the international” organises the (dis)positions of the states themselves. 
Each patch is like the distinct distribution of the sensible which grounds the conditions of 
apprehensibility within that particular state, both temporally and spatially. The patches are not 
separate from each other but constituted by a partage. While the contents of each patch might be 
different to another patch they are distributed in line with the broader quilt. This is the important 
point with regard to the distribution of the sensible in IR. While there exist states, which are internally 
ordered by a distribution of the sensible which sets the conditions of their apprehensibility, the 
conditions of those states own apprehensibility, by an observer, is set at an external level. The stakes 
of my argument rest not on the partage of relations within the state but rather on a distribution of 
the sensible making “the international” apprehensible and thus a partage of IR. In order for this to be 
reasonable there must be a distribution of the sensible that enables states themselves to be 
understood as states by other states. There must be an international order(ing) of states as it is 
possible for states to apprehend each other.  
Following on from this example I argue it is worth thinking about the way in which the distribution of 
the sensible orders states. Because the distribution of the sensible sets the conditions of 
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apprehensibility both of itself and the subjects produced in relation to it, the notion of statehood itself 
is set by IR’s distribution of the sensible itself. This will be important when we look at the formation 
of the Police and politics within IR.  
Having argued for the existence and applicability of the distribution of the sensible to IR I now go on 
to explore the character of this distribution. Namely how it is structured by an arkhè but also how it 
sets up the conditions of apprehensibility for and by states. I highlight how the distribution of the 
sensible for IR is coheres around the arkhè of anarchy. Anarchy is given as the ordering principle not 
only by Waltz222 and Wendt223 but, as I have argued in Chapter 2 throughout the field. It is the ordering 
principle across not only the great debates of IR224 but also its contemporary existence and 
understanding of itself where it makes apprehensible the subject positions of IR. Anarchy then isn’t a 
geo-political or territorial force that shapes state behaviour in relation to each other. Rather anarchy 
structures IR at the level of apprehensibility.  It establishes the (dis)positions which make IR 
apprehensible as a practice and a field and constitutes what can be seen as a subject of IR. Here it is 
clear that territorial, sovereign, nation-state become the (ac)countable parts of the international. They 
are, given the Police, the constituents of IR without void or supplement.  
Anarchy constructs IR’s distribution of the sensible as it is the arkhè which enables the distribution to 
cohere. In thinking anarchy’s relationship to the distribution of the sensible as an arkhè it follows that 
it produces a series of self-evident facts which enable the apportionment of (dis)positions, relations 
between these (dis)positions and a commonly apprehensible world. In short anarchy constructs IR’s 
distribution of the sensible by providing a logic which enables the coherence of IR. Without an arkhè 
the distribution of the sensible in IR would be unable to formulate its object into a common 
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apprehensible world. This also means that political action within IR must necessarily challenge 
anarchy’s apportionment. To explain this I want to turn to an example from Feminist IR.  
As we saw in Chapter 1 the fourth debate structures IR in terms of ontology.225 I have argued that the 
fourth debate restructures the boundaries of IR and in doing so organises IR around these approaches’ 
epistemological and ontological foundations. A good example of this reflexive turn is the work of 
Ackerly & True.226 Feminist IR and specifically Ackerly & True227 deploy an epistemological approach 
by which they establish the ethical standard to which IR should adhere,228 arguing, in common with 
other Feminist engagements in IR is that attentiveness to feminist-informed research can produce an 
understanding of “the international” that is not only more effective/accurate but also sound ethical 
practice.229 As Ackerly & True state ‘we would also argue that the feminist research ethic is an ethical 
practice.’230 The sort of reflexive turn, brings through the normative implications of theorising IR while 
situating IR within the remit of ontology and epistemology. That is to say, it aims at a transformation 
of methodology so that we, as IR researchers, can be attentive to the ways in which the object of our 
research can be rendered sensible.231 As Ackerly & True argue ‘feminist attentiveness to disciplinary 
boundaries reveals how the political boundaries of the state system shape our knowledge about IR and 
continue to render women invisible as international subjects and actors.’232 This highlights the latent 
and potentially political character of the field as understood by Feminist IR. In being concerned with 
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how the way gender and women can be subjectivated into IR against the wrong perpetrated by IR we 
can read this potentially as a site for politics.  
This, as I argue now, is related to but distinction from the Police distribution’s understanding of gender 
and women. We can see this in their argument that ‘Feminist perspectives redirect our attention from 
the kinds of questions that are being asked in International Relations to ask questions that have not 
fallen within the purview of IR as the discipline has traditionally defined knowledge.’233 Here Ackerly & 
True move to open IR up to an excluded part that has been reduced to only having voice. The proposal 
of a research-ethic enables the articulation of their argument to the Police order of IR through 
becoming depoliticised by a focus on ethics/power. We can see this focus as they argue the ‘a feminist 
research ethic can give us limited confidence that our epistemological perspective, theoretical choices, 
research design, data collection, data analysis, exposition of findings, and venues for sharing findings 
are attentive to power.’234 The feminist-research ethic proposed by Ackerly & True is useful in 
unpacking and understanding the ethical and power relations that exist within the state-system. This 
is an interesting understanding of how IR can and does relate to the Police order. Ackerly & True could 
be read here as organising a redistribution of the Police understanding of IR as opposed to a political 
move that re-distributes the sensible. Here there is both a linkage between my argumentation and 
also a tension between how I am writing.   
 
As Feminist IR isn’t solely concerned with the conditions of subjectivation and apprehensibility but 
rather also unpacking power relations, I need to highlight how these two modes of engagement go 
together. As Rancière highlights for us politics requires more than just the explication of power 
relations: it must ‘give rise to a meeting of [the] Police logic and [an] egalitarian logic that is never set 
up in advance.’235 With this in mind it is clear that Ackerly & True do represent a moment of politics in 
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IR but one that is related to the specifics of IR’s distribution of the sensible. While they break down 
and challenge the notions of apprehensibility within IR they do not draw through these relations to 
the Police ordering of IR. This is a good example of how my reading of IR through Rancière is useful. 
We can see in Ackerly & True, as well as Feminist IR more broadly, not only the potential for politics 
but a mode of politics that is specific to IR. This understanding of IR produces a meta-ethical critique 
of the Police order in addition to its political understanding of subjectivation against a wrong. This 
becomes understandable through Rancièreian theory as the Feminist research-ethic providing a meta-
ethical comparison between the current Police order and a potential Police order that is feminist-
informed and therefore ethically preferable.  
 
This is not a criticism given my previous argument for the muddying of the Police and politics 
previously within the thesis. Rather it highlights how Feminist IR can be considered as political but also 
how it relates to political possibility. The critique of IR given by Ackerly & True raises the spectre of 
political possibility as a clear example of the subjectivation that would be necessary for IR to take 
gender and women seriously as parts of IR that possess speech. This example highlights how IR has 
been constrained to Policing through the terms of the fourth debate and also foregrounds my next 
section which looks explicitly at the conditions of politics and Policing in IR. The contribution of 
applying a Rancièrian theory of politics to IR, with regard to Feminist IR, is the ability to translate and 
understand meta-ethical claims and critiques into political ones. By focusing on the wrong of IR’s 
distribution of the sensible Feminist IR gives us an account of the possibility in subjectivating women 
and gender within IR. As I have argued Ackerly & True do present a mode of potential political 
argumentation and in reading them with regard to a Rancierian theory of politics allows us to see how 
they pave the way for the process of political subjectivation. The specifics of this articulation are 
something I work through in the next section of this chapter which is concerned with the police and 
politics. 
 
Page 154 of 278 
 
The Police & Politics in IR  
I argue that if we are to accept the distribution of the sensible as an appropriate framework for 
rendering sensible IR then we must also accept its consequences for how we understand its Police as 
well as political (ac)counts. If IR is to be rendered apprehensible by the distribution of the sensible 
then it must always already be a (mis)counting of IR. Through the translation of Rancièrian political 
theory into IR I argue that politics in IR can only occur at the site of a wrong. Given this wrong politics 
then must be the subjectivation of a part of IR that has no part of IR. Policing for IR must be an 
(ac)count of IR that is without void or supplement.  
As I argued in the previous chapter the Police are distinct from the “petty police” of everyday law 
enforcement agencies.236 Work that understands and charts the activities of the “petty police” in IR 
can be seen in that of Dunton & Kitchen237, Gould238 & Greener239 where they look at the way in which 
the “petty police” enforce both laws within IR but also normative relations. Within IR this is the 
approach which dominates understandings around policing. Rather than looking at the way the “petty 
police” acts internationally, or the way in which shared norms between states can maintain their 
coherence, I look at the Police as a total (ac)count of IR without void or supplement. This 
understanding is consistent with what I argued in the previous chapter. The Police are a specific mode 
of (ac)counting the distribution of parts within a given distribution of the sensible.240 In particular the 
Police (ac)count is a total one without void or supplement. Politics cannot occur wherever the whole 
of “the international” is reduced to the sum of its parts with nothing left over.241 The Police, then, are 
the mechanisms by which the distribution of the sensible’s totality is maintained.  I now go on to argue 
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for how the Police (ac)count of IR is structured and give three examples of the way in which this 
silences potential politics.  
The first mode by which the Police order (ac)counts for our commonly apprehensible world so as to 
preclude politics is what Rancière terms archipolitics.242 Archipolitics is by its very definition the 
inception of the complete realisation of the arkhè of the distribution of the sensible as enacted in the 
(ac)count of the distributed commonly apprehensible world.243 Archipolitics is then not really a mode 
of politics but is instead a mode of Policing.244 Policing here grounds itself through understanding 
arkhè as a way by which the part which has no part can be written out of our commonly apprehensible 
world. This links the arkhè precisely to the wrong which is the miscount inherent within every 
(ac)count. Specifically, archipolitics is a mechanism by which political-philosophy245 enables a Police 
(ac)count. The archipolitical Police (ac)count of IR is in (ac)counting for an understanding of IR that 
underlines and reinforces the distribution of the sensible as rendered apprehensible through its arkhè 
anarchy as natural. This can be understood as making the self-evident facts (nomos) produced by the 
distribution of the sensible the referent and basis for the Police (ac)count of IR. Rancière gives us an 
example of archipolitics as the translation of quality of the demos, as I have argued previously this is 
freedom (elutheria), into the virtue of moderation (sōphrosunē).246 I argue that this translation enables 
the conversion of the “empty quality” of freedom into the empty virtue of moderation. Through an 
archipolitical Police (ac)count politics and the wrong at the centre of any and all Police (ac)counts 
becomes written out of the common apprehensible world (ac)counted. This is achieved as the 
archipolitical Police (ac)count fuses together the naturality (phusis) of the Police count with the self-
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evident facts (nomos) it produces.247 Through this fusion the archipolitical Police (ac)count renders 
politics impossible by transitioning any (ac)counting of the commonly apprehensible world into a 
“politics” 248 of harmony. This harmony is a reaffirmation of the arkhè which enables to constitution 
of the Police (ac)count as total.  
We can see an archipolitical Police (ac)count of IR within work that makes arguments along the lines 
of the affirmation of anarchy as the organising principle of IR. Looking back to my previous chapter on 
anarchy as the organising principle of IR we can see that the literature that understands anarchy as an 
organising principle is the basis for archipolitics. We can see it clearly within works that fall within the 
Realist school of thought. Work by Waltz both Man, the State and War249 and his Theory of 
International Politics250 as well as works by Mearsheimer251, Wohlforth252 and Rose.253 Looking at 
Classical realists like Morgenthau254 and Carr255, as well as Neo-Classical scholarship such as 
Rathburn256 and Taliaferro257, we can see their understanding of IR is based in both a naturalised 
human nature and anarchic system. This literature reifies anarchy as the natural and total (ac)count 
of IR. Classical Realist scholarship paints a picture of a naturalised anarchic cosmos. The principles of 
this cosmos serves to establish an ordering of IR. As such Classical Realists give a Police archipolitical 
(ac)count of IR. Classical Realist argumentation is archipolitical in that they give a total (ac)count 
without void or supplement, that negates politics through the “natural harmony” of an anarchic order 
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of territorial sovereign nation-states. It is obvious here that harmony doesn’t necessitate actual peace 
or normative tranquillity. Rather the harmony referred to is in the relation between the (ac)count’s 
totality and the totality given by the arkhè of the distribution of the sensible. 
With regard to the Realist literature, that I write against, it is not the case that these texts are wholly 
archipolitical. Rather they forward a Police (ac)count of IR that is grounded within an archipolitical 
understanding of the distribution of the sensible. This is one example of how archipolitics can be seen 
to take place within IR but of course this is not limited or specific to Realist thought. Wendt for example 
takes great pains to situate his constructivist reading of states within an anarchic world to which they 
are held accountable and also internalise.258 The normativity of the arkhè here doesn’t matter; what 
is important is how the arkhè becomes the central point of fusion between its appearance as nature 
(phusis) and the self-evident facts (nomos) of the distribution. Archipolitics becomes a way for the 
miscount that the Police (ac)count relies upon to become unrealisable: for IR to be Policed.  
The second mode by which the Police (ac)count can order IR is that of parapolitics. This is a mode of 
Policing that is more complex than archipolitics. This is because parapolitics does not seek to use the 
complete totality of the Police (ac)count but rather precludes politics by redirecting the political 
impulse. While Rancière credits Plato with the formulation of the archipolitical syllogism he gives 
Aristotle as the source for the para-political.259  Parapolitics recognises the peculiarity of politics but 
redirects and reaffirms the Police count over this miscount. This is a mode of Policing that changes its 
basis for ordering from the arkhè of the distribution of the sensible to the arkhaï (offices), or 
(dis)positions, within the distribution of the sensible. Within Parapolitics the site for “politics” 
becomes read as the relationship between already apprehensible (dis)positions and parts. Parapolitics 
does not look at the arkhè as necessarily natural but rather understands the arkhè of the distribution 
through the arkhaï (offices) held by and in relation to apportioned parts of the distribution. “Politics” 
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then is read as the negotiations and conversations between these already apportioned and 
apprehensible parts.  
This is a mode of Policing that is not about highlighting the cosmological unity of the arkhè of the 
Police (ac)count but instead is about the relative “power” (kurion)260 held by the relative (dis)positions 
of and between apportioned parts.261 Parapolitics, then, is a mode of Policing which looks to provide 
an “equality” between the already apprehensible parts of the distribution of the sensible through an 
arithmetic and geometric equality. This is not to be confused with the fundamental equality which is 
an axiom required for politics proper. Equality for parapolitics becomes the struggles around the 
apportion between the arkhaï and over the “power” (kurion) within the system.262 This mode of 
Policing gives an (ac)count of IR without void or supplement not through a cosmic harmony 
engendered by subservience to our commonly apprehensible world, to the arkhè, but rather looks to 
establish the conditions of “politics” through its absence.263 As such any and all “political” movement 
within a para-political (ac)count must be by, for and between the already apprehensible (dis)position 
of parts.  
An example of this mode of Policing within IR can be found within the work of Liberal Institutionalists 
such as Keohane.264 Within this mode of thinking IR, questions of “politics” are taken as questions of 
balance and distribution. We can see a similar impulse in some of the work of Neo-Realists which 
focuses on relative gains.265 Another example of parapolitical Policing in IR is the work of Hedley Bull 
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both in The Anarchical Society266 and elsewhere.267 By turning anarchy into a socialised and countable 
understanding, Bull transforms the arkhè of IR into its requisite arkhaï. This movement is focused not 
on anarchy itself but on the nature and relations between states within anarchy. This is a mode of 
Policing which is typical of parapolitics as it converts the appearance of the order(ing) of IR from its 
arkhè, anarchy, into a totalising count of the relations between states. This makes the miscount which 
enables the Police (ac)count inapprehensible.  
The third and final mechanism of Policing in IR is that of metapolitics. The two previous articulations 
of political-philosophies that have enabled Policing, have been attempts to render “politics” 
inapprehensible. Both archipolitics and parapolitics are Policing as they enable a total (ac)count of IR 
that makes the miscount which enables the Police (ac)count to be rendered inapprehensible. 
Metapolitics differs in that it is not necessarily an amalgamation of philosophy and “politics” but rather 
is read as the “politics” of a philosophy.268 While archipolitics established arguments and the Police 
(ac)count in the form of a “politics” which is the reaffirmation of the arkhè of the Police (ac)count, 
Metapolitics is the assertion of a radical surplus of “wrongs”.269 This is different from the “wrongness” 
of a particular distribution that becomes the “politics” of parapolitics’ Police (ac)count. The 
metapolitical Police (ac)count is established on the assumption that our commonly apprehensible 
world is constructed on and by a falsity.270 Metapolitics constructs the falsity of our commonly 
apprehensible world as that conflation between the allocation of lots and the “political” process.271 
This conflation, for a metapolitical Police (ac)count, is designed to obscure a form of truth.272 “Politics” 
then becomes the uncovering and rupture of this truth back against the commonly apprehensible 
world which assumes it is true. Metapolitics as a Police (ac)count gives a total (ac)count without void 
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or supplement by highlighting how the allocation of (dis)positions within the distribution of the 
sensible is inequitable and that this inequitable character is obscured by the system. “Politics” for the 
metapolitical Police (ac)count, then, is the way by which the “truth” of the inequality of the system is 
revealed through the understanding and argumentation of the philosopher.273 This mode of Police 
(ac)counting serves to write politics out of apprehensibility in a similar way to archipolitics. The 
difference is that archipolitics serves the truth and rightness of the distribution of the sensible whereas 
metapolitics serves through an exposition the falsity and wrongness of the distribution.  
While it is tempting to read metapolitics as offering a coherent account of actual politics this is not the 
case. Metapolitics is Policing. In revealing the falsity/inequity of the system its “politics” is grounded 
through a referent and this is itself unequal. Metapolitics is not about opening up the fundamental 
exclusion of a part which has no part but, rather, the wrongness of the distribution of a specific special 
or true part.274 Metapolitics is the philosophical rupturing of the true, an account of the superpowers 
of ontology. Metapoltics is therefore the “politics” of those who ‘play the game of forms and those 
who direct the action designated to eradicate the play of forms’.275 It is a seizing of an aspect of the 
allotment of positions established by the distribution of the sensible and then focusing on the 
inequality that is articulated against this segment. This conceives of “politics”, not as the revelation 
and struggle for “power” as in parapolitics, but rather revealing the inequality of the allotment with 
regard to a specific position. Metapolitics then is Policing through a “politics” of the rejection of a 
specific distribution in favour of the revelation of a “truth” specific to an individual position.276 This 
account of metapolitics gets that the tension between my argumentation and the limitations of writing 
my Rancierian framework into IR.  
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The metapolitical Police (ac)count of IR can be seen within some works of Marxist IR. Work like that 
produced by Davenport277, Cox278 & Teschke279 operates partially within a metapolitical frame in that 
it critiques the distribution of the sensible within IR in order to open up the way in which IR itself is a 
product of a “hidden” socio-political arrangement, namely capitalism. Davenport is an excellent case 
for this metapolitical reading as he sublates the Marxist reading of IR into the Realist understanding. 
This is a metapolitical Police move as it subverts any political reading of IR, to understand the potential 
impact of the argument only within the frames of the distribution of the sensible despite its “false” 
nature.280 In addition to this mode of metapolitical argumentation there is another clear example of 
this mode of Policing IR. This can be read in line with the “great debates narrative” if we look at the 
work of Schmidt281, Wæver282 and Jackson283. Where Marxist IR is metapolitical due to its reduction of 
the distribution of the sensible to a falsehood in favour of a singular allotment of that distribution in 
these examples metapolitics is different. This clearly highlights the positionality of my work and the 
organisation of my arguments articulation to IR.  
The way in which the “great debates narrative” and the meta-theorisation of IR Polices IR not through 
looking at a single allotment as given by the distribution of the sensible but rather its conditions of 
apprehensibility. For example, Jackson conceives of conducting “politics” in IR along the lines of 
understanding the epistemology and ontologies which ground the field as a whole. This understanding 
of IR is metapolitical as it reduces any “politics” to engagement with the distribution of the sensible 
                                                          
277 A. Davenport, ‘Marxism in IR: Condemned to a Realist Fate?’, European Journal of International Relations, 
Vol. 19, No. 1 (2011) pp. 27-48 
278 R. Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: an Essay in Method’, Millennium Journal of 
International Relations, Vol.12, No. 2, (1983)  
279 See, B. Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations, 
(Verso, London, 2003) and B. Teschke, ‘Geopolitics’, Historical Materialism, Vol. 14, No. 1, (2006) pp.327-335 
280 A. Davenport, ‘Marxism in IR: Condemned to a Realist Fate?’, European Journal of International Relations, 
Vol. 19, No. 1 (2011) pp. 42-43 
281 B. Schmidt, ‘On the History and Historiography of International Relations’, Handbook of International 
Relations, (Sage Publications, London, 2013) pp.3-28 
282 O. Wæver, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate’, International Relations Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1996) pp.149-185 
283 See, P. T. Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry into International Relations: The Philosophy of Science and its 
Implications for the Study of World Politics, (Routledge, London, 2010) and P. T. Jackson, ‘Must International 
Relations be a Science?’, Millennium Journal of International Relations, Vol. 43, No. 3, (2015) pp. 942-965 
Page 162 of 278 
 
purely at the level of philosophy. “Politics” under this mode of Policing becomes understanding and 
forwarding claims based on these set and realised true assumptions.  This isn’t political as it isn’t about 
the emergence of a part without a part in relation to a wrong but rather is about understanding the 
way in which the current distribution of the sensible allocates lots according to the conditions of 
apprehensibility it establishes. When Jackson looks at the monist or dualist philosophical-ontological 
positions he is looking at the way in which the distribution of the sensible establishes the conditions 
of apprehensibility in IR284. This isn’t done so as to facilitate the entry of a part which has no part into 
the field but rather to better categories and understand the already existing allotments.  
I have argued so far for three different modes of Policing as examples of how the Police (ac)count 
within IR can propagate itself. These differing Police (ac)counts are given as mechanisms by which 
politics proper can be excised from emergence. These mechanisms are taken as modes by which 
politics and the political impulse can be rendered into the Police count. What, then, of politics? As we 
have seen, for Rancière politics is a process of subjectivation of a part which has no part in regard to 
a wrong. It is important to remember that this wrong is not reducible to a problem or distribution, the 
conditions of apprehensibility or the allotment and apportionment of the (dis)positions of parts under 
the distribution of the sensible. Rather, it is the assertion of the fact that the Police (ac)count if 
fundamentally a miscount. This fundamental miscounting always relies on the preclusion of a part of 
the count that has no part in the count. The task of politics is to enable this part that has no part to 
become apprehensible: for it to be (ac)counted. Within the context of IR this might seem an 
impossibility given the apparent totality of the Police count.  
Given that the arkhè of IR’s distribution of the sensible is anarchy we can see the conditions for what 
is apprehensible within IR. This forces IR to be considered as the domain of sovereign territorial states. 
By establishing the conditions of apprehensibility along these lines the distribution of the sensible 
within precludes apprehension not only of the domestic but also any sub or supra state activity. This 
                                                          
284 Ibid. pp. 946 
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preclusion is an example of a wrong. IR obviously relies and is founded upon and with regard to the 
activity of sub/para-state agents. As I have argued it doesn’t make sense to understand IR without 
looking at the reality of IR in practice or the political, social and historical imaginaries which 
engendered its emergence. In actuality “the international” is composed of non-, sub- and para- state 
actants but these are excluded from direct study in IR. This exclusion is formulated to enable the 
stability of the field through a distribution of the sensible.  Following from this it is clear that the best 
way to understand the location of a potential part that has no part is within those bodies that exist in 
actuality in “the international” yet are not eligible for apprehensibility within IR. This division between 
the actuality of aesthetic, social and material relations contained within the world and those rendered 
apprehensible by the distribution of the sensible are at the core of the miscount which is the wrong. 
For IR then the wrong which enables the formation of politics is carried out at the level of its state 
centrism. In order for there to be politics in IR it must address this wrong through the subjectivation 
of an excluded subject.  
My approach to politics renders the majority of work within IR Policing. This is not a surprise or 
criticism as Rancière acknowledges the rarity of politics proper and as I have highlighted Policing is not 
a normatively pejorative activity. So, given the relationship between the distribution of the sensible 
and IR it becomes clear that work within IR that is concerned with the actions and relations between 
states is Policing as opposed to political. This might seem counter-intuitive as work that has been done 
on state relations can be emancipatory. However, as I have argued this work cannot be political but is 
rather a renegotiation between the already apprehensible apportioned (dis)positional parts. This is 
the renegotiation of the arrangement within the Police (ac)count. As I have argued in the previous 
chapter there can be meta-ethical comparison between Police (ac)counts but this does not alter their 
character as Policing. The emancipatory potential of Alexander Wendt’s social theory of IR over 
Waltz’s neo-realist theory doesn’t change the fact that both of these are Police (ac)counts of IR.  
Page 164 of 278 
 
Turning attention back to the previous examinations of archi-, para- and metapolitics it becomes clear 
how they fit into Policing even more deeply. These modes of Police (ac)counting manage to 
reintroduce political strands of argument that would turn disruption of the state system back into 
reaffirmations of that very system. The case of archipolitics is clear cut in that it writes off any attack 
against the virtuosity of an anarchic cosmos. Parapolitics reduces the political dimension of IR to a 
negotiation that crucially can only take place in IR at the level of the state. Metapolitics doesn’t just 
reduce the social, aesthetic and material relations of the real world to the state system but rather to 
a solely philosophical engagement with that world. The location of politics within IR then must be to 
do with a relation to anarchy and thus the primacy of sovereign territorial nation states. Given that 
the part of IR with no part in IR occurs below or above the state level then the potential subject for 
political action could be a variety of figures. I go on in my case-study to work through the potential 
political subject of the migrant/migration. This is by no means a comprehensive and total account of 
potential political subjects but rather an exemplar of how a Rancièrian theorisation of IR can play out. 
As I argued in the previous section and introduction we can see some literatures as already charting 
the emergence of a part which has no part into IR.  
I have now given an answer to the effect of my Rancièrian theorisation of IR on politics for IR. Through 
the application of my understanding of Rancierian political theory to IR I have given an account of how 
such an understanding shapes politics. Namely I have shown that in order for there to be politics in IR 
this has to be the emergence of a part of IR which has no part in IR. This must be articulated against 
the wrong which is the exclusion of a part of IR that is a part of IR. In assertion of IR’s miscount and 
the fundamental equality of the part which has no part this is what is formulated as politics for a 
Rancierian understanding of IR. In terms of its effect this changes the focus of what international 
politics can be thought as. Given the constraints put on understanding IR by my Rancièreian 
framework it is only activity that enables the subjectivation of a part which has no part against a wrong 
that can be understood as politics.  
Page 165 of 278 
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have built on my previous explication of Rancièreian political theory articulating it to 
critical IR theory. I made arguments for the application of the distribution of the sensible to IR as well 
as for anarchy to be taken as its arkhè. This was done with reference to my relationship to Rancière, 
my position in the field as well as how I deal with the limitations of my approach.   
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Chapter 5: 
Theorising the International Politics of Migration 
 
Introduction  
In this chapter I begin to further develop and demonstrate these claims through consideration of an 
exemplary case. That case is the politics of migration and migrants. My argument proceeds, in the first 
section, through a review of contemporary literature. Through close reading and a critical appraisal of 
this literature, I chart how migration and the figure of the migrant sit awkwardly within the field’s 
distribution of the sensible. I break this down into three areas in which migration and migrants become 
sublimated into IR through a Police count: territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. In a second 
section I look at how migration is conceived within the work of Rancière, highlighting how the migrant 
is subject to a social wrong which, potentially, opens up a process of political subjectivation. As I 
explain in the conclusion this opens the way to the next chapter in which I propose a way of 
understanding migration and the figure of the migrant as a potential political subject within IR and 
shows how the my approach to this recast the debate around politics in IR in particular through the 
collation of critical strands and a movement away from ontology. I also highlight where I sit in the field 
and to who I am writing with and against.  
Policing Migration: Territoriality, Sovereignty & Citizenship  
Within IR migration is often cast as a security issue,1 flows of people across and along borders written 
into the sub-field of security studies.2 In critically reviewing this work I focus primarily on research 
                                                          
1S. Scheel, ‘Autonomy of Migration Despite Its Securitisation? Facing the Terms and Conditions of Biometric 
Rebordering’, Millennium, Vol. 41, No. 3, (2013) pp. 575-600 
2 It is worth noting the major approaches to migration differ depending on theoretical alignment within this sub-
field. A major contributing framework to the analysis presented by critical scholarship is the Copenhagen School, 
with work such as Balzacq’s Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (Routledge, 
London, 2010) and Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde’s Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, London, 1998) providing a clear and solid introduction to the literature and theory around 
securitisation.  
Page 167 of 278 
 
informed by critical theory given that there is no space to review all IR work on migration and also 
because this highlights most clearly and directly the ways in which migration and migrants provide a 
location for political subjectivation. The mainstream literature on migration has primarily failed to 
present a clear foundation for theorising migrants as subjects in and of IR3 while confining its 
theorising about the phenomenon within the framework provided by three intersecting and founding 
concepts: territory, the State (sovereignty) and citizenship. Within critical theory, as we will see, 
migrants and migration have been understood as a challenge to these mainstream assumptions.  
The first of the conceptual foundations around migration I want to explore is territory. It is worth 
noting again the centrality of Walker in thinking territory in IR. As he informs us: ‘the spatiality of the 
state conceived as a territorial entity has always been fairly obvious and has consequently allowed for 
a strong geographical component within theories of international relations.’4 Walker, as we have seen, 
allows us to understand how IR can be articulated in such a way as to perpetuate a political relation 
namely: sovereign territorial states. Walker makes clear in the quotation the assumption of the 
centrality of territory to IR, not only in the sense of spatially defined limitations to states but also 
geography itself. Indeed, the concept of the sovereign state has rested upon territory as one of its 
foundations from Weber onwards.5 Migration as a phenomenon is constituted against just this 
backdrop of territoriality. As Ypi argues, considering the difficulty of pinning down definitions here, 
the notion of territoriality refers to ‘the control of a geographical unit by an agent, be it an individual, 
                                                          
3  This is in line with my argumentation as if migration and migrants by their nature as a part which has no part 
they cannot be incorporated cleanly into Police theories of IR. Mainstream attempts to pursue understanding 
migration prioritise the state. Brigden shows us this in her article ‘Improvised Transnationalism: Clandestine 
Migration at the Border of Anthropology and International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60 
(2016) pp. 344. Further explication for both my focus on critical theory and the inability for mainstream IR to 
articulate migration and migrants as subjects coherently within IR comes off of the back of Sylvester’s 
‘Experiencing the End and Afterlives of IR’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2013) pp. 
609-626. Sylvester, as shown on pp. 611-617, charts her critique of the field highlighting why the structural 
academic arrangements of critical theory are divergent from mainstream IR. In “camp IR” there isn’t necessarily 
communication between mainstream and critical IR and this, as I’ve previously argued, is central for my 
approach to the field and the argument forwarded by this thesis.  
4 R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 
1993) pp. 135 
5 M. Weber, Essays in Sociology, (Oxford Uni. Press, London, 1948) pp. 77‐128 
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family, company or any other kind of artificial institution responsible for the use of land (terra) and its 
subsequent formation’.6 Migration is inherently spatial, involving as it does movement across space. 
A precondition for its recognition is, then, a certain conception of spatiality. We might conceive of 
human migration in a larger anthropological and biological context, comparing it with the patterns7 
and motivations8 behind the mass movements of birds for example. This might be sufficient for a 
spatial understanding of migration but not one connected to concepts of territory. The concept of 
migration takes shape not only against the backdrop of a world that is spatial but one that is divided 
territorially – that is one that is not only spatial but also political. The spatial-political ordering of 
sovereign territorial states makes impossible any simple analogy to biological migration. Rather 
migration must be understood in reference to the territoriality of our contemporary global order.  
This distinction between the spatial and political characteristics of territory is essential for 
understanding the contemporary literature around migration. Territory isn’t wholly particular to 
states9  but can also apply to supra-state entities.10 What is important for the territorial dimension to 
understanding the location of migration isn’t how territoriality is expressed within the particularity of 
a state or supra-state entity but in their establishment of fixed borders.11 The spatial delineation of 
fixed borders enables the integrity of both state and supra-state entities. This is what Walker has in 
mind when he explores the territoriality of states.12 The modern state system’s totalising framework13 
                                                          
6 Ibid. pp. 242 
7 R. Smith, T. Meehan & B. Wolf, ‘Assessing Migration Patterns of Sharp-Shinned Hawks Accipter Striatius Using 
Stable-isotope and Band Encounter Analysis’, Journal of Avian Biology, Vol. 34, (2003) pp. 387-392 
8 M. Somveille, A. Rodrigues & A. Manica, ‘Why Do Birds Migrate? A Macroecological Perspective’, Global 
Ecology and Biogeography, Vol. 24, (2015) pp. 664-674 
9 L. Ypi, ‘Territorial Rights and Exclusion’, Philosophy Compass, Vol.8, No. 3, (2013) pp. 241 
10 See, A. Little & N. Vaughn Williams, ‘Stopping Boats Saving Lives Securing Subjects: Humanitarian Borders in 
Europe and Australia’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 3, (2016) pp. 2-3 and C. 
Oelgemöller, ‘‘Transit’ and ‘Suspension’: Migration Management or the Metamorphosis of Asylum-Seekers into 
Illegal Immigrants’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.37, No. 3, (2011) pp. 407-424 
11 B. Muller, ‘Risking it All at the Biometric Border: Mobility, Limits and the Persistence of Securitisation’, 
Geopolitics, Vol. 16, No. 1, (2011) pp. 94-97 
12 R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 
1993) pp. 135 
13 A totality that rests upon legal and political doctrine. For example, the notion of terra nullius, the doctrine 
which enabled western powers to legally seize the land of indigenous populations. Duffy gives this a good 
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constitutes one of the Policing assumptions of IR. Anarchy holds together this distribution of the 
sensible through its generation of territoriality within IR.  
As the arkhè provides the polarising force which enables a common world to be rendered 
apprehensible, it establishes the conditions around which subjects can be understood within IR. These 
subjectivities, which are territorial sovereign states, rely primarily on anarchy for their establishment 
as the apprehensible subject of and for IR. Anarchy, then, establishes through its position as arkhè the 
self-evident facts of the international system.  Here territoriality is one of the essential self-evident 
facts of the international system. Territoriality becomes akin to the Artisans “double virtue” of 
sōphrosunē - it is required for (ac)counting of the system of IR and its subjects (sovereign territorial 
nation states). I am arguing that territoriality is one of the self-evident facts produced by IR’s 
distribution of the sensible and is required for the subjects of IR to understand in order for them to be 
(ac)counted by IR. From this foundation it now becomes possible to look at how and why the migrant 
and migration are a locus for potential political subjectivation.  
Migration rests upon the notion of territoriality within IR – one which it also challenges. Movement 
between and across these boundaries presents a problem for (ac)counting the reality of IR. The 
distribution of the sensible rests upon territoriality14 and thus IR can only apprehend subjects that are 
territorial in nature. Migration/migrants as phenomena and subject are not territorial in the sense of 
the state but are constructed in relation to territory.15 The migrant is both within IR’s distribution of 
the sensible but also a counter to it. In order to protect and produce the territorial integrity of states 
migration must be controlled and securitised – that is to say, it is sublimated into IR through the 
Policing count of security.  
                                                          
treatment in her article ‘Indigenous People’s Land Rights: Developing a Sui Generis Approach to Ownership and 
Restitution’, International Journey on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 15, (2008) pp. 513.   
14 As a self-evident fact produced in relation to the arkhè anarchy.  
15 You can see some examples of this with Agoumy & Tamim’s, ‘Migration, Networks and Territories in the 
Oueine Valley, High Atlas, Morroco’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 35, No. 10, (December 2009) 
pp. 1679-1697 and Ewing’s ‘“Enemy Territory”: Immigration Enforcement in the US-Mexico Borderlands’, Journal 
on Migration and Human Security, Vol. 2, No. 3, (2014) pp. 198-222. 
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Within the literature there is a focus on a variety of economic justifications for migration.16 Massey 
builds on and situates this approach to migration around economics.17 Migration is contextualised and 
understood as an economic function operating at the behest of state power. Thus, problems with 
migration are situated with regard to its economic impact and security concerns. The focus on 
economics within mainstream political literature does not seek to integrate migration fully into IR but 
often refracts it into a domestic political issue. Security is the route through which migration has most 
clearly been brought into the discipline. This includes, for example, research into the ways in which 
conflict becomes a generative and steering mechanism for the flow of refugees18, states desires for 
construction of fortified borders19 as well as migration as a direct cause of conflict20 and threat to 
national security.21 In reading migration in this way it is often reduced to domestic labour effect of 
globalisation22 which threatens the state’s economic security. The relationship between domestic 
security and migration is, then, often constituted both economically and militarily. Stivachtis highlights 
the way in which migration is seen to present a challenge to both national and international stability.23 
Tirman contextualises this in the American policy environment post 9/11.24  
                                                          
16 D. Massey, J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino & J. Taylor, ‘Theories of International Migration: A 
Review and Appraisal’, Population and Development Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, (September 1993) pp. 431-466  
17 D. Massey, ‘Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement Without Legalization Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration’, 
Trade Policy Analysis No. 29, (Cato Institute Centre for Trade Policy Studies, Washington DC, 2005). 
18 M. Weiner, ‘Bad Neighbours Bad Neighbourhoods: An Inquiry into the Cause of Refugee Flows’, International 
Security, Vol. 21, No. 1, (Summer 1996) pp. 5-42 
19 R. Hassner & J. Wittenberg, ‘Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?’, International 
Security, Vol. 40, No. 1, (Summer 2015) pp. 157-190 
20 D. Johnson & M. Toft, ‘Grounds for War The Evolution of Territorial Conflict’, International Security, Vol. 38, 
No. 3, (Winter 2013/14) pp. 7-38 
21 F. Adamson, ‘Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security’, International Security, Vol. 31, 
No.  1, (Summer 2006) pp. 17 
22 S. Sassen, The Mobility of Labour and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labour Flow, (Cambridge 
Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1988) 
23 Y. Stivachtis, ‘International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security’, Journal of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2008) pp. 1-24 
24 J. Tirman, The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration After 9/11, (New Press, New York, 2004) 
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Domestic security for the mainstream literature is understood as threatened by the migrant who takes 
on the role of the criminal25 or internal-enemy26 a status reliant on a neo-liberal and governmental 
frame27 which construes them as a subject onto which the states territoriality must be reaffirmed 
through their criminalisation. Again, the migrant, and thus more broadly migration, is used to reinforce 
the territoriality of IR. Specifically in the constitution of migrants as criminal’s territory and thus the 
political legitimacy of the state has their apprehensibility reinforced through the performance and 
construction of the migrant as criminal or potential terrorist. This reading of territoriality highlights 
the way in which security is summoned to enable the Policing of IRs boundaries. It forces the sublation 
of the migrant into the category of criminal or always potential enemy, i.e. an “other” and this is never 
a legitimate subject of the state.  
It is worth noting here that outside of the “mainstream” literature on migration, security has also been 
a framework within which migration is politically located within IR and securitisation has been a 
central theme in the critical migration literature. For example, McNevin,28 in a case-study of Bintan in 
Indonesia, charts the territorial and governmental location of borders drawing upon the existing 
securitisation29 and governance30 literatures to situate her claims. What is particularly interesting 
about McNevin’s argument is the way in which she finds migration both linked to and is critical of IR.31 
                                                          
25 A. Innes, ‘International Migration as Criminal Behaviour: Shifting Responsibility to the Migrant in the Mexico-
US Border Crossing’, Global Society, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2013) pp.237-260 
26 D. Bigo, ‘Rethinking Security at the Crossroad of International Relations and Criminology’, British Journal of 
Criminology, Vol. 56, (2016) pp. 1076 
27 A. Innes, ‘International Migration as Criminal Behaviour: Shifting Responsibility to the Migrant in the Mexico-
US Border Crossing’, Global Society, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2013) pp. 240-243 
28 A. McNevin, ‘Beyond Territoriality: Rethinking Human Mobility, Border Security and Geopolitical Space From 
the Indonesian Island of Bintan’, Security Dialog, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2014) pp. 295-310 
29 This while too vast to go into here is best encapsulated by the work of Weaver in Securitization and 
Desecuritization, (In: Lipschutz R (ed.) On Security. New York: Columbia University Press, (1994) pp. 46–86.) as 
well as Balzaq in ‘The Three Faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and Context’ (in: European Journal 
of International Relations, Vol. 11, (2005) pp. 171-201) & Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge 
and Dissolve (Routledge, New York, 2011). In addition to these core texts there is good summary from Buzan, 
Waever & Wilde in Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Lynne Rienner, London, 1998). 
30 A. McNevin, ‘Beyond Territoriality: Rethinking Human Mobility, Border Security and Geopolitical Space From 
the Indonesian Island of Bintan’, Security Dialog, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2014) pp. 296 
31 Ibid. 296 
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As she states: ‘prevailing subject categories (citizen, alien and specific categories of migrant) deployed 
to investigate migration remain embedded in the spatial assumptions of the modern state system. 
Such categories are therefore unable to capture the complexity of the multidimensional yet 
contextually specific architecture of governance evident in Bintan, which does not necessarily operate 
according to territorial logic, despite deploying territorial norms to justify migration control’.32 This 
remark is indicative of how migration and migrants are often articulated to IR. Firstly is the level at 
which the subject categories are fundamentally apprehensible in relation to territoriality. Secondly is 
the way in which this articulation is not sufficient to encapsulate the “real” experiences and location 
of migration in IR. McNevin encapsulates the attempt by the field to sublate migration into the 
reaffirmation of its territorial foundation. Her experience of Bintan however shows how such a 
procedure is unsuccessful: ‘territoriality obscures the morphing space of border security and its 
implication in the reproduction of prevailing geopolitical norms.33 The political dimension, which is 
noted by McNevin34, of the border is both an attempt to (re)produce the self-evident assumptions of 
territoriality in the locus of migration but also as is already evident a miscount. McNevin highlights the 
way in which critical security studies has understood territoriality and migration as both Police action 
but also the potential location for political action.35 This is an example, and I will give more in a later 
section, of how migration and migrants can become potentially subjectivated. McNevin argues for 
territoriality as essential for understanding the migrant in IR. This “self-evident” category also 
perpetuates a wrong against the migrant. It renders them only ever partially (in)visible and this, as we 
shall see, is why migrants have the capability to disrupt the Police order in IR; they are not fully 
factored into the totality of the police count given the way in which territoriality relates to it.  
Anarchy, as the arkhè of the distribution of the sensible, produces the set of self-evident facts which 
enable the apprehensibility of IR and while territoriality is one of these it is not the only one. The 
                                                          
32 Ibid. 296 
33 Ibid. 306 
34 Ibid. 306 
35 Ibid. 306 
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state/sovereignty is another and it too us used to render migration apprehensible within the terms of 
IR while also opening up sovereignty as a category for political contestation.  It is clear that the nation-
state is presumed by the model of territorialisation but, the nation-state, is also a locus for 
migration/migrants in and of itself. 
The state is a central assumption not just of the IR literature but of the field as a whole.36 For migration 
and migrants, the state, much like territory, is the location across which migration can be mapped. 
Just as territory is produced via IR’s distribution of the sensible so too is the state/sovereignty.  The 
trajectory of the state/sovereignty in IR is evidently a long one but it is operationalised primarily in the 
migration literature as a governing body.37  The state is the purveyor of documentation, which enables 
the legal recognition, classification and regulation of migrants.38 It is worth briefly commenting on the 
relationship between the state and citizenship with regards to migration/migrants. Within IR the state 
functions as the body tasked with regulating and (ac)counting for migration. Citizenship is a 
mechanism by which the state can (ac)count for its obligations towards those within its borders and 
is often an individual and performative categorisation as well as a legal definition.39 The state operates 
through power, often violently, directly across bodies of migrants.40 Citizenship, while a referent to 
and from the state is open to contestation by migration/migrants through their own agency41, 
performativity42 and understanding.43 There is then an interrelation between the state, as arbiter of 
citizenship and the individuals understanding and performance with regard their (non-)being as citizen 
                                                          
36 N. Pourmokhtari, ‘A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR: The Contradictory Legacy of a ‘West-
Centric’ Discipline’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 10, (2013) pp. 1767 
37 S. Colombeau, ‘Policing the Internal Schengen Borders- Managing the Double Bind Between Free Movement 
and Migration Control’, Policing and Society, Vol. 27, No. 5, (2017) pp. 480-490 
38 A. Innes & B. Steele, ‘Spousal Visa Law and Structural Violence: Fear, Anxiety and Terror of the Everyday’, 
Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 8, No.3, (2015) pp. 403 
39 A. Innes. Migration Citizenship and the Challenge for Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) pp. 102-
106 
40C. Moulin & P. Nyers, ‘“We Live In A Country Of UNHCR”- Refugee Protests and Global Political Society’, 
International Political Sociology, Vol. 1, (2007) pp. 356-372 
41 C. Aradau, ‘Acts of European Citizenship: A Political Sociology of Mobility’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 48, No. 4, (2010) pp. 945-965 
42 A. Innes, ‘Performing Security Absent the State: Encounters With a Failed Asylum Seeker in the UK’, Security 
Dialog, Vol. 45, No. 6, pp. 565-581 
43 A. Innes. Migration Citizenship and the Challenge for Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) 
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of the state. The state is one of the self-evident facts of IR against which migration and migrants must 
be (ac)counted. Citizenship, through its relation to the state, becomes both a mode of (ac)counting 
and the location whereby the wrong is manifest upon the individual.   
This isn’t to say however that the state is a ‘cold monster imposing its rigid order on the life of society’44 
but that the state is one of the core self-evident assumptions against which migration/migrants 
becomes apprehensible within IR. The state for IR is the (ac)counter of migrants both within the 
mainstream and critical literature. Within that literature I want to draw out and reflect on two themes. 
There is the mainstream liberal literature around International Political Economy and human rights 
and there is the critical security discourse which highlights the migrant/migration and problematizing 
IRs conception of security. I make clear how within these literatures, in particular critical security, 
there is a potential grafting site for my understanding of politics in IR.   
I begin by looking at the mainstream economic and liberal literature around migration and the state. 
Part of the move taken, in particular around refugees, is the contrast between the state as a particular 
and humanity as a universal.45 Here already the state is subsumed into a broader domain.   This 
liberalised discourse finds the migrant to be the embodiment of an ethical and legal rights regime that 
cuts across the power of the state. So, for example, Mosley and Singer explore the linkage between 
migrant workers, remittance and labour.46 Massey breaks down the distinction between world 
systems theory47 and institutional theory48 as defining migration in sociology and economics 
respectively.49 With regard to the state, migration is, then, both an economic and security concern. 
Massey highlights the way in which the state can be understood in relation to capital. Here migration 
                                                          
44 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 29 
45 B. Chimni, ‘Globalisation, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 
Vol. 12, No. 3, (2000) pp. 243-263 
46 L. Mosley and D. Singer, ‘Migration, Labour and the International Political Economy’, Annual Review of Political 
Science, Vol. 18, (2015) pp. 283-301 
47 S. Sassen, The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow, (Cambridge 
Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1988) 
48 D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, (Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 
1990)  
49 D. Massey, ‘A Missing Element in Migration Theories’, Migration Letters, Vol. 12, No.3 (2015) pp. 282 
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flows (both foreign and domestic) are understood as the product of market demands. The economic 
system which underwrites the international order is used to sublimate the emergence of workers and 
to (ac)count away the potential political subjectivisation of these migrants. This is enacted twofold 
within the literature’s recourse to human rights. States here are particulars that are subsumed into a 
broader discourse of humanitarianism that serves to write out their modes of agency and account for 
them as apprehensible only in relation to this understanding.  
The critical security discourse around migration seeks to explain its relationship to the state through 
deconstructing its relationship to security studies. Salter for example breaks down the dramaturgy 
inherent within the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority,50 drawing on Balzacq51 and Strizel52 
while looking at the way that security is performed.53 Here dramaturgy is drawn on to highlight the 
relationship between individuals and the state. This is interesting with regard to migration as it 
highlights the way in which this is neither solely aesthetic nor political but rather both. Sylvester’s 
contributions to Borderlands highlight the way in which, both in their form and content, the aesthetic 
relates to both migration54 and violence.55 Underwriting this movement to understanding 
performance is the aesthetic turn in IR.56 Here, Shepard, for example, draws out the ethical 
implications in moving towards ethics57 and politics58 and while there is a focus upon images59 the 
                                                          
50 M. Salter, ‘Securitisation and Desecuritisation: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security 
Authority’, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 11 (2008) pp. 321-349 
51 T. Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience, and Context’, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 11, No.2 (2005) pp. 171–201. 
52 H. Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond’, European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol.13, No.3 (2007) pp. 357–83. 
53 M. Salter, ‘Securitisation and Desecuritisation: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security 
Authority’, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 11 (2008) pp. 328-31 
54 C. Sylvester, ‘Global “Development” Dramaturgies/Gender Stagings’, Borderlands, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2003), 
Available at: http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol2no2_2003/sylvester_global.htm (Last Accessed 18/01/2018) 
55 C. Sylvester, ‘Dramaturgies of Violence in International Relations’, Borderlands, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2003), Available 
at: http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol2no2_2003/sylvester_editorial.htm (Last Accessed 18/01/2018) 
56 R. Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic Turn In International Political Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 
Vol. 30, No. 3 (2001) pp. 509-533 
57 L. Shepard, ‘Aesthetics, Ethics and Visual Research in the Digital Age: ‘Undone in the Face of the Otter’’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, (2017) pp. 214-222 
58 C. Moore & L. Shepard, ‘Aesthetics and International Relations: Towards and Global Politics’, Global Society, 
Vol.24, No.3 (2010) pp. 299-309 
59 L. Hansen, ‘How Images Make World Politics: International Icons and the Case of Abu Ghraib’, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2015): 263–88 
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move towards thinking sensibility60 does some work in bringing some of my argument into IR.61 This 
movement is key to understanding how the relationship between migration and the state is played 
out within IR. As Huysmans highlights, security can be constructed as an action between parties62 and 
in particular he highlights the centrality of speech and speech acts. If for the state and 
migration/migrants is not an issue of an actuarial (ac)count but rather ‘enacting refers to both 
expressing limits and bringing limits into being as an issue of contestation63’ then this action could 
have a Rancièrian political implication.  
The aesthetic turn in IR establishes the conditions by which speech acts can be read in terms of 
performativity. Within critical security studies this comes out of work by Wæver64 and the Copenhagen 
School (as we saw in chapter one and four). Understanding performativity around migration/migrants 
has implications for citizenship. With regards to the state it establishes differing performances 
between the migrant and the state. As Innes argues, criminalisation65 takes on a governmental mode 
between the migrant and the state. She opens up the performative aspect of the relation(s) between 
migrant and state and how this is given both in the individual experiences and accounts of migrants66 
as well as the legal effects of the state.67 This approach has been carried forwards by Squire in looking 
at the agency possessed and exercised by migrants and its relation to Foucauldian subjectification.68 
Within aestheticized IR’s focus on performativity there is a clear entry point for thinking Rancierian 
                                                          
60 R. Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic Turn In International Political Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 
Vol. 30, No. 3 (2001) pp. 526 
61 R. Bleiker, ‘In Search of Thinking Space: Reflections on the Aesthetic Turn In International Political Theory’, 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2017) pp. 262 
62 J. Huysmans, ‘What’s in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings’, Security Dialog, Vol. 42, 
No. 4-5, (2011) pp. 371-383 
63 Ibid. pp. 373 
64 O. Weaver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, (In: R. Lipschutz ed.) On Security, (Columbia Uni. Press, New 
York, 1994) pp. 46–86 
65 A. Innes, ‘International Migration as Criminal Behaviour: Shifting Responsibility to the Migrant in the Mexico-
US Border Crossing’, Global Society, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2013) pp.237-260 
66 A. Innes, ‘In Search of Security: Migrant Agency, Narrative, and Performativity’, Geopolitics, Vol. 21, No. 2, 
(2016) pp. 263-283 
67 A. Innes & B. Steele, ‘Spousal Visa Law and Structural Violence: Fear, Anxiety and Terror of the Everyday’, 
Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 8, No.3, (2015) pp. 401-415 
68 V. Squire, ‘Unauthorised Migration Beyond Structure/Agency? Acts, Interventions, Effects’, Politics, Vol. 37, 
No. 3 (2017) pp.264-5 
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politics. It is important to chart the differences between the two positions and to state clearly my 
argument with regard to it. As I have argued earlier and will develop later this is a literature to which 
I am writing this thesis.  
Critical security studies, particularly Feminist security studies, situates ‘the practice of seeking security 
in lived experience [and] reveals security as a performative concept.’69 This highlights the individuated 
agency and experience of particular migrants against a backdrop of securitised discourse. For 
“aesthetic IR” this constitutes a mise en scène upon or within which terms of, and the relation 
between, the migrant and the state become understandable. There is here an ontological distinction 
to be drawn here between the distribution of the sensible and the discursive frame of aesthetic IR. 
Following on from my arguments about the aesthetic, the ontological and the aesthetic turn in IR I am 
writing with this literature but also exploring the limitations of this frame, as such the literature around 
ontological security, while an ally is something I am not necessarily writing towards.70  By grounding 
security within a (re)performative aesthetic scene and assessing the performances, by migrants, in 
relation to such a scene, the ontological foundation of this approach, and thus my tension with it 
becomes clear. Here the temporality implicit within ontological security, having a secure future, is 
recognisable only within the aestheticized limits of the scene. It is ingrained within the literature that 
this security is constructed in relation to both the ontological status of the individual and the aesthetic 
nature of the discourse around them. This is what makes the migrant a possible figure for critical 
security studies but also what they are constructed against. My understanding of IR, as I have fleshed 
out earlier, cannot and will not ground migration/migrants within such an ontological framework. 
                                                          
69 A. Innes, ‘In Search of Security: Migrant Agency, Narrative, and Performativity’, Geopolitics, Vol. 21, No. 2, 
(2016) pp. 264 
70 The concept of ontological security is drawn out of the work of Gidden’s Modernity and Self Identity: Self and 
Society in the Late Modern Age. A good summation is the concept is giving by Steele in his book Ontological 
Security in International Relations and Zarakol in her article ‘Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Historical 
Crimes: Turkey and Japan’ in International Relations 24 (3): pp 3-23. Innes uses the concept to unpack the 
experiences of her subjects in her work Migration, Citizenship and The Challenge for Security. 
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Rather, it focuses on the ways in which migration/migrants are rendered (in)visible by the self-evident 
facts generated by IRs distribution of the sensible.  
 
While this may seem like splitting hairs it does have serious theoretical ramifications for the way in 
which both Police and political action are understood to occur with regard to migration. Because it 
conceives of ontological security as primarily individuated and performed in relation to governmental 
structures, for critical security studies the subjectification of any migrant to the state is both possible 
and a way of thinking politics.71 My focus is also on political subjectivation72 but this begins with 
understanding the self-evident facts, that make migration (in)visible73 for IR, are produced by the 
distribution of the sensible. The analysis is not at the level of the individual who is grounded in mutable 
ontology but at the level of order(ings).74 This means the concern and stakes of my Rancièrian 
theorisation of IR concern is not so much with the experiences of individual migrants themselves but 
rather with how migration/migrants are made apprehensible by and to IR. Thus, the claim that all 
migration is potentially ripe for political subjectivation is a harder one to prove.  
This is because of the way in which the state relates to migration/migrants as a Police force.75 Through 
mechanisms such as Visas, Passports and Borders, the state can regulate its (ac)count of itself. 
                                                          
71 V. Squire, ‘Unauthorised Migration Beyond Structure/Agency? Acts, Interventions, Effects’, Politics, Vol. 37, 
No. 3 (2017) pp. 254-272 
72 Here I use the Rancièrian term for the stakes of my argument. As I have argued previously Chambers gives a 
breakdown of the distinction between the terms of pgs. 98-108 of The Lessons of Rancière. I do go on to use the 
term subjectificaiton in reference to the work of Squire as she situates the response to Foucault but also given 
the ontological understanding that grounds the field it would be inapplicable to refer to it as subjectivation. In a 
simple sense part of the contribution of Rancierian IR is the move from subjectification which is grounded in 
ontological relations to discourse to subjectivation which is grounded in a relation to the distribution of the 
sensible.   
73 As well as what is (un)thinkable and (im)possible. 
74 This is not the same as breaking the question down along lines of structure/agency. To do so presupposes an 
ontological framework which would propagate these conditions. Rather in taking a Rancièrian approach to this 
structure/agency are structures produced in relation to the distribution of the sensible as opposed to an a priori 
ontological frame by which to understand the phenomena of IR.  
75 Here the term carriers both an ordinary and a Rancièrian meaning. While the State does literally police the 
border and bring the mechanisms of police structure to hunt (as shown by Chamayou in Manhunts: A 
Philosophical History) and detain migrants deemed “irregular”. The state does deploy the judiciary to charge and 
deport those “irregular” migrants caught but also regulate the conditions and lives of “regular” migrants. They 
also are Policing in that the State is a mechanism by which a total count without void or supplement is 
undertaken. In this sense the state is both a policing state in its practice but also its “politics”.   
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Potential political subjectivisation can effectively be “nipped in the bud” through the sublimation of 
individual migrants into its visible Police count. We can see this process at work through the courts in 
the delimitation of terms such as Asylum Seeker. Here the state is able to take the potentially political 
migrant and place them into a countable (dis)position and thus maintain the coherence of its own 
Police count. At the level of IR this same consistency is maintained not only in practice by the State’s 
sublation of potential political subjects into (ac)countable categories but also through citizenship. By 
the coherence of the distribution of the sensible, via its arkhè: anarchy, and along the categories of 
state, territory and citizenship, IR establishes the position of countable migration on the proviso, and 
because of this provision, it is rendered apprehensible by these facts. Of course, like any (ac)count this 
is always a (mis)count. Despite the appearance of totality in fact they are always too much or too little.  
 
Following on from this it is clear that the political subjectivation of migration and migrants is possible. 
The possibility however of seeing politics within migration and the position of migrants cannot be 
upheld through a focus or recourse to migration or migrants’ ontological status. This is for several 
reasons I have discussed both within this chapter and chapter four. As the ontological status of 
migration/migrants has been territorialised by the state as a category for Policing it is already is in a 
sense (ac)counted. Through the states establishment of (dis)positions the ontological claim to a 
specificity of migration or migrants as potentially political does not function. Rather if I am to make a 
broader claim about the potentially political positioning of all migration/migrants I must do so with 
regard to a category that is not reliant on ontological positionality.  This is because of the framework 
I have outlined but also in order to effectively give my contribution. I argue that this can be done with 
recourse to the concept of wrong. Rather than seeking to look at the way in which the differing 
ontologies of migration/migrants structure the potential political claims that can be made around 
migration or migrants I seek to understand how they are be seen as (mis)counted. In focusing on the 
wrong I am freed from the shackles of ontological positionality and rather can look at the underlying 
aisthesis which prohibits (ac)counting for migration and migrants within IR.  
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Once we shift the approach and understanding to my position which is grounded in the exploration of 
wrong it becomes clear that there are differing severities of wrong between different performances 
of migration. Two things become clear from making this shift to wrong as opposed to ontology. Both 
of which are central to my contribution to the field. The first is that it becomes easier to navigate and 
issue an argued with regard to the political potentiality of migration and migrants. The second thing 
revealed by the shift to wrong is how the focusing of critical IR onto ontology has led to the 
reoccupation of the ontological categories within established IR that it sets out to critique. This in turn 
has led to the replication of these categories, although in emancipatory fashion. Through the 
movement to wrong the possibility for the subjectivation of migration/migrants in IR becomes 
divorced from the ontological framings that are produced by the distribution of the sensible in IR. This 
potential politics then offers an opportunity to rethink and challenge these categories through the 
subjectivation of migration and migrants into IR that does not rest upon the ontological reabsorption 
and repetition of the same categories back into IR. This is essential for my argument and contribution 
to be meaningful to the field. It also highlights and draws upon the tension in my reading and approach 
to IR and Rancière’s own work. Here I have shown this difference in argument and how I differ from 
Rancière’s argumentation. We now go on to look at a third ‘self-evident’ fact that makes the migrant 
apprehensible to IR: citizenship 
 
Citizenship sets up an apprehensible relationship between the migrant and the state, connecting it to 
a sense of belonging76 that is both legal and personal.77 It is a self-evident fact that enables the 
(ac)counting of people within the state who are “meant to belong” there. The contemporary literature 
follows Agamben in drawing out the meaning of the concept from its Greek roots and showing its 
                                                          
76 M. Varsanyi, ‘Interrogating “Urban Citizenship” Vis-à-vis Undocumented Migration’, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 
10, No. 2 (May 2006) pp. 235 
77 See, S. Coutin, Legalising Moves: Salvadorian Immigrants’ Struggle For U.S. Residency, (Uni. Of Michigan Press, 
London, 2003) pp. 45-7 and N. De Genova, ‘Migrant Illegality and Deportability in Everyday Life’, Annual Review 
of Anthropology, Vol. 31, (October 2002) pp. 419-447 
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relation to legal and political categories.78 Citizenship then has a delimiting function not only at the 
legal level of the state but also at the individual level.79 I have already clarified my position to Agamben 
in the introduction. This literature parses the social into those who can draw on the state’s services, 
those that can be “seen” by the state, and those who cannot.80 Joppke attempts to draw out a cohesive 
and organised understanding of citizenship,81 through its presentation as three dimensional, evolving 
alongside the human rights regime established after the end of the Second World War.82 Citizenship, 
then, isn’t taken as ahistorical but as changing significant shift as one of the political effects of the 
holocaust.83  This sits uneasily with the literature that has been developed on the basis of Agamben’s 
Homo Sacer84 and which has hardly been free from criticism.85  Owens, for instance, highlights the 
need to draw distinctions between the natural and political world via Arendt.86 Citizenship, for 
Agamben, is at the borderline between zoē and bios.87 This distinction, taken at the level of life, serves 
a Policing function. Citizenship is often taken in the literature as parsing “regular” and “irregular” 
migrants by the State but whether inclusive or not it functions in part to sublate potentially political 
subjects into countable subjects. This is a literature which I am writing alongside although my work 
                                                          
78 G. Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, (Uni. of Minnesota press, Minneapolis, 2000), pp. 16  
79 G. Lonergan, ‘Reproducing the ‘National Home’: Gendering Domopolitics’, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 22, No.1 
(January 2018) pp. 1-18 
80 J. Könönen, ‘Differential Inclusion of Non-Citizens in a Universalistic Welfare State’, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 
22, No. 1, (January 2018) pp. 53-69  
81 C. Joppke, ‘Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity’, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, (February 
2007) pp. 37-48 
82 Ibid. pp. 46-47 
83 Ibid. pp. 47 
84 See G. Agamben, Homo Sacre, (Stanford Uni. Press, California, 1998) pp. 119-135 for the primary literature 
and these are examples of the literature: S. Hanaft & T. Long, ‘Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of 
Exception in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon’, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, (2010) 
pp.134-159 and P. Rajaram and C. Grundy-Warr, ‘The Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacre: Migration and Detention 
in Australia, Malaysia & Thailand’, International Migration, Vol. 42, No. 1, (2004) pp. 33-63 
85 P. Owens, ‘Reclaiming ‘Bare Life’?: Against Agamben on Refugees’, International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 4, 
(2009) pp.567-582 
86 Ibid. 578-579 
87 G. Agamben, Homo Sacre, (Stanford Uni. Press, California, 1998) pp. 126-133 
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and understanding sits in tension with it. If citizenship is, as Lister argues88, operative both at the global 
and individual level89, then it is worth bearing in mind how the domestic and IR are articulated.  
Citizenship can be understood as a tool by the state to organise internally but also to differentiate 
itself externally. Citizenship enables the state to understand who it can count and who it doesn’t need 
to count domestically. This means that the sublation isn’t just about “counting in” people through 
citizenship but also “counting out”. Thus “regular” migrants can be (ac)counted for within the state. 
In terms of the level of IR citizenship is useful for the same reasons as it enables states to be 
(ac)counted for in proportion to their populations and this is one of the ways in which migration is 
rendered apprehensible - without the category of (non-)citizen then differentiation between resident 
and migrant would be impossible. 
Other research moves on to look at the way in which citizenship becomes constitutive of constructing 
security relations for the state. A prime example here is Innes’ Migration, Citizenship and the Challenge 
for Security90 which does show some clear examples of how migration/migrants can be political for IR 
and can help us see how the figure of the migrant is subject to a social wrong and therefore open to 
political subjectivation. Innes locates migration as a particular problem for security studies as a sub-
field of IR.91 She is concerned with the problem that migration/migrants pose, given 
migration/migrants ‘embodied and lived contestation of the boundaries of the sovereign state, which 
has conventionally been the primary unit of analysis for security studies.92’ Innes’ ethnography 
presents clear examples of migrants who are silenced in IR and here interviews clearly show how the 
categories of territory, sovereignty and citizenship are undone in the face of the migrant. She is 
conscious of the fact that her interviewees ‘already speak for themselves93 and highlights how the 
                                                          
88 R. Lister, ‘Inclusive Citizenship: Realising the Potential’, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (February 2007) 
pp.49-61 
89 Ibid. pp. 57-58 
90 A. Innes. Migration Citizenship and the Challenge for Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) 
91 Ibid. pp. 2-3 & 20-40 
92 Ibid. pp. 3 
93 A. Innes. Migration Citizenship and the Challenge for Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) pp.39 
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‘security studies literature silences certain voices… Silenced voices are not silent but are speaking in a 
certain context that the limited realm of security studies often cannot or does not access.’94 This 
inability to see or hear the experiences of migration/migrants is not just a failure in the as Dingli has 
argued drawing on The Politics of Aesthetics95 within IR silence can be read as the wrong carried 
through by IRs distribution of the sensible96 (and as we have seen, such silenced subjects are 
potentially also political subjects in Rancière’s sense - the (ac)counting of migration is a clear 
(mis)count).  
As I charted in the introduction the similarities between my own understanding and work and the 
organisation of the literature. In this section am drawing an equation between the aims of my own 
work that that of Dingli/Innes as I foregrounded in the introduction. I am producing a linkage that 
draws my work and contribution in line with that of these authors. While the results of Innes’ and 
Dingli’s intervention into the field yield similar conclusions to my own there are methodological and 
philosophical distinctions. This is not to say in any way that my approach is contradictory or challenging 
but rather that it runs alongside and with these approaches. Part of the distinction, as I have given in 
the introduction, is the way in which my theory is organised with regards to Rancière’s work. My 
adoption, with alterations, of Rancière’s framework establishes a categorical distinction between my 
work and that of Dingli/Innes. This is clearly a point in which we differ as it inflects our ontological and 
methodological inquiries with subtly different intonations. There is also a difference in contribution 
and scope between the work of Dingli/Innes and my own inquiries into migration. While both Dingli 
and Innes are making a contribution to the field and its understanding, my argument and thesis are 
looking to use migration as a case study by which to draw out and emphasises what my theoretical 
                                                          
94 Ibid. 40 
95 S. Dingli, ‘We Need to Talk About Silence: Re-Examining Silence in International Relations Theory’, European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 21, No.4, (2015) pp. 721-745 
96 Ibid. pp. 725 
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approach will look like and justify its use. In thinking of this position to the literature there are clear 
differences between my engagement and orientation between that of Dingli/Innes.  
To explore this distinction more clearly, Innes, drawing on Donnelly, focuses on the fractured nature 
of the state in IR.97 She makes clear the inherent contradictions between how it is conceived of in both 
theory and practice and how these are problematized by her interviews with Ali a Sudanese migrant 
in Greece attempting to reach his family in France98 and caught up within a multitude of state 
processes. Ali’s case is complex and highlights the way in which state counting defines the (in)visibility 
of migration. Innes informs us of how Ali, due to have being made visible in to the state, through the 
Greek police classifying him as undocumented99, cannot be understood as anything other than 
deportable.100 The example is striking because it highlights not only the mechanisms by which the 
Police count sublates a subject into its (dis)position but also that citizenship can be operationalised at 
the individual level. As Innes101 and Isin102 highlight, the claiming of rights is in itself an act of 
citizenship. This is interesting as it highlights how citizenship is both a category which establishes IR’s 
distribution of the sensible with regards to migration/migrants but also is problematized by it. The 
state doesn’t have a monopoly over the concept, it can and is re-deployed by migrants themselves 
litigiously against the state. In this re-deployment migrants are exercising their logos and in doing so 
are asserting themselves politically, disrupting the distribution of the sensible. This reading of 
migration and of the particular case can be read as a clear way in which my approach and framework 
can be understood. There is however always a slight tension in the application of my framework and 
theorisation here. 
                                                          
97 Ibid. 76 
98 Ibid. 57 
99 Ibid. 58 
100 N. De Genova, ‘Migrant Illegality and Deportability in Everyday Life’, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 31, 
(October 2002) pp. 419-447 
101 A. Innes. Migration Citizenship and the Challenge for Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) pp. 47-9 
102 E. Isin, ‘Citizenship in Flux: The Figure of the Activist Citizen’, Subjectivity, Vol. 29, (2009) pp.267-388 - E. Isin 
& G. Neilsen, Acts of Citizenship, (Uni. Of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008) 
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The way in which the exercise of logos is essential for subjectivation has been explored by 
Vandevoordt in a study of the experiences of Syrian refugees in Belgium. Focusing on practices around 
hosting and eating103 Vandevoordt, citing Rancière, argues that ‘the very moment he [a Syrian refugee] 
invites me to his house and serves me a Syrian breakfast, this man changes the subject-definition that 
was imposed from the outside’.104 Here the act of hosting reaffirms a fundamental equality, 
contrasting with the Police count. Again there is an ally for my thesis here in this approach however 
the orientation of their argument is towards migrations as opposed to IR theory. We can through my 
reading of Vandevoort see how the act of sitting down and sharing a meal opens up space in which 
the wrong of the Police (mis)count can be addressed. This is brought to the fore when the refugee 
Vandevoordt is dining with says: ‘You have mind I have mind, you have eyes I have eyes okay. We are 
the same, you are feeling I am feeling. You are professional in your job and your study and I have 
professional on my own.’105 This moment and assertion of the equality of intelligences is mirrored in 
Innes’ interviews and arguments. She  argues, following an interview with a Eleanor a UK Home Office 
Employee, ‘Migrants without documents problematize the picture of the world as divided up into 
territorial units, or countries: they are people who are not where they ‘should’ be, who do not hold a 
recognizable and verifiable state-based identity and who do not belong.106’ Here Innes is, in my terms, 
showing how migration/migrants undermine IRs distribution of the sensible. They are always a surplus 
that is intolerable to the Police order not because they are ‘not where they ‘should’ be107’ but also 
because they are not who they should be.108 Migration and migrants through seizing on citizenship as 
a mechanism to exercise their logos are not showing the sōphrosunē the Police count demands of 
                                                          
103 R. Vandevoot, ‘The Politics of Food and Hospitality : How Syrian Refugees in Belgium Create a Home in Hostile 
Environments’, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (May 2017) pp. 605-621 
104 Ibid. pp. 610 
105 Ibid. pp. 609 
106 A. Innes. Migration Citizenship and the Challenge for Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) pp. 47 
107 Ibid. pp. 47 
108 R. Vandevoot, ‘The Politics of Food and Hospitality : How Syrian Refugees in Belgium Create a Home in Hostile 
Environments’, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (May 2017) pp. 609 
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them. We can see here the linkages and differences between my own argumentation and that of 
Innes’, Dingli’s and Vandevoort’s arguments. 
The final way in which migration/migrants undoes citizenship as a category is through interpretation 
of asylum seeking and citizenship as a category itself. Here I argue that Innes gives us an example of 
migration and migrants ‘writing a name in the sky109’ to use a phrase employed by Aletta Norval. In 
her reading of migration/migrants can be seen to be writing themselves into the symbolic order of the 
community of speaking beings, giving themselves a name.110 This as Norval highlights for us is key to 
subjectivation.111 The way in which a name can be inscribed and therefore the wrong replied to 
through an act of logos is central to political activity. Innes gives us a clear example of the Migrants 
doing this through their identification of themselves under the name asylum seekers112 a (dis)position 
manifested by the state, and I would contend, a Policing tool: ‘Because the state hold the power of the 
definition and the power of the decision as to what is credible it forces the asylum seeker into a position 
of passivity.’113 Here there is a clearly organised (dis)position114 into which migration/migrants are 
poured. Within the definition comes passivity that acts as its virtue (sōphrosunē). Thus, the migrant, 
who is always-already the equal of the homeland office official, is (mis)counted down and placed into 
a position of passivity.  Innes gives us clear examples of the way in which migrants re-interpret the 
category applied to them by the distribution of the sensible (both domestically and in IR) and exercise 
                                                          
109 A. Norval, ‘“Writing a Name in the Sky”: Rancière, Cavell, and the Possibility of Egalitarian Inscription’, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 106, No.4, (November 2012) pp. 810-826  
110 J. Rancière, Disagreement, (Uni. Of Minnesota Press, London, 1995) pp. 25 
111 A. Norval, ‘“Writing a Name in the Sky”: Rancière, Cavell, and the Possibility of Egalitarian Inscription’, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 106, No.4, (November 2012) pp. 817-820 
112 It is important to note here that this is not true only for asylum seekers but also the (dis)position of refugees. 
I focus in on asylum seekers here but, as I will say later, this is not the only possible political category. There is a 
certain level of synonymy between the asylum seeker and the refugee as both are (dis)positions that the migrant 
exceeds through the exercising of their logos. See: A. Innes. Migration Citizenship and the Challenge for Security, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) pp. 42-60 
113 Ibid. 47 
114 As Innes highlights on page 48. “asylum seeker” isn’t the only (dis)position that migrants can be placed into. 
There are other categories such as ‘undocumented migrant, ‘illegal immigrant’, ‘bogus asylum seeker’ that serve 
a similar Policing function. My decision to focus on asylum seeker as opposed to these other categories is based 
on the coercive aspect implicitly within these. Whereas asylum seeker exists to ascribe a name to migrants that 
enables them to be (ac)counted, which is in and of itself Policing the other listed terms also seek to count-out 
its subjects more directly.  
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their logos with regard to it. She understands these narratives as demonstrating ‘the disconnect 
between people who consider themselves to be asylum seekers and how the state defines asylum 
seekers. These self-identifications of asylum seekers are in particular obscured and denied by asylum 
law’.115 It is precisely this disjunction between the always already equality of the subject and its 
(dis)position by the distribution of the sensible that enables the migrant to be politically subjectivated. 
By taking seriously their (dis)position as one capable of speech, by hosting guests as asserting their 
equality,116 migrants turn asylum seeker from a site of passivity into one of agency.117  
While the next section focuses on the Rancièrian literature around migration and the figure of the 
migrant it is important to connect this to IR before we get there. This is important as it draws out the 
core claim and contribution of my thesis in looking at what effect does a Rancièrian theory of IR have 
on IR’s understanding of politics. As I have looked at in this section of the chapter it is clear that 
migration and the figure of the migrant are not properly and tightly (ac)counted by the field’s 
distribution of the sensible. I have given a critique of both the “mainstream” and critical IR literatures 
that look at migration and the figure of the migrant and highlighted how these approaches often either 
sublimate migration/migrants into the Police count or offer a critique which while emancipatory 
reoccupies the terrain of territory, state/sovereignty and/or citizenship.  The next section foregrounds 
my argument in chapter six that articulates directly both Rancière and migration/migrants. This is 
important for the thesis as it enables the articulation of explanation of Rancière as given in chapter 
four to the literature I set out in the next section. In doing so I am able to level the critique raised in 
this section and provide and answer to my research questions.  
Turning back to the research questions I laid out in the introduction we can see here how I am 
answering the second of them. Here I have argued for the implications of a Rancièrian theory through 
                                                          
115 Ibid. 49 
116 R. Vandevoot, ‘The Politics of Food and Hospitality : How Syrian Refugees in Belgium Create a Home in Hostile 
Environments’, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (May 2017) pp. 605-621 
117 A. Innes. Migration Citizenship and the Challenge for Security, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) pp.64 
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the example of migration and migrants within IR. I have argued that a Rancierian theory of IR’s focus 
on wrong as opposed to ontological (re)categorisation has implications for understanding the 
potential possibility of politics in IR as well as the manner and modality of claims that can be made 
about such an argument. In order to avoid the reoccupation of such spaces and the potential 
meta/para-politics of such a reoccupation we must see a move towards thinking through and 
understanding the role of both the distribution of the sensible and wrong within IR.  
 
Migration and the Figure of the Migrant in Rancière 
In this next section I critically assess Rancière’s own work on migration, some of the relevant 
secondary literature and the differentiation between them and my own approach. This will help in the 
development of a theory of the political nature of migration within IR. We will start with the idea of 
‘movement’. Across Rancière’s work movement and displacement are a motif for political 
subjectivisation. For example, in Short Voyages to the Land of the People Rancière conceives of the 
voyage as a potentially aesthetically transformative endeavour.118 It is the movement to ‘lands that 
offer the visitor the image of another world. Just across the straits, away from the river, off the beaten 
path, at the end of the subway line, there lives another people (unless it is, quite simply, the people).119 
Here Rancière is exploring the way in which movement across aesthetic and political boundaries opens 
up new spaces for interpretation.120 The voyage is a moment of stepping out of one’s place, both 
geographically but potentially also aesthetically and politically. This exploration by Rancière is 
essential in foreground my own understanding of migration with regards to the framework I have laid 
out throughout the thesis.  
                                                          
118 J. Rancière, Short Voyages to the Land of the People, (Stanford Uni. Press, California, 2003) 
119 Ibid. pp. 1 
120 Ibid. pp. 2-5 
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When looking at Rossellini’s Europa 51, Rancière compares the act of becoming “foreign121” to 
Socrates’ atopia which in Rancière’s thought is grounded in both displacement and trust.122 Trust 
serves to highlight the way in which “foreignness” offers up the potential recognition of the equality 
of intelligences.123 The “foreign” as both a mirror and potential pathway is a recurring theme within 
Rancière and in the book he finds broadly melancholic124 but transformative accounts of travelling as 
subjects move across boundaries and are confronted in part by the people. This confrontation is not 
always complete and, much like politics, is often unsustainable. I align my argumentation and 
approach with Rancière’s reading here. Travel transforms the “homely” into the “foreign” which in 
turn enables the opening up of the “home” and the self, an opportunity to see beyond given 
allocations of (dis)positions and to experience what is in part a political transformation. However, in 
Short Voyages to the Land of the People the transformation is manifested aesthetically. It is not a text 
that is about politics and the concrete subjectivisation of a part which has no part. Rather it is about 
aesthetic attempts to chart the boundaries at which transformation from the familiar to “foreign” 
opens up the possibly of scratching below the surface of (dis)position and making visible the always 
already equality of intelligences. This builds into my argument for migration/migrants as a potential 
political subject for IR as it shows the aesthetico-political force behind travel. As my application 
highlights how migrants necessarily move across boundaries they bring with them the confrontation 
of both the “foreign” and the “self” opening up the possibility for dissensual revelation of the 
distribution of the sensible.  
                                                          
121 This is not strictly a commentary of nationality or citizenship.  Rather here Rancière uses the term to mean 
an exterior to society’s interiority. Thus it isn’t about a strictly judicial or legal relationship to the state but rather 
it is about being perceived as separate from society. The point being foreignness isn’t a relation set up by the 
State or people (i.e the Police count) but rather it is that which is alien to the state or people (i.e. the Police 
count). The assertion that underwrites Short Voyages to the Land of the People is that the people are of course 
always already alien. They are always already foreign as they are never fully (ac)counted by the Police.  
122 Ibid. pp. 122 
123 Ibid. pp. 123 
124 A. Gibson, ‘The Unfinished Song: Intermittency and Melancholy in Rancière’, Paragraph, Vol. 27, No.1, (March 
2005) pp. 61-76   
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This notion of the “foreign” as the representation of the social back to the social but also the 
presentation of an “other” is also developed in On the Shores of Politics where Rancière explores 
Aristotle’s treatment of the a-social individual,125 the city-less individual, ‘lover of war in that he is an 
azux, a non-co-operator, an isolated piece at draughts.’126 It is an odd proposition.127 The “hearthless” 
individual is already established, in Aristotle, as a character that is both more and less than human.128 
Hearthless here isn’t just homeless. The idea carries with it a sense of ungrounding. Migration, as I 
argue, is only apprehensible within IR given the precondition of territoriality and by cutting across 
these boundaries migration/migrants undo IR’s distribution of the sensible but engender the 
possibility for subjectivisation with regards to their (dis)position within it. I draw out from the Rancière 
the conception of the city-less individual as important because it isn’t just that this figure is absent 
from a/their city but that they don’t belong to a city at all. This individual through their inability to be 
(ac)counted for in relation to the proper position in a world of city-states becomes both more and less 
than human.129 The city-less individuals are a superfluous unit that forms the basis for an unintelligible 
conflict founded not on envy or their own superfluous character but rather the socialisation of hatred 
itself.130 This example here is important for my argument as it carried with it some of the implications 
of my framework. There is also the tension between my contribution being orientated towards IR and 
Rancière’s orientation towards the polis. In working through Rancière’s work in this regard I draw out 
the tension between Rancière’s thinking of the polis and my account of IR’s distribution of the sensible. 
In thinking this relationship I develop from my theorisation Rancièrian basis and bring through my own 
voice.  
This example is interesting for my argument as it draws through something external to the 
geographical material bound of the polis. The presentation of the individual as without specified 
                                                          
125 Aristotle, The Politics, 1253a, ( pp.5-6 
126 J. Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 27 
127 Ibid. pp. 27 
128 Aristotle, The Politics, 1253a, pp.5-6 
129 J. Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 27-31 
130 Ibid. pp. 28 
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citizenship is presented within the Aristotle categorises this position as an isolated piece without 
recourse to the tapestry of meaning and positionality within the distribution of the sensible. This for 
Rancière becomes a question as to how Aristotle divides and closes off the mobilisation of hatred from 
a mass of people.131 Rancière’s dissection of the gaming analogy becomes the site of a critique of 
philosophical thoughts totalising character.132 This totality becomes the totality of the distribution of 
the sensible and of philosophies Police character. I develop this argument through my theoretical 
position to draw Rancière into IR as explicate my own Rancièreian argument for IR. For Aristotle what 
is important is the division and distribution of set apprehensible parts of the polis. This, para-politics, 
becomes the grounding for all consent and dissent. The a-social individual who is outside of this 
distribution, who lacks citizenship, is problematic for this arrangement as they cannot be rendered 
into the para-political negotiation between parts. They are always superfluous too the arrangement 
within Aristotle. This superfluous individual cannot be understood in the way proper portioned 
(dis)positions are. As such they cannot be seen or heard, their claims cannot be understood as 
anything but noise. This then located themselves as external to apprehensibility. In doing so they 
become a representation of the disorder of democracy and fundamental equality. This is both an 
indorsement of their political potentiality against Aristotelian para-politics but also an instantiation of 
philosophy’s distain for both democracy133 and void/supplement.134  This socialisation of hatred as 
referenced by Aristotle then is already and internalisation of his own para-political position contra 
democracy.  
Rancière tracks how Aristotle renders unthinkable this socialisation of hatred through a recourse to 
the naturalness of humanity’s condition as the political animal.135 Rancière’s movement here is telling 
in that he locates a philosophical blind spot in a fundamentally sensory challenge: that of the city-less 
                                                          
131 Ibid. pp. 27 
132 Ibid. pp. 30-31 
133 J. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, (Verso, London, 2014) pp. 3 
134 J. Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 27-31 
135 Ibid. pp. 28 
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individual. This has repercussions for thinking through the status of migration/migrants with regard 
to politics. There is an analogy to be made between the migrant and the city-less individual that ties 
into the socialisation of hatred.136 Such an analogy stages the socialisation of hatred as a reaction by 
the city to the exposure of its fundamental truth: ‘the equality of [everyone’s] capabilities to occupy 
the positions of governors and of the governed.’137  Rancière’s excavation of the figure of the city-less 
individual is useful in showing how “stepping out” of, or across, territoriality removes a figure from 
apprehensibility. In Aristotle the lack of belonging to a city becomes grounds for the cessation of 
humanity (and with it speech), becoming an unchecked checker, the azux (an isolated piece in a game 
of draughts).138 For Aristotle the city-less person is inapprehensible as a person just as 
migration/migrants are inapprehensible for IR. This distinction read through Rancière’s reading of 
Aristotle is central to my own argument that I make in chapter six.   
Rancière also argues that ‘the whole political project of Platonism can be conceived as an anti-maritime 
polemic.’139 This he characterises as ‘a matter of mise-en-scène, of shifting images around: cave and 
mountain instead of sea and land.’140 This movement from the metaphors of the boundaries of rivers 
and shorelines to ranges and grottos is designed to “ground” politics. Rather Plato takes the implicit 
democracy of the work and life of sailors and transposes it onto the regimentation of the shepherds. 
This is a double move. The shoreline of the sea is transmuted into the abstract division of the demes.141 
Plato summons these images and metaphors because ‘Athens has disease that comes from its port, 
from the predominance of maritime enterprise governed entirely by profit and survival.’142 This is 
                                                          
136 Of course this hatred is not really about the conditions or being of migration/migrants rather it is grounded 
in migration/migrants as an expression of democracy. As Rancière looks to in Hatred of Democracy on pages 3-
4 it is clear that the hatred of democracy is a thinly veiled hatred of fundamental equality. The expression of 
such an equality as outside people (dis)positions. In drawing these two together the discourses around the 
hatred of migration/migrants becomes a hatred of the assertion of fundamental equality. It is precisely because 
migration/migrants exercises capacity their (dis)position shouldn’t have that they are hated for having it. 
137 J. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, (Verso, London, 2014) pp. 49  
138 J. Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 27 
139 Ibid. pp. 1 
140 Ibid. pp. 2 
141 J. Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, (Verso, London, 2014) pp. 44 
142 J. Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 1 
Page 193 of 278 
 
because the sailors are not fit to carry out their politics. They are bawdy and drunk. Plato’s parable of 
the ship carries this with it. If the sailors are left to their devices they will raid the stores, the journey 
becomes a “pleasure-cruise”. Only the philosopher, who knows how to navigate by the stars, is 
capable of bringing them back to land. There is a double move here.  Plato privileges the stasis of the 
land and the stars over the motion of the seas, and also the purpose of the journey over the voyaging 
itself. Sailing is not proper, as it is not in its proper place. This is important not only for the rhetorical 
comparison between the shore and the border but because it highlights the disruptive capacity of 
movement. Sailors lack the virtue of the artisans (sōphrosunē) - their enterprise isn’t governed by their 
capacity or availability for work and singularity of task but by profit and survival. They are a category 
that isn’t present in the city and therefore is not fully (ac)countable to the city.  
Rancière in his critique of Plato blurs the distinction between the polis and the distribution of the 
sensible. In doing so he charts the limitations of his own thought, lyrically, as on the shore. The liminal 
nature of the rhetorical scene of the shore is important here as it expresses the limitations with 
Rancière’s approach to thinking migration. He is concerned with the oblique relationship between the 
“land” of philosophy and the “sea” of politics. This distinction gets charted as possessing motility but 
one across which Rancière treads lightly. Given his light-steps Rancière’s metaphor of the shore 
doesn’t escape his own critique of Plato; that in ‘entering the cave we bid farewell to this fatal and 
seductive seascape143’. This is the limitation I worked through in the introduction: Rancière’s inability 
to fully distance himself from philosophy. Rancière is still, through his thinking of philosophy and the 
grounding of his theory in the polis very much concerned with the schema and scene of the “land”. 
My approach and development of Rancière’s thought is to think across the “sea” and to the “land” on 
the other side. To think the “international” and IR through my Rancierian framework is to attempt to 
see the shore not as a singular delineating boundary. Rather to think of the shores that surround and 
connect us both metaphorically and literarily as the partage that constitutes IR. That movement 
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across, over and around these shores and shorelines as a location which can be read as political is 
central both to the argument, contribution and theorisation I set out in this thesis. This highlights not 
only the Rancièrian heritage with which I am writing but also the ways in which I am developing and 
progressing that heritage.    
Now when we look to the current migration crisis and see people traveling by boat across the 
Mediterranean to arrive in Europe, my arguments highlighting of the disruptive capacity of this 
movement is clear. The (mis)counting of migration/migrants is made harder as they are not still but 
rather have motility. Migration/migrants are not scalar quantities. They necessarily cut vectors across 
IR. Migration/migrants move physically/literarily (in)between places and they do not have the 
singularity of labour demanded by the Police (ac)count. The comparison I have drawn here between 
Rancière’s reading of Plato as an anti-maritime polemic and migration/migrants as well as my own 
reading and relation to this reading is important as it constitutes a shift in the mise-en- scène of my 
argument. Such a rearrangement is important when I make claims as to the political potential of 
migration and migrants for IR. In doing so I highlight the inadequacy of Rancière’s (ac)counting for 
migration due to his own relationship to philosophy I explored in the introduction. My approach 
progresses this metaphor through the (un)grounding of philosophy, in order to constitute my 
argument as an opening up of and attention to the effluvious shorelines of IR.  
Rancière’s addressing of migration directly in his article Politics, Identification and Subjectivisation. Is 
important to clarify his and my own positions. Here Rancière states: ‘twenty years ago the “immigrant 
had an other name; they were workers or proletarians. In the meantime this name has been lost as a 
political name. They retained their “own” name, and an other that has no other name becomes the 
object of fear and rejection.’144 Rancière is writing of metapolitical Police (ac)count and of how this is 
played out.145 His argument is not directed at the political effects of migration/migrants but rather at 
                                                          
144 J. Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, October, Vol. 61, (Summer 1992) pp. 63 
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a collapse of emancipatory politics as the politics of the other.146 He argues that growing racism and 
xenophobia in France stem not from the material reality of migration/migrants but from a collapse of 
the capacity to deploy “wrong” names.147 From this it follows that, much like the socialisation of hate 
brought by the city-less individual148, ‘the new outcomes of racism and xenophobia thus reveal the very 
collapse of politics, the reversion of the political handling of a wrong to primal hate149.’ Just as the city-
less individual is a superfluous character that cannot access their proper place and as such is 
(mis)counted out of humanity so the, barred by the metapolitical discourse from accessing a name 
which renders them sensible, is (mis)counted out of humanity. My argument, while concurrent with 
this position moves to think this relationship to the name migrant as constitutive and central to the 
way in which IR enables its own coherence.  
When migration/migrants are (mis)counted out of humanity this isn’t just the Police count rounding 
down the surplus. It is a metapolitical Policing in the sense that it is situated within the frame of the 
discourse between humanity and citizenship150. The discourse ‘that man and citizen are the same 
liberal individual enjoying the universal values of human rights embodied in the constitutions of our 
democracies151 makes the categories of humanity and citizenship homogenous. The policy of 
liberalised human rights becomes the de facto position of humanity, while erasing the interval or gap 
between names/identities152. This is a totalising erasure that renders inapprehensible those who don’t 
fit into the count as human or citizen. Through this discourse the capacity of migration/migrants to be 
visible as anything other than humans rendered simply as humans becomes impossible. This enables 
both the rendering of passivity that Innes has informed us of153 but also the capacity to count 
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migration/migrants out of humanity and socialise hate154. This for Rancière takes place precisely 
because there hasn’t been the capacity for immigrants to access another name. They aren’t able to 
draw on their previous heterological identity as workers or proletarians155. As Rancière argues this 
category has always been superfluous156 as opposed to denoting a particular (dis)position157 
highlighting the wrong that is being carried out against migration/migrants; the migrant cannot access 
a recognised subject-position within the social constellation as they are written out by the distribution 
of the sensible. They can be reduced to their bare life and be assigned passivity, or they are seen in a 
similar manner to the city-less individual in Aristotle. The fact that wrong is evidenced here as being 
carried out against migrants is essential for my argument. Rancière demonstrates clearly how migrants 
are miscounted – a miscounting essential for politics to emerge. The wrong that blocks the access of 
migrants to names and consigns them to passivity is the same wrong that enables them to act 
politically and assert their fundamental equality. I side with this approach to reading and only differ in 
my application of this position to IR. 
In Who is the subject of the Rights of Man? Rancière looks to break down the relationship between 
human-rights and the conditions of bare life158 and develops an argument about how the ordering of 
these rights can be articulated as part of a Police (ac)count.159 The figure of the refugee is given, via 
Arendt, as the concrete conditionality that enables the abstractedness of human rights.160 Rancière 
shows how, in the Arendtian tradition,161 the condition for human rights are established through a 
                                                          
154 J. Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, (Verso, London, 2007) pp. 27 
155 J. Rancière, ‘Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization’, October, Vol. 61, (Summer 1992) pp. 63 
156 We can see this within the article itself on page 61 when he states that ‘proletarian was not the name of any 
social ground that could be sociologically identified. It is the name of an outcast. An outcast is not a poor wretch 
of humanity; outcast is the name of those who are denied and identity in a given order of policy.’ This similar 
understanding is given in The Philosopher and His Poor as well as Disagreement.  
157 Linking back to the previous chapter, this is a good example of how politics doesn’t have a singular subject 
but rather a transcendental subject. That is a subject waiting for its subjectivation into the (ac)count.  
158 J. Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 2/3, 
(Spring/Summer 2004) pp. 297-310   
159 Ibid. 308-309   
160 Ibid. 298-299 
161 Which is drawn on by Innes as a way of thinking through the potential security implications of migration see: 
Migration, Citizenship and the Challenge for Security pp. 106-9 
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reduction of humans to their humanity.162 Arendt characterises the plight of refugees not as a lack of 
equality before the law but rather ‘that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that 
no one wants to oppress them.’163 For Rancière this is the ‘statement of a situation and status that 
would be “beyond oppression”, beyond any account in terms of conflict and repression or law and 
violence.’164 The condition then is not the reduction to bare life that Agamben discusses, that of 
exceptionality from the law but a broader reduction beyond the law. It isn’t that the subject is 
rendered apprehensible only as someone who can be killed with impunity but may not be sacrificed.165 
Rather the subject becomes inapprehensible as a subject: the migrant does not have recourse to any 
names in society.166 They are completely isolated from social identification as they are in total 
exteriority to territoriality. For Arendt this makes sense: her archipolitical Police (ac) count requires 
the division between the proper “political” community, resembling Athenian-Spartans167, and the 
realm of private endeavour.168 The point for my argument here is that this condition that is established 
by Arendt is not solvable through dissolving itself into the totalising community. Rather it is a condition 
of wrong. I carry forwards this reading and articulate that precisely it is the condition of a wrong that 
is required for subjectivisation to occur.  
Rancière’s thinking here has been developed by, for example, Salvanou in Migrants Nights.169  
Salvanou explores the way in which parallels can be drawn between Rancière’s depiction, in 
Proletarian Nights, of the experiences of 19th century workers and the situation of contemporary 
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Pakistani migrants in Athens.170 She explores both the working conditions171 and leisure time172 of 
these migrants arguing that we can see a parallel with Rancière’s shoemaker poets173 and dreaming 
floor-layers.174 The migrants in Athens are able to ‘develop subjectivities that challenge the discourse 
that devaluates them collectively by defining them as culturally inferior.’175 It is in this capacity, through 
their leisure time and communal existence that they are able to challenge the excessive social-cultural 
predetermination of their lives. Much like the workers of the 19th century, migrants face an excessive 
predetermination (as shown by Innes176, Genova177 and Lane).178 The speech (logos) of migrants is 
reduced to their voice (phonē) (something also explored within the work of Lane179, Schaap180 and 
Gunneflo & Selberg).181 This reduction of the apprehensibility of their speech is a key component of 
wrong. What Salvanou shows in her study of the aesthetic practices of Pakistani migrants in Athens, 
that which allows them to ‘develop subjectivities that challenge the discourse that devalues them’182 
is what could be construed as political action. My articulation can be read as doing something similar 
to the work of Salvanou. In looking to draw through my Rancièrian argument to IR I am making that 
similar kind of reading and movement Salvanou does but with IR as my target not Athens. 
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Another way in which the political activity of migrants is constructed is with regards to protest. Rigby 
& Schlembach explore the way in which protests at the Anglo-French border become political183 
arguing that ‘the politics of the noborder camp did not begin in some pre-established domain of the 
political, but in the struggle over whether or not migration could be a site of politics at all.’184 Rigby & 
Schlembach articulate the struggle here directly to Rancière’s arguments from Ten Theses for 
Politics.185 The act undertaken by the migrants in contesting the Anglo-French border is political 
precisely because it enables their subjectivisation. This is made clear as they describe the protest of 
one of their interviewees as having ‘made manifest this dissensus between having a part and having 
no part. It staged the ‘dissensual’ or ‘impossible’ presence of ‘two worlds in one’ (Rancière 2010, p. 36–
37). We are all human, we are all brothers, or we are not.’186 This mode of protest opens up the wrong 
through a dissensual identification and enables the possibility of subjectivisation. Similar arguments 
are made by Panagia187 and Nyers188 and by Millner who takes things in an ethical direction and is 
explicit about the ways in which migration confronts a wrong189 grounded in ‘the shift from the figure 
of refugee to migrant in the politicisation of asylum at Calais.’190 Millner forwards an argument for the 
ethics of solidarity grounded in the political subjectivation based in the Police (ac)count of migrants 
and refugees. This ethical orientation in relation to thinking through politics here lines up in part with 
the critical account given in IR. In focusing in on the particular practices of Migrants this approach does 
open up a potential space for politics through the focus on the fundamental equality and relationality 
between the practices of migrants and the Police. This has interesting results when compared back to 
the approach given in critical IR theory. The focus within the Rancierian literature is not the 
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constitution of migration/migrants by (un)stable categories, or ontology rather on the relationality 
between the practices and communities and the Police ordering of these (dis)positions. In making this 
shift it I forward and write in and towards this tradition of explicating how it becomes possible to 
apprehend not only a space for dissensus and by extension subjectivation but also politics. 
 
A different take is offered by Dornhof who looks at the way in which violence against women, in 
particular migrant/post-migrant women, is rendered (in)visible in the French Banlieue.191 The concept 
of dissensus is central here enabling Dornhof to think the way in which the women exercise their 
politics and fundamental equality.192 This rendition is interesting given not only the way in which the 
distribution of the sensible assigns a (dis)position that is challenged not only on as migrants but also 
as women.193 In a similar vein to Salvanou’s comparison to Proletarian Nights, Dornhof looks at the 
aesthetic practices of letter writing and how through this dissensus begins to be made possible.194 
Dornhof argues that the letters of migrant women in the Banlieue produce ‘an interruption that is not 
equal to critique, but that introduces a surplus of words in the mode of the ‘as-if’. Speaking in the mode 
of the as-if means ‘the staging of a dissensus’… (Rancière, 2009:11).’195 The migrant women of the 
banlieue through an act of dissensus are able to, undergo subjectivisation and therefore to act 
politically. This application of dissensus is a point of convergence between Dornhof196, Gunneflo & 
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Selberg197, Rigby & Schlembach198, Engles-Schwarzpaul199, Millner200  and Puggioni.201 Converging on 
‘dissensus’ as a mechanism for thinking politics these all locate migration/migrants as potential 
political subjects who are subject to wrong and thus open to political subjectivation. This is key for 
thinking through how a Rancièrian theory of IR effects the notion of politics. In looking at how political 
subjectivation is related to wrong it becomes possible to move forwards IR’s critique from the 
literatures I explored in the first section of this chapter and produce a reading of migration and 
migrants, that is attentive to the nature of wrong and the implications dissensus has for politics in IR.  
Dornhof isn’t alone in looking at the way in which aesthetic practices provides the impetus for protest 
and politics. Johnson gives an interesting account of how migrant narrative making opens up spaces 
for political subjectivisation.202 Drawing on the securitisation literature Johnson highlights the 
performativity of borders in migrant’s relation to them and puts Rancière in conversation with 
Agamben to show that the ‘fleeting interruptions and flashes of resistance that occur in the everyday 
lives of migrants create politics itself within this state of exception.’203 Johnsons argument aligns with 
the analysis I gave of Innes’ account of how migrants regain their agency. This gives a clear moment 
of articulation between the Rancierian understanding and the IR literature on migrations and 
migrants. Migrants in Spain pushing their demand and claims for recognition against the state204 and 
the performative identity of asylum seekers,205 both highlight the possibility for the political 
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subjectivation of migration and migrants. Interestingly, both Johnson and Millner contest the notion 
of ‘the camp’. Johnson articulates her critique directly to show how exceptionality can become the 
location for political activity206 (a claim mirrored in Rancière’s, that ‘an outcast is not a poor wretch of 
humanity; outcast is the name of those who are denied an identity in a given order of policy).207 Millner, 
rather than focus on the locus of the camp highlights how the camps are not necessarily sites of 
exceptionality or “bare life”208, but rather offer up a mediated experience of authority209 and a location 
for dissensus to take hold.210 This offers us an example of potential politics that differs from IR’s 
current understanding of migration/migrants. Rather than offering a reinforcement of the categories 
of territoriality/sovereignty/citizenship we can see how through dissensus a political subjectivation is 
possible that necessarily subverts these categories. By focusing on the way in which 
migration/migrants are a cite of dissensus it becomes possible to forward a critique in IR that moves 
to bring through potential political subjectivation.  
Johnson gives us a series of arguments that are useful for thinking migration/migrants in IR211. Her 
work present a clear and critical take on the issues of reading migration through and into IR. Her 
approach is a clear ally with which I am writing. As I have explored in the paragraph above her work 
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places Rancière in discussion with Agamben212. I referenced a similar mode of discussion in the 
introduction and such the conversation between Johnson, Rancière and Agamben is useful to 
delineate my own understanding of Rancière as well as my argument and the differences that spring 
from my argument. Johnson’s work then becomes central to my argument in articulating Rancière to 
IR. Her work gives a clear crampon against which I can leverage my argumentation to and through IR. 
This is not say mine and Johnson’s work are identical in nature. We have slightly different readings 
and inflections when it comes to reading the Rancière. We also have a different target in our 
articulation and aim of our arguments. These differences then are very minor when it comes to 
thinking this in contrast to the points of similarity in our approach.  
Here, then, I have explored the literature surrounding Rancière and migration. I began looking at the 
primarily material. I broke down Short Voyages to the Land of the People, Politics Identification and 
Subjectivisation as well as On The Shores of Politics and argued that we can see within these texts the 
potential of movement and migration/migrants as setting the stage of political action. I then examined 
the secondary literature that directly articulates Rancière to migration. Here I have seen how 
migration/migrants can be conceived of as a locus for political subjectivisation.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter’s appraisal has shown how IR and the literature around migration and migrants is 
constructed via the distribution of the sensible in IR. In looking at the three self-evident facts produced 
by this distribution I have shown how migration is constituted based on territoriality, sovereignty and 
citizenship. In looking through the mainstream and critical literatures on migration I have drawn out 
how they are constituted. I have worked through how while Critical IR Theory presents an interesting 
and emancipatory critique of IR. I have highlighted how there lies a potential political subject for IR 
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within migration and the figure of migrants. However, I have also argued that in order for this to be 
fully drawn out I have given an account of my argument and how it relates to Rancière’s reading. This 
has included the similarities and points of difference.  
My Rancièrian (ac)count of migration and migrants for IR is foregrounded in this chapter through my 
exploration of the current Rancièreian literature around migration and migrants. The key things to be 
drawn out of this literature on migration and migrants, as well as my reading of Innes and Johnson is 
the prominence of dissensus as essential for politics. It is essential for subjectivation for a dissensual 
articulation against the wrong of the Police (mis)count. Through understanding and drawing across 
the primary and secondary Rancièrian literature on migration and migrant to IR I showcase how 
migration/migrants are subject to a wrong in IR. From this I highlight their potential political 
subjectivation through application of Rancière to IR. 
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Chapter 6: 
Migration and Political Subjectivation 
 
Introduction  
I begin this chapter by outlining my overall argument - that migration as such creates the potential of 
the formation of a political subject for IR – developing it by building on what has been argued in earlier 
chapters. I then show that this involves a more general move away from ontology which, as I noted in 
the introduction is part of my working through the limitations of Rancière. This is part of the 
contribution I am offering to IR through both my development of a Rancièreian framework. This also 
aims my contribution towards the fourth “debate” in IR, in particular Post-positivist IR theory, as 
established by my introduction. That is to say, the chapter gives my case-study of migrants as political 
subjects which is a central claim of my thesis to show my contribution to IR. I then conclude the 
chapter by linking the argument and case study back to the previous chapters and show it provides an 
answer to the research questions formulated within the introduction. 
Migration, Migrants and Political Subjectivation in IR  
The following argument recapitulates and presents back to us what we have seen in the previous five 
chapters, focusing my findings about IR, anarchy and the distribution of the sensible onto the situation 
of migrants. The argument is constructed out of six clear moments. I work through each of these 
moments in turn and give a statement of how this is not only drawn together in the terms of the 
argument at hand but also how it links back across my thesis as a whole. This is done to draw together 
and collate not only my contribution to the field but also to provide answers to the research questions 
that provide the remit and contribution for and of my thesis.  
1: A wrong is where a subject is reduced to a part which has no part through a (mis)count.’ 
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As I have argued in chapter four of the thesis I read a wrong is a specific form of disagreement within 
and against a distribution of the sensible. The latter as I have argued, is what creates the condition of 
and for an apprehensible common world. It does so by specifying a series of positions and disposition 
specific to them. This is both a distribution of bodies and disposition specific to those bodies.213 This 
order(ing) takes place with a reference to the arkhè which structures the distribution of the sensible. 
As I have argued in chapters two, three and four the arkhè of IR’s distribution of the sensible is 
anarchy. This arkhè, by definition, order as (mis)count because it rests on the reduction of one of its 
constitutive (dis)positions as inapprehensible. This is to say that it produces a wrong through the 
creation of a part which has no part. That wrong is the void/supplement that makes possible dissensus 
and the assertion of the part which has no parts fundamental equality. If such a movement was 
impossible then politics itself becomes and impossibility. Without this movement then we would be 
completely trapped within the Police and unable to exercise any modes of political change with regard 
to the distribution of the sensible and thus the order(ing) of our lives.  
Here I make clear the assumptions and arguments I have made in the thesis. This moment within the 
argument I am forwarding in this chapter is not a controversial one with regard to the account of 
Rancière I have presented in the earlier chapters, most notably chapters three and five. The definition 
of wrong itself is important given its relationship to politics within my theorisation. This moment is 
also important as it brings in the arkhè of IR: anarchy.  
The first moment of this argument tells us something about the migration and the figure of the migrant 
within IR as it gives us the terms around which wrong can be understood for IR. In doing so it 
establishes the conditions of my argument and politics. My contribution to post-positivist IR differs in 
that it establishes the site of politics not around a specific ontological framework but rather about the 
conditions of apprehensibility itself. This is also in line with many other thinks who I have outlined 
throughout the thesis until this point. My emphasis on that wrong provides the locus for politics is 
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part of the contribution I am forwarding through my framework. This step of the argument in one in 
which I unpick and foreground what the political in IR must be, in the very least partially, at the level 
of apprehensibility.  
2. ‘A potential political subject is one which has a wrong enacted upon it’. 
In the second moment of my argument I look at the way in which a potential political subject relates 
to wrong. I draw out the stakes and relationship between politics and wrong. As the first moment of 
the argument defined and drew wrong back to the distribution of the sensible and the fundamental 
(mis)counting of the Police order, this moment draws out a defined political relationship to wrong. 
Notably we can see this in chapters three and four.  
The term ‘potential political subject’ is important for the stakes of my argument. With regards to the 
argument I am forwarding subjects are not preconditions for politics but rather part of what it is for 
politics to take place. The act of subjectivation is necessary for politics but is not a guarantee the 
occurrence of politics. Neither does, the fact that there is a wrong being carried out by the Police 
(ac)count. Rather wrong is the necessary but is not on its own a wholly sufficient precondition for 
politics. This is an important is fine point. Politics is not to be confused with the wrong itself. It is also 
not the reaction to that wrong. Rather it is only the assertion of a fundamental equality against the 
wrong of the distribution of the sensible. Looking back at the terms of this moment in the argument 
this means that the subject is only potentially political as there is no guarantee they will undergo 
subjectivation into an apprehensible subject and thus no guarantee of politics occurring. It is perfectly 
possible for a Police (ac)count to never have the wrong of its foundation addressed.  
There is also the fact that, strictly speaking, as subject isn’t an apprehensible subject until it has 
undergone subjectivisation. Rather the part which as no part, precisely by virtue of being the part 
which has not part, is inapprehensible to the Police (ac)count. As I have argued previously in chapter 
three, the Police (ac)count is a distribution of the sensible without void or supplement. Thus, the part 
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which has no part cannot be meaningfully understood as a subject within that distribution of the 
sensible. The ‘potential political subject’ within this moment of the argument is not only potentially 
political but also only potentially a subject until it undergoes the process of subjectivation. Therefore, 
until the potential political subject undergoes a process of subjectivation it is in a superposition with 
regard to the Police (ac)count.  
This is important for the stakes of my argument in that it draws a direct linkage between the wrong 
outlined in the first moment and the conditionality of both subjectivity and politics. The second 
moment then tell us two things about the conditionality of migration and the figure of the migrant 
within IR. It tells us initially that migration and the migrant can only be potentially political if they are 
subject to a wrong by the distribution of the sensible. This links back to the first moment of my 
argument that has established the conditions for wrong. This is also important as it highlights the 
conditions and stakes of politics with regard for migration and the figure of the migrant within IR. This 
is important for my contribution to post-positivist IR as it establishes the conditions of my engagement 
with the field.  
3. ‘Politics is a process/moment of subjectivisation by which a potential political subject asserts its 
fundamental equality against a wrong.’ 
The next moment in my argument builds on the previous ones by distinguishing between the potential 
political subject and the act of subjectivation itself. In order for politics to take place there needs to 
be subjectivation. Subjectivation involves the invocation of the miscounted part which has no parts 
fundamental equality. I argued for the previous in chapters three and four. This is to say the part which 
has no part is subjectivated through the assertion of its fundamental equality against the wrong of the 
Police orders (mis)count. 
In the context of IR politics then must be the process of subjectivation with regard to the wrong carried 
out the Police (mis)count of IR. This means that the potential political subject for IR must be being 
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miscounted by IR. As we saw in the first moment of my argument and in chapter three the 
(mis)counting of the Police order must leave the part which has no part inapprehensible to IR. The 
Police (ac)count cannot have a gap or surplus within it.  What is important is the characteristics of the 
Police (ac)count in IR as this will determine the conditions of apprehensibility and thus the character 
of the wrong.  The arkhè of IR is clearly important for the character with which migration and migrants 
within IR as subject to a wrong and thus be a potential political subject. As we saw in chapters two 
and four the arkhè of IR is anarchy and thus its Police (ac)count is founded on this ordering principle. 
As I have argued previously anarchy delimits and (re)produces the tools by which IR can be and is 
rendered apprehensible. This is to say that key vectors along which apprehensibility runs in IR; 
territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship are produced only through their relationship to anarchy. 
These categories of apprehensibility, as I argued in chapter five, have been a means through which 
migration and migrants have been sublimated out of IR.  
From this then I am showing in this moment of my argument how politics in IR must necessarily be a 
distribution of the distribution of the sensible and the Police (ac)count of IR. This disruption must occur 
through a subjectivation that destabilises anarchy and the constituent self-evident facts produced by 
the distribution of the sensible. In the case of IR this is its arkhè: anarchy as well as territoriality, 
sovereignty and citizenship. Following the previous moments of my argument it is also apparent that 
this disruption is only possible given the assertion of a part which has no parts fundamental equality 
against a wrong. This moment sets out the conditions for politics in IR. This is essential for the 
functioning of my case study as it organises clearly the conditions for politics within IR and also for the 
articulation of this case study to post-positivist IR theory, given the accounts of this mode of theory I 
have made throughout the introduction and thesis.  
4. ‘Migrants and the phenomena of migration are (mis)counted in IR’; that is, they are (mis)counted in 
IR and thus have a wrong enacted upon them.’ 
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If it is not the case that migrants and the phenomena of migration are miscounted in IR, then they 
cannot be understood as a potential political subject for IR as they will not have a wrong enacted 
against them. But, as we have seen in chapter five, in order to maintain a coherent totality for IR the 
claims, experience and existence of migration/migrants is sublated into the category of security. This 
renders invisible migration and migrants inapprehensible as phenomena. Rather than being read as 
discrete and important (dis)positions within IR they are written out as the objects of economic and 
security concerns. Territoriality is, as I have argued, one of the ways that migration/migrants are 
clearly a part which has no part in IR but so too are sovereignty and the state. As we saw, the State 
relates to migrants as the Police and this rationality precludes the possibility for migration or migrants 
to be understood as-if they were an equal subject for IR and restricts their apprehensibility through 
the denial of access to common names. This means that the state counts migration/migrants out of IR 
not only through sublation into an economic/security issues but also through limiting the claims they 
can make. IR constitutes migration/migrants as only capable of voice (phonē) within IR. This means 
that they cannot be seen as a subject and therefore are reduced through the state and sovereignty to 
a part which has no part. We can see this (mis)counting through the ways in which citizenship 
functions in IR. Citizenship renders migrants (in)apprehensible firstly by assigning the (dis)position of 
the citizen as tied to a state. This automatically makes migrants superfluous to the category. I argued 
that following this there is also a way in which citizenship makes migration/migrants inapprehensible 
to IR through reducing them to the domestic sphere of individual-state relations. I highlighted here 
how this category serves to sublate migration/migrants through their possession only of voice (phonē) 
as opposed to speech. This is a crucial point. If the distribution of the sensible of IR can effectively 
(ac)count for migration/migrants then they will not be miscounted and therefore are always already 
able to be taken as an equal within the field. However, within chapter five I have argued that this is 
not the case and we have seen how IR’s distribution of the sensible constructs migration/migrants as 
inapprehensible. The self-evident facts of territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship are produced by 
anarchy and render migrants an inapprehensible subject within IR, subject to a miscount.  
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A slight caveat is required here. There are potential Police mechanisms that render some 
migration/migrants apprehensible to IR. These rely on the distinction between regular 
migration/migrants and that which is irregular. This distinction between regular and irregular 
migration is drawn with regards to the conception of deportability. Huysmans214 , De Genova215 and 
Nyers216 each define and build on the concept of irregularity with regards to migration. This distinction 
between regular and irregular cuts across the boundaries of legality and the state.217 While legal and 
illegal migration is defined from the perspective of the state, irregular migration seeks to break from 
this definitional assumption. In this way it is a distinction that seeks to recapture the categories of 
sovereignty and citizenship.  An important caveat to add is that this analytic category is not ‘a generic, 
singular, universal and thereby a transhistorical and essentialised object of study.218’ There is no 
specific categorisation, in terms of material factors, that can be ascertained through this this 
terminology.219 This means that the distinct between regular and irregular are general categories that 
account for a swathe of individuated identities and experiences that are not necessarily aligned or 
consanguineous.  
We can see how the distinction between regular and irregular migration undermines the self-evident 
facts of sovereignty and citizenship within IR as irregular migrations is defined as migrants/migration 
that is not authorised by the state in/across which they exist. Within the mainstream and critical 
literature there is often an economic implication tied to irregularity.220 This categorisation between 
regular and irregular migrants as tied into the correct possession of state approved paperwork is a 
mechanism by which migration/migrants can be sublimated into the Police (ac)count of IR. Through 
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the reduction of migration/migrants into an issue of security lensed through sovereignty and 
citizenship as articulated in state paperwork they are rendered inapprehensible.  
I have argued earlier in chapter five that regular and irregular migration can be seen as a mechanism 
that divides critical and ‘mainstream’ literatures in IR. What becomes apparent at this moment in my 
argument is that both literatures already have the conditions of apprehensibility, as delineated by the 
Police (ac)count, baked into their understanding of migration/migrants. Through understanding that 
the conditionality of the difference between regular and irregular migration is the authorisation of the 
state, critical IR reoccupies the ground of territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. Through the 
invocation and exploration of these self-evident facts we can see here how the conditions of 
apprehensibility are granted to regular migration. This division takes migration and migrants as a 
category at large and though a para-political reduction, along the lines of IR’s self-evident facts, 
enables regular migrants to become apprehensible. This enables the distribution of the sensible as a 
whole to remain coherent through boiling out the surplus matter of irregularity.  
Regular migration is made apprehensible to IR through its locution via territoriality, sovereignty and 
citizenship. Irregular migration and irregular migrants by contrast are not subject to recognition by the 
state in the same way. They do not adhere to the implementation of territoriality, sovereignty and 
citizenship but rather flaunt it. As such they are inapprehensible to IR. This is where in part the 
(mis)count occurs through the exercising of deportability.221 The irregular migrant is rendered 
apprehensible only as a surplus to the Police (ac)count of IR and given that the Police (ac)count cannot 
tolerate void or surplus, they become sublated into the Police (ac)count through deportation i.e. the 
reassertion of territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship. This is then a mode of wrong. Through the 
distinction between regular and irregular migration/migrants it is clear how wrong plays out even with 
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Police action rendering regular migration apprehensible. Even as there are differing levels of 
apprehensibility between different modalities of migration or migrants there is still the central wrong 
of irregular migration. Migration/migrants that do not fit into the frame of IR are then rendered into 
a security problem. This wrong serves the function of retrenching the core self-evident facts of IR 
produced by anarchy: territoriality, sovereignty and citizenship: it is a Police action.  
Critical IR generally focuses on irregularity as a site which undermines the core self-evident facts of IR 
produced by anarchy. The critical literature rather than looking to reaffirm the foundations of the 
(ac)count seeks up problematize the relationship between these core self-evident facts and IR. This is 
often done by looking at cases which naturally fall outside the remit of states own established 
conditions of apprehensibility i.e. regular migration/migrants. This is why Critical IR both focuses on 
irregular migration but also eschews the terminology of illegal migration. This is example of both 
wrong and potentially a political subject. Although here the self-evident facts are not always taken as 
dissensual but rather can be reproduced and reoccupied by Critical IR. This is the core contribution of 
my Rancièrian framework that I am deploying here. In reading migration and migrants through the 
lens of (in)apprehensibility and wrong it becomes possible to step out of the self-evident facts 
themselves and look to the function of politics in IR.  
At this moment within my argument it is clear that there are differing modalities of apprehensibility 
with regards to migration and migrants within IR. Following from the delineation between regular and 
irregular migration/migrants it is clear that there is a wrong perpetrated against irregular 
migration/migrants and thus that they can be potentially political subject for IR. A quick summary of 
this moment in my argument reads that irregular migration is inapprehensible to IR as it cannot be 
seen, heard or thought by IR. This is why it becomes criminalised. My earlier arguments have also 
highlighted that this (in)apprehensibility opens up the potential for the politicisation of irregular 
migration. The second movement within this moment of my argument shows how the condition of 
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irregular migration/migrants’ inapprehensibility is established by the apprehensibility of regular 
migration. This linkage highlights the central wrong of IR’s Police (ac)count.  
As migration/migrants themselves are an inherently excessive/empty phenomenon for IR they are 
sublimated into the distribution through the para-political rendering of regular and irregular 
migration. As we saw in chapter five with my discussion of Short Voyages to the Land of the People 
and On the Shores of Politics, movement itself has the potentiality for aesthetic-political disruption; 
the very act of being outside of one’s place creates potential for the realisation of a wrong and an 
awareness of a potential political subject (the part which has no part). This should be read within the 
limitations I established in that chapter. If we transpose this analysis of movement to IR it becomes 
clear that even regular migration can be seen to cut across the boundaries of territoriality, sovereignty 
and citizenship. I have drawn on the literature above which makes precisely this claim at the domestic 
level. The Police (ac)count which renders apprehensible some migration/migrants in IR does not 
complete eliminate or reduce the miscount against migration/migrants as a whole. Rather it reduces 
the capacity through which a sub-set of migration/migrants can enact their fundamental equality. 
Here the potentiality of the political subject rears its head again. The Police (ac)count reduction of the 
capacity of migration/migrants to carry out politics is a reduction not an elimination. And because they 
are still (mis)counted they have a wrong enacted upon them.  And we saw in my discussion of Innes 
and Johnson, for example, exactly the mechanisms by which this wrong is carried out.  
5. As migrants and the phenomena of migration has a wrong enacted upon them they must be a 
potential political subject and capable of enacting politics. 
This moment in my argument follow on from the previous ones. My claim is that as migrants are 
subject to a wrong in IR then they must be a potential political subject for IR. I have provided evidence 
for this claim in detail in the previous moment.  We have seen in chapter five my discussion of the 
secondary literature in both IR and Rancière which brought forwards numerous examples of how 
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migration/migrants should be taken as a potentially political subject in IR. In particular Salvanou222 
and Gunneflo & Selberg223 give clear accounts of how migration/migrants can be taken as a potential 
political subject.  
This is a point in the thesis where my framework for IR can be clearly seen and established. As I have 
charted throughout the thesis and in the introduction there is now a clear argument that can be read 
through into post-positivist IR. I have made clear not only how my framework and understanding of 
IR has been configured but also the point at which we can see the implications for this framework for 
IR and thus my contribution and articulation to post-positivist IR theory.  
6. Politics in IR is the process/moment of subjectivisation by which migrants and the phenomena of 
migration assert their fundamental equality against a wrong.  
This is the concluding claim of my argument. It is both the logical amalgamation of the preceding 
moments and the core claim of my thesis as it represents my proposition about my conception of 
politics in and for IR. This moment in the argument is where I articulate the claims about migration 
and migrants in IR to the implications of my Rancièrian understanding of politics for IR.  
Looking back to my introduction we can see here how my argument related to post-positivist IR theory 
as well as my two research questions. The argument I have laid out above and my parsing of the 
relevant literatures in chapter five, addressed these questions directly and made clear how I am 
making a contribution to post-positivist IR theory. Through looking at the distribution of the sensible 
and the self-evident facts produced by the arkhè of the distribution I have drawn out the position of 
anarchy in IR. Throughout my argument I have given an account of what a potential political subject 
might look like for my theorisation of IR. This provides an answer to my second research question.  In 
                                                          
222 E. Salvanou, ‘“Migrants Night’s: Subjectivity and Agency of Working-Class Pakistani Migrants in Athens 
Greece’, Oral History Forum d’histoire orale, Vol. 33, (2013) pp. 1-19 
223 M. Gunneflo & N. Selberg, ‘Discourse or Merely Noise? Regarding the Disagreement on Undocumented 
Migrants’, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 12, (2010) pp. 173-191 
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short I have shown that my Rancièrian theory of IR forces us to look at migration and migrants as a 
potential site for politics.  
The Rancièrian Contribution to IR 
One thing that we can draw out of the argument I have given the preceding section is that it is not 
reliant on or grounded in claims of ontology. This is central to the contribution to post-positivist IR as 
I set out in the introduction. It is organised as such partly, to recognised and progress the limitations 
between my own work and that of Rancière’s. Secondly given the research questions I am attempting 
to answer but also how I am articulating my contribution to post-positivist IR this is essential to 
understand. The fact that my argument is grounded with recourse to Rancière’s understanding and 
politics and his notion of the distribution of the sensible means that it offers the opportunity for re-
evaluation of the trajectory of politics in IR after the fourth “debate”. This is essential for reading in 
light of my contribution to the field as laid out in my introduction.  
With this in mind it is clear that my Rancièrian understanding can help IR in breaking free from its own 
fixation on ontology. This is in part the contribution and articulation to post-positivist IR I have argued 
for throughout but in particular in chapters two and four. As discuss in the introduction this ontological 
fixation comes out of the arkhè of IR: anarchy but also is a location of tension between my own writing 
and that of Rancière. As anarchy structures and organises both critical and mainstream IR we can see 
how this commonality in organising principle engenders contestation over ontology as opposed to 
politics/the Police. My articulation to post-positivist IR recognises the locations which often reoccupy 
and reproduce the self-evident facts of IR and thus the Police distribution of IR. It also seeks to produce 
a cohesive framework that offers the potential to escape this reproduction and reoccupation. In 
outlining this (re)production and given the stakes of my argument I have given a way in which we can 
discuss migration and migrants in IR potentially politically without recourse to ontology, which is 
essential to my contribution and articulation to post-positivist IR. My Rancièrian framework, when 
looking at IR, shows the capacity for IR to look outside of its own assumptions and to acts of 
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subjectivation that could be political. In particular I am writing towards and attempting to organise 
myself within post-positivist IR theory. This move breaks away from both the encamped meta-politics 
of ontology that reproduces IR’s arkhè: anarchy; and its supporting self-evident facts: territory, 
sovereignty and citizenship. 
My argument as I have given above in this chapter focuses on how IR creates the condition of 
(in)apprehensibility is bound up within IR’s own (ac)count of itself. Anarchy becomes the central point 
which collates the field around ontology without void or supplement. My gives an account which does 
not rely on a recourse to ontology but rather is centred around politics. The advancement of my 
Rancièrian understanding of politics should be read through not only my own tension with Rancière 
but also with my articulation towards post-positivist IR. I have given who the allies I am writing towards 
and against the conceptions of IR and politics I am writing against. Thus I have shown how both the 
political and ontological are distinct categories in IR. It is clear that the ontological has a depoliticising 
character in IR as it is designed to reinforce a Police distribution of the sensible organised through its 
principle anarchy. Ontology is manifested then as a mechanism by which the political can be counted 
out of IR. This is part of my core contribution and the grease which enables me to write into post-
positivist IR both as an ally and contributor.   
Turning back to the literatures of Post-positivist IR I identified as benefiting from a Rancièrian theory 
of IR in my introduction and literature review we can see my contribution thrown into relief clearly 
given my argument about migration and migrants. For example, as I traced in the introduction and 
literature review Narrative IR theory is a ripe site for politics in IR given its unique methodological 
perspective and arrangement. My argument, as outlined in this chapter, has implications for Narrative 
IR theory. My movement away from a mainstream reading and deployment of ontology lines up with 
the work I have highlighted as political within Narrative IR theory, for example: Aijazi’s piece on 
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Kashmir224 and Alexander’s on nuclear evacuation.225 Both of these articles work through subjectivity 
as experienced by individuals. The argument I forward in both my argument here and across this thesis 
gives the opportunity to articulate this directly and politically as well as at the level of individual affect. 
This is a clear moment of articulation between my thesis and post-positivist IR theory. As such I have 
highlighted how the complex individual weaving and experiences of subjectivation become then the 
ground of and for politics. This is argued in solidarity with the important methodological concerns and 
contributions Narrative IR theory makes but also in thinking through the implications of my argument 
as given here.  We can see this articulation in a similar vein to both Post-structural and Post-Positivist 
Feminist theory. As I made clear in the introduction as well as my literature review I am actively 
seeking to write my argument towards these literatures. I have highlighted how they are oriented post 
fourth “debate” and have an interest in setting out the ontological claims in addition to unpicking how 
these claims ground and structure the field. My argument can be a useful tool for stepping outside of 
the fourth “debates” quagmire of ontology. This is important for thinking how I can be read into post-
positivist IR as well as bearing in mind the limitations and framing of my own theoretical perspective. 
Looking back to my argument we can see this mode of engagement with IR as useful to post-positivist 
IR as it gives us a way of understanding politics in IR that isn’t liable to reoccupy the ground established 
via the Police distribution of the sensible but rather offers up a new mechanism with which to augment 
the arguments and projects already underway in these literatures.  
Secondly through my argument I have given here we can see how it directly brings out an answer to 
my first and second research question. The example of migration and migrants in IR as a potential site 
for politics gives us a clear answer to my second research question. If we take my reading of Rancière 
and my Rancièrian theory of IR that emerges from that reading seriously then politics must be 
                                                          
224 O. Aijazi, ‘Kashmir as Movement and Multitude’, The Journal of Narrative Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2018) pp. 88-
118 
225 R. Alexander, ‘Feeling Unsafe: Exploring the Impact of Nuclear Evacuation’, The Journal of Narrative Politics, 
Vol. 4, No. 2, (2018) pp. 65-87 
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considered as subjectivation. The ramifications this has for the field in line with ontology have been 
given at length previously within this section.  
The second claim (and partial contribution of my argument to IR theory) is that my theorisation 
orientates IR to be open to new subjectivities.  As I have shown in my argument as well as Chapters 
Two, Three and Four of my thesis, IR’s distribution of the sensible is made possible through its arkhè 
of anarchy. The position of anarchy produces the self-evident facts which structure and provide for 
the Police (ac)count and distribution of the sensible for IR. This is shown within the argument I have 
given in this chapter, but it also provides a direct answer to my first research question. This again helps 
draw through and cement my contribution as located directly within post-positivist IR theory. 
My argument shows that IR is incapable of understanding itself or what is political for it without a 
direct reflection upon the self-evident facts that make it possible. This argument shows that we should 
be opening IR up to new subjectivities as it is only through the subjectivation of a part which has no 
part that politics can occur in IR. Without a sensitivity and focus on the way in which the current 
distribution of the sensible occasions wrongs on different potentially political subject’s politics 
becomes impossible. If, however, like my argument above, we are attentive to the way IR’s 
distribution of the sensible in constructed then it becomes possible for us to apprehend the way in 
which IR has (mis)counted out its potential political subjects. My argument above and exploration of 
the literatures in chapter five provides a case study that shows this with regard to migration and 
migrants in IR. This argument is directly explicitly towards post-positivist IR theory. In breaking down 
this aesthetic-political order(ing) it becomes clear that IR has delimited its own access to its subjects 
and this has been don’t to maintain the coherent of its Police (ac)count of and to itself. We have seen 
this in the case of migrant and migration in IR and this analysis gives the opportunity not only the focus 
on the subjects the Police order rendered apprehensible but also the potential political subjects that 
are part of IR but have not part in IR.  
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Turning back to the specific literatures within post-positivist IR that I outlined as potentially situated 
to benefit from my reading and theorisation of IR theory we can see how my arguments possibility for 
opening up sections of the field to new subjectivities, which have been excluded from not only IR but 
apprehensibility within IR as useful. This is developed within the introduction and written towards and 
in the spirit of alliance with these particular literatures.  Through the application of subjectivation we 
can see how such a notion and argument could be of use to post-positivist IR theory clearly. As I 
explored in chapter one this literature seeks to unpick the ontology and methodology of IR with regard 
to the functionality of multiple terms of reference .My theorisation of IR offers a way to unpick the 
structural organisation and ordering of the field that is inattentive and at times incapable of 
apprehending its own constitution. The opportunity presented through reading my argument into 
post-positivist IR theory so as to open up the field to new and diverse subjectivities that it currently 
occludes is an important contribution of my approach.  
In fleshing out subjectivity and subjectivation and their relationship to politics I offer a potential 
augmentation to post-positivist IR theory but in particular post-structural IR theory. We can see how 
my mode of reading IR is particularly useful through moving away from ontology but also through 
highlighting the way in which subjectivation provides the ground and action of politics in IR. My 
argument about the potential politics of migrant and migration gives a clear case for how 
subjectivation in IR is the meter-stick for politics, but it also highlights the darker spaces of subjectivity 
that the current distribution of the sensible occludes. This is of particular interest to how post-
structural IR reads its own understanding and thinking around politics in IR as I evidenced in the 
introduction. Not only have I shown this this but I also service answering both my first and second 
research questions. I answer the first through my account of subjectivation and looking at how arkhè 
constitutes the foundation for the self-evident facts that enable the apprehensibility of subjectivities 
in IR.  Anarchy as the arkhè of the field not only organises the field along the lines of ontology but also 
sets the conditionality of which subjectivities can be understood as visible, hearable etc. within IR. I 
have offered an approach here which not only gives an account of how these subjectivities via anarchy 
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(as it is the arkhè which orders the field distribution of the sensible) but also how we should be 
attentive to the potential subjects excluded from that ordering.   
Following on from my arguments implications for subjectivity and ontology I turn to how my argument 
means we need to rethink politics in and for IR. Through my exemplary case of migration and migrant 
we have seen that for a Rancierian theory of IR the political is not the reassertion or occupation of a 
Police distribution but rather a recounting of that Police count. This is clear articulated and of interest 
to how post-positivist IR must necessarily relate against the arkhè of anarchy and the self-evident facts 
it produces if it is to be considered political in a meaningful way. This changes the frame of reference 
for what politics means in IR. Rather than understanding IR as being about the already hearable, see-
able and thinkable orientation of sovereign territorial nation states we are forced to focus on and 
consider what is written out by this categorisation. The stakes of my argument mean that in order for 
IR to be political it needs to confront its own inherent (mis)count and open itself up to the contingency 
of its own foundation.  
Thus, as my argument above has shown to understand politics in my reading of Rancière and the 
tensions that persist around this reading place emphasis on the fact that IR must be able to begin to 
hear, see and think the subjectivisation of its own parts that have no part in its current distribution of 
the sensible. I have already highlighted how this means a movement away from the fields own 
grounding in ontology and the emergence of occluded subjectivities. This movement necessitates a 
rethinking of the way in which IR’s arkhè: anarchy and its self-evident facts: territoriality, sovereignty 
and citizenship shape the conditions of apprehensibility for the field. This has implications for and 
clearly draws my thesis into post-positivist IR theory. In particular given the heritage, organisation and 
implications of the arguments I draw out throughout the thesis my work it is closely tied to post-
structural IR theory.  As I have highlighted anarchy as an arkhè is often shared by both the 
“mainstream” and critical readings of the field. However my argument, while an immanent and explicit 
critique of “mainstream” IR is explicitly written towards critical post-positivist IR. The fact that the 
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arkhè is congruent across both readings of IR has ramifications for IR in that it displaces the focus of 
the political wings of the field. My argument within the thesis places the concerns of post-positivist IR 
with regard to politics, as orientated around subjectivation and the status of the Police while calling 
into discussion the field’s perceptions of ontology. Again, here we can see a clear answer to the first 
research question. Anarchy as arkhè has a twofold effect on the distribution of the sensible for IR.  
My argument has given and sustained a Rancièreian understanding throughout the thesis. This is not 
to say it is solely constituted in this vein as I have explicated the limitations and tensions that this 
framework brings to light. Not only this however but through my exploring of the fact that anarchy is 
the arkhè of IR’s distribution of the sensible also has an effect on how the field is able to constitute 
itself. I have given this argument in more detail in my literature review and introduction through 
charting how anarchy effected and steered the formation of the great “debates. This steering and its 
relationship to critical and “mainstream” IR, I explored in chapter two when I looked at how anarchy 
has direct consequences for how IR can possibly organise and order itself. My argument throughout 
this thesis then has shown not only the consequences of anarchy as arkhè but also a way that 
challenges this ordering. This challenge is intelligible to, directed towards and written in solidarity with 
post-positivist IR theory. If we adopt my line of argumentation rather than reproducing or reoccupying 
the territory of anarchy as arkhè it becomes possible through dissensus to open up this distribution of 
the sensible to direct critique that is clearly tied into post-positivist IR. The mode of politics shown by 
my argument here is also a direct answer to my second research question as it gives an account of not 
only what my argument would look like but also the implications of that theory for politics in IR. My 
argument in this chapter as well as arguments given in chapters four and five show clearly what politics 
looks like for my theory and its articulation to post-positivist IR theory.  
My understanding of politics as given throughout the thesis but through my argument in this chapter 
and the previous two both has implications for the literatures I have outlined earlier but also a 
contribution towards post-positivist IR theory. Through thinking politics in the manner I have given in 
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my argument above, we can see directly the contribution such a claim has for post-positivist IR theory. 
It is evident that such a manner of argumentation is useful to Post-structural, Narrative and Post-
positivist IR literatures for the reasons I have outlined in my introduction and within this section. This 
mode of politics, as evidenced in my argument above, is useful as it gives a way of doing politics in IR 
that forces us to rethink not only the founding assumptions of the field but how the field is rendered 
apprehensibility to us. Through the distribution of the sensible and understanding politics as the 
subjectivation of a part which has not part it is possible to make arguments that not only look at the 
constitution of the self-evident facts that structure IR but how these themselves are products of the 
fields distribution.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have given an argument which acts as an exemplary case of an argument grounded in 
Rancièrian theory. This chapter has built on Chapter Five’s exploration of the literatures around 
migration and migrants in IR. From this basis my argument has been gives to show what a Rancièrian 
theory of IR would mean to politics. This has been done through an exemplary case study. This chapter 
has drawn out in depth the relationship between migration/migrants and political subjectivation. The 
case-study has taken the form of an argument which shows how migration and migrants are potential 
political subjects for IR. In doing so I have shown that Rancièrian theory is applicable to IR. I have 
building on this looked in depth at the relationship between not only migration and political 
subjectivation but also how the Rancièrian conceptual framework connects into IR as a whole. My six-
point argument has served as both evidence for the claims throughout the thesis but also as an 
example of the resultant of these claims.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has been a work of theory that has applied and articulated the work of Jacques Rancière to 
IR Theory. It has clearly articulated my argumentation to post-positivist IR theory. I have carried out 
this work in order to help understand how thinking within IR is ordered and the implications that this 
ordering has for politics in IR.  
Contribution of the Thesis  
As I have argued throughout the thesis my contribution has been aimed at post-positivist IR theory. 
This is evident not only from my approach but also from how my argument has progressed across this 
thesis. In this section I provide an answer to the central question of any PhD: What do we know now 
that we did not when we started reading? I aim to do this but looking at what I have argued throughout 
the thesis as a whole. I focus on not only the how of the thesis but the whys of my argument to clearly 
show the original contribution to knowledge I have delivered to post-positivist IR theory.  
Looking back to the introduction and my justification of why my reading of Rancière is interesting and 
useful for IR theory we can see the stakes of my argumentation throughout the thesis. I have argued 
consistently that explicitly in that section of the introduction that my reading of Rancière offers 
something of value to post-positivist IR.  This use value can be seen in how Rancière conceptualises 
politics and his broader approach to thinking political theory. The reading of Rancière given by this 
thesis is not simply a statement of his thought but, as explored across many different sections of the 
thesis, and theorisation of my position having read Rancière. Here then are two things we know given 
my exploration of Rancière’s thought that we didn’t at the start of the thesis.  
The first is my position and understanding of Rancière that I have developed across and throughout 
the thesis. This is useful as, I will set out in the next section, as it deals with the tensions and limitations 
that come with articulating Rancière’s though to post-positivist IR theory. I have throughout this thesis 
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explicated and developed on Rancière’s position to formulate my own Rancièrian framework. There 
is then a contribution here which is my development of my position on Rancière into an individual and 
clearly given Rancierian framework for and of IR. In the previous chapter I have spoken about how and 
why this would be useful for post-positivist IR theory. It is worth highlighting briefly here that this is 
useful not because it is my understanding of Rancière but in articulating an understanding of Rancière 
there that makes sense within the field of IR I have provided a reading that can be used as a stepping 
stone towards future and potentially more systematic research in IR. 
It is important that we do not just know my thoughts on Rancière in IR but rather that we know the 
implications of my theorisation of Rancière in post-positivist IR. These implications, as I have shown, 
are both interesting and useful for post-positivist IR. While I have, throughout the thesis, briefly 
charted different specific literatures that might benefit from my theorisation of IR, there is clearly a 
broader contribution to post-positivist IR in my theorisation. By working through my theories 
implications to IR we now know what my Rancièrian theorisation has to say about politics and the 
political in IR. I hope, although I cannot guarantee that these are not only of interest to but use to the 
literatures I have outlined throughout the thesis.   
The second thing that we know now that we did not when we started reading the thesis is how anarchy 
can be understood to function in my Rancièreian theorisation. This point follows on from the previous 
ones I just outlined. In making this articulation and reading I have produced a theorisation that breaks 
down and analyses how anarchy orders IR. As I have shown this is not some kind of particularly special 
or unique contribution. I have given evidence of many different scholars understanding of anarchy in 
IR. What is particularly useful here is not simply the fact that my reading is my own or that it is 
Rancièrian. Rather what is important for this contribution to be read as distinct from the myriad other 
criticisms or “mainstream” that exist within post-positivist IR. I argue that there is a particularly 
interesting contribution from my theorisation and approach to IR that lies within its understanding of 
and relation to ontology. While I have given a detailed account of this both in the introduction and 
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throughout the thesis it is worth mentioning again here. My theorisations thinking of ontology is 
something which has been developed throughout the thesis and placed in relation to post-positivist 
IR theory directly. As I have argued this is something that has a potential use value for post-positivist 
IR. I should add here, as I will explore in when I revisit the limitations of Rancière and in my gestures 
towards future research that this is not complete. Rather my thesis has kicked off a process of thinking 
and critiquing the role of ontology in post-positivist IR, which while it is not an astonishingly unique 
one, is one that constitutes a contribution to the field.  
From these two brief summaries of my contribution to knowledge we can see how this thesis has 
offered up a contribution to post-positivist IR theory. Bearing this in mind I go on now to look at the 
limitations I set out for my approach in the introduction and see how the stand given the work I have 
carried out across my thesis.  
Limitations of Rancière Revisited 
As I argued in the introduction of this thesis my theorisation of IR can never be totalising or complete. 
Rather I have written throughout my thesis both with Rancière but also against and in tension with his 
ideas. In the introduction I separated out three clear areas where I am writing against the limitations 
of Rancière’s own thought. It is appropriate now to reflect back across these three distinct limitations 
and to analyse how I have wrestled with them across the thesis.  
The first limitation I touch on now is how Rancière’s work has focused on the polis or the nation-state 
as the location for his political thought. This is an area that I explicitly broke down through my chapters 
that focused on migration and migrants. Chapters five and six have worked through this limitation in 
detail and I have shown that while Rancière does focus on the polis there is certainly room to read his 
thought and core concepts beyond this frame. I have highlighted, amputated and translated Rancière’s 
own understanding to produce my own theorisation of IR along the tracks that Rancière laid. I argue 
that this has been broadly successful in charting and that this limitation and tension has been a 
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formative one for the arguments I have given and made throughout this thesis. While this limitation 
will always provide and produce a tension between my own writing and that of Rancière it is and has 
been throughout this thesis a productive one. It is this tension which has enabled and arranged my 
contribution to post-positivist IR theory.  
The second limitation I come to is Rancière’s understanding of thinking and speaking beings. As I 
highlighted in the introduction there is a central tension between how Rancière reads thinking and 
speaking and how I conceptualise and theorisation this distinction. This limitation can be simplified 
into thinking about Rancière is an anthropocentric thinker or not. While my thesis doesn’t directly 
engage with breaking down and resolving this tension directly it is one that has informed my own 
thinking and reading of Rancière throughout. As I return to in my section on the gestures to future 
research this is a location where my reading of Rancière can be developed out and articulated to 
current debates in IR around anthropocentrism. This limitation has been constitutive to my 
organisation of both Rancière and my argument. It is not a tension that is resolved throughout the 
thesis although I have made repeated movements in my argument to characterise and shift my 
argument away from an anthropocentric reading of Rancière and to a different position constituted 
against a reading of IR as centred on humanity.  
The third limitation I have written both with and against is Rancière’s relationship to philosophy and 
in particular ontology. Throughout the thesis I have been explicit and implicit in stating the importance 
of Rancière’s understanding of and use of ontology. My reading of this limitation is what has informed 
many of the central claims and contributions of my thesis. As such it has been a site not only of internal 
production and tension but also of reflection and contribution. The core limitation of Rancière against 
which my own interpretation and voice has been drawn out is in regard to thinking ontology within 
and around Rancière.  The role of the aesthetic and his critique of general theories is something I have 
taken up throughout my thesis. I have been writing in mind with the “better-half” of Rancière which 
is a theorist concerned with and actively opposing the “super-powers” of ontology. Throughout the 
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thesis this where much of the meat of my criticism and contribution has been drawn out from. It is 
not a tension or limitation that can be resolved, not least because of the ideological and material 
organisation of both academia and IR. Thus this limitation has been both deeply productive and a 
constant challenge for both articulating and thinking my theorisation of IR into post-positivist IR.  
As is evident from my brief reflections back on the limitations I have wrangled with across my 
engagement and theorisation both with Rancière and IR these are not easy sites for resolution. Rather 
each one presents a tension that is both constitutive of my thought but also a challenge to it. They 
represent the shorelines against an across which I have tried to explicate and organise the 
argumentation in this thesis.  
Research Questions Revisited 
Having explored the limitation and contributions of my thesis I now look back to the research 
questions I sought to answer in within it. These research questions have been the guiding light towards 
which I have driven my articulation of Rancierian theory to IR. My two research questions have thus 
structured my thesis and set the conditions for navigating the literatures and producing my 
argumentation within the aforementioned chapters. These questions have been not only a bridging 
tool, in that they are conditioned by and respond to the state of the field but also a critical lens as they 
have enabled the application to the post-positivist IR theory throughout my thesis  
Research Question One: 
My first research question was: How does anarchy construct IR’s distribution of the sensible? 
This question drew our attention towards the juncture between anarchy and the Rancierian concept 
of the distribution of the sensible. This question was useful because it enabled me in answering it to 
work through the boundaries between IR theory and Rancierian theory as they currently stand.  
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As I have already stated anarchy constructs IR’s distribution of the sensible through it being its arkhè. 
In being the arkhè of IR’s distribution of the sensible anarchy enables the production of the self-
evident facts that engender the apprehensibility of IR. In addition, as the arkhè of IR’s distribution of 
the sensible anarchy enables the (dis)positions that are produced by the distribution. I have also 
shown that the arkhè of a distribution is central to the creation of that distribution’s Police (ac)count 
and the inevitable miscounting of that Police (ac)count. As such, given that anarchy is the arkhè of IR’s 
distribution of the sensible, it also contracts the miscount which enacts the wrong that enables 
politics.   
Research Question Two: 
My second research question was: What effect does a Rancierian theory of IR have on our 
understanding of International politics? 
This question built on the implications of the first question. While my first research question looked 
specifically at anarchy and the distribution of the sensible in IR the second worked through the 
implications of such an articulation. In answering the first question I necessarily gave an account of IR 
that have implications for how politics could be understood in IR. My second question explicitly raised 
this fact and looked to work through the differing implications of my answering of my first research 
question.  As such I argued that my Rancièrian theory of IR is a useful tool that has beneficial 
implications for our understanding of International Politics.  
I have already answered this question previously within the thesis, but it is worth recapping my answer 
here at my thesis’s conclusion. The effect that a Rancierian theory of IR has on our understanding of 
International Politics is manifold. My reading of politics in IR means that international politics is the 
subjectivation of a part which has no part that has been subject to a wrong. In terms of implications 
this means that politics will inevitable cut across the Police distribution of the sensible in IR and for 
the reasons I have argued anarchy. My theorisation also means that politics for IR must always 
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maintain an attentiveness and openness to occluded potentiate subjectivities. IR’s politics is 
necessarily focused towards understanding and seeking subjectivities that cannot be apprehended by 
IR and look at their subjectivation into IR. This understanding of politics also necessitates that what 
we consider politics to be in IR is not true given the Rancièrian reading.  
Here it is worth thinking briefly about both of these research questions. As I have already echoed these 
both have provided a mechanism by which I can not only think IR and Rancière as in relation but 
actively articulate my own Rancièreian theory of IR to post-positivist IR theory. In thinking about the 
limitations and framing of this thesis the questions have provided the structure by which my research 
project has been guided. As such they have been crucial in setting the intellectual timbre and 
topography through and against which my thought has been directed. This in conjunction with the 
inherent tensions and limitations between my own and Rancière’s thought I just previously reflected 
on have provided the ley-lines through which the power of the contribution can flow. As such my 
capacity to answer and respond to these research questions has given my thesis its own organisation 
but also mechanics for my original contributions.  
Gestures to Future Research: What Comes Next? 
Having worked through my research questions I now look back to reading the thesis as a whole and 
thinking critically about where and what can be taken forwards as a result from it. In doing so I begin 
to think where and how my contribution can go now that I have articulated my Rancièrian theorisation 
of IR to post-positivist IR theory. I have identified two broad strands for future research along which I 
could take forwards and develop the contributions and argument I have forwarded across the thesis. 
The first is a focus back on the limitations and tensions between IR and Rancière. The second is thinking 
about taking forwards my reading of IR theory deeper in and through post-positivist IR along the lines 
of my case study.  
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I start then by looking at the potential for carrying forwards and excavating the limitations and 
tensions that have enabled the coherence of my own thought. As I have set out in the introduction, 
the body of the thesis and revisiting section above these tensions and limitations condition all of the 
work I have carried out here. In terms of going forwards with the project there is more work to be 
done in thinking my own understanding of ontology, Rancière’s understanding of ontology and the 
way in which IR deploys and uses ontology. There is definitely a site here for research dedicated to 
breaking down and working through the history and development of ontology in IR, how Rancière 
relates to this and my own reading of this limitation and tension as constitutive of politics. Obviously 
such a project is beyond the scope of this thesis but it is winked at here and at other occasions. The 
second gossamer that can be developed into a research strand here is thinking about IR’s relationship 
to philosophy given my own and Rancière’s opposition to this as a mode of critique.  
There is also room to work through the two other limitations I have written with and against into 
gossamers of research. The primary project that springs out of this thesis would be thinking the 
relation between thinking and speaking beings and my theorisation as given here. One way in which 
my theorisation could be deployed against the limitations explicated here would be to join other 
academics in thinking an IR that is inherently non-human a way in which we can begin to think of a 
theory of IR that is radically against anthropocentrism. My theorisation given in this thesis can 
potentially begin to trace the first footfalls of thinking a non-human theory of IR that still holds the 
potentiality for politics. This is not wholly separate from the rethinking of ontology given in the first 
section.  
Another way future research can be approached having read through the thesis is in rolling out my 
theorisation and applying it to other cases. While I have given the exemplary case found in chapters 
five and six this is by no means exhaustive or singular as an example. It is a reasonable mechanism, to 
take the work I have done in this thesis and apply it to other potentially political subjects/phenomena 
within IR. This mode of research does rub up against the previous limitations and understandings I 
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have given out across the previous sections and readings of Rancière across the thesis. This is because 
it moves in tension with both my own and Rancière’s scepticism of general theorisation of the 
discipline.  
Here I have begun to trace out the potential future avenues for research that this thesis opens up. I 
have attempted to begin to show not only the questions that I have answered in this thesis, the 
contribution I have provided but also the questions to which my framework can begin to think outside 
of the confinement of its research questions. 
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